国際公共財としての感染症対策

HIV/AIDS、SARS、鳥インフルエンザといった新興感染症、薬剤耐性を持った病原体の出現によって問題が深刻化している結核、マラリア等再興感染症への関心が世界で高まっている。感染症の予防や治療はそれを個人に施すことのプラスの効果が国境を超えてスピル・オーバーすることが多く、国際公共財としての性質を持っている。また、新薬・ワクチンの成分・製法に関する情報および、感染症の流行に関する情報は典型的な公共財であり、誰しもがフリー・ライドするインセンティブを持っている。したがって、これら公共財の過少供給の問題を解決するためには国際的な協調行動が必要である。 　世界の感染症対策は、感染がより大規模に広まっている発展途上国を中心としたものにならざるを得ない。現在これをリードしているのはアメリカであり、日本はWHOへの出資については存在感を示しているものの、それ以外の機関への出資や二国間協力の面において、少なくとも今現在においては貢献度が大きいと見られていない。また、新薬・ワクチン開発については日本の財政的な面での貢献は全く目立たない。 　国際的な感染症対策に関する日本の印象を高めるためには、沖縄感染症イニシアティブの際になされたような形で金銭的貢献度を再び高める、あるいは、国際的に必要と考えられているものの他国が協力を決めていない分野への貢献をいち早く宣言する、等の対応が考えられる。

The determinants of rural electrification in Bihar, India

This paper explores intra-state disparity in access to electricity and examines the determinants of electrification at the village level in Bihar, one of the underdeveloped states in India. Our field survey of 80 villages in 5 districts conducted in 2008-09 found that 48 villages (60%) are electrified when using the definition of electrification that a village is electrified if any one household in the village is connected to electricity. The degrees of “electrification” in terms of the proportion of household connection and available hours of electricity remain by and large low, and at the same time differ across districts, villages and seasons. In the processes of electrification, approximately 40% of villages have been electrified in recent years. Based on the basic findings of the survey, this paper examines the electrification processes and how it has changed in recent years. The econometric analyses demonstrate that location is the most important determinant of a village’s electricity connection. Another important finding is that with the rapid progress of rural electrificationunder the recent government programme and the tendency to connect the villages which are easily accessible, the collective bargaining power of the village, which used to significantly affect the process of electrification, has lost influence. This adversely affects remote villages. In order to extend electricity supplies to remote and geographically disadvantaged villages, the government needs to consider seriously other options for sustainable electricity supply, such as decentralized distribution of electricity rather than the conventional connection through the national/local grids.

Progress and issues in rural electrification in Bihar, India : a preliminary analysis

Rural electrification has been an important part of government policy since India gained independence. However, despite the number of electrified villages expanding rapidly in recent years, there are many that still remain un-electrified. This paper addresses the issue of intra-state disparity in access to electricity and examines the determinants of electrification at the village level using data from a survey conducted in rural Bihar, one of the underdeveloped states in India. An econometric analysis demonstrates that small villages in remote locations tend to be considered a low priority in the process of electrification. Electrification at the village level in the more advanced states is no longer an issue, though the challenge of access to electrification at the household level remains. This paper also discusses issues that emerged from interviewing villagers and visiting rural areas, and shows that the actual progress of rural electrification may not be as advanced as government statistics indicate.

Theory of a Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy

A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy emphasizes the importance ofthe ordering of policy measures. The flow of policy implementation is to establish an industrial zone, to invite an anchor company, and to promote its related companies to invest in the industrial zone. This article delineated "a flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy" by proposing sufficient conditions for forming industrial clusters typical in the manufacturing industry in Asia to enhance regional economic growth. The typical industrial cluster policy was theorized by defining an industrial zone as "quasi-public goods", and it was shown that the policy enhances economic growth under a production function of "increasing returns to scale" of an anchor company. Critical amounts of the production of "scale economies" that are used by the related companies to decide whether or not to invest in clusters were also shown.

Fiscal Decentralization, Chinese Style: Good for Health Outcomes?

This study analyzes the effect of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes in China using a panel data set with nationwide county-level data. We find that counties in more fiscal decentralized provinces have lower infant mortality rates compared to those counties in which the provincial government retains the main spending authority, if certain conditions are met. Spending responsibilities at the local level need to be matched with county government's own fiscal capacity. For those local governments that have only limited revenues, their ability to spend on local public goods such as health care depends crucially upon intergovernmental transfers. The findings of this study thereby support the common assertion that fiscal decentralization can indeed lead to more efficient production of local public goods, but also highlights the necessary conditions to make this happen.

Decentralization in Nation State Building of Indonesia

Introduction：Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly to changes in society under the centralized system. Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). 　　　What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is applicable here. 　　　Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. 　　　This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building. 　　　In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration (dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking that particular service on their own.

Yangtze River Delta's system integration: institutional barriers and countermeasures

This paper addresses the issue of institutional barriers to the Yangtze River Delta integration and the resulting slow development. It analyzes the problems including the coordination of local interests and regional interests, market segmentation during the regional integration, competition for the local government‘s investment on the public goods, labor movement within the delta. The paper argues that to reduce the negative impacts of these barriers and to promote the further integration of the Yangtze Delta region, the central government should strengthen the coordination between local governments, regulate their disorderly competition and reform the official evaluation system.