4 resultados para Market Entry
em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies
Resumo:
This paper explores the process of creation of the netbook market by Taiwanese firms as an example of a disruptive innovation by latecomer firms. As an analytical framework, I employ the global value chain perspective to capture the dynamics of vertical inter-firm relationships that drive some firms in the chain to change the status quo of the industry. I then divide the process of the emergence of the netbook market into three consecutive stages, i.e. (1) the launch of the first-generation netbook by a Taiwanese firm named ASUSTeK, (2) the response of the two powerful platform leaders of the industry, Intel and Microsoft Intel, to ASUSTeK’s innovation, and (3) the market entry by another powerful Taiwanese firm, Acer, and explain how Taiwanese firms broke the Intel-centric market and tapped into the market-creating innovation opportunities that had been suppressed by the two powerful platform leaders. I also show that the creation of the netbook industry was an evolutionary process in which a series of responses by different industry players led to changes in the status quo of the industry.
Resumo:
For manufacturing firms in developing countries, there are high barriers to entry and to catching up with competitors in their global production networks (GPNs). This paper examines the case of a Mexican auto-parts manufacturer that succeeded in catching up in the automotive GPN. The author proposes that the door to GPNs is open thanks to frequent changes in the boundaries of firms, and also stresses the importance of the necessary conditions that generate opportunities, including institutional settings that facilitate market entry and catching up, and capability building by firms hopeful of entry.
Resumo:
We utilize Thailand's the financial crisis in 1997 as a natural experiment which exogenously shifts labor demand. Convincing evidence from the Thailand Labor Force Survey support the hypothesis that both employment opportunities and wages shrunk for new entrants after the crisis. We find that workers who entered before the crisis experienced job losses and wage losses. But these losses were smaller than those of new entrants after the crisis. We also find that new entrants after the crisis experienced a 10% reduction in the overtime wages compared to new entrants before the crisis.
Resumo:
This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.