An empirical analysis of the money demand function in India

This paper empirically analyzes India’s money demand function during the period of 1980 to 2007 using monthly data and the period of 1976 to 2007 using annual data. Cointegration test results indicated that when money supply is represented by M1 and M2, a cointegrating vector is detected among real money balances, interest rates, and output. In contrast, it was found that when money supply is represented by M3, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship in the　money demand function. Moreover, when the money demand function was estimated using　dynamic OLS, the sign onditions of the coefficients of output and interest rates were found to be　consistent with theoretical rationale, and statistical significance was confirmed when money supply was represented by either M1 or M2. Consequently, though India’s central bank presently uses M3 as an indicator of future price movements, it is thought appropriate to focus on M1 or M2, rather than M3, in managing monetary policy.

Financial Policies and Dynamic Game Simulation in Poland and Hungary

Recently, steady economic growth rates have been kept in Poland and Hungary. Money supplies are growing rather rapidly in these economies. In large, exchange rates have trends of depreciation. Then, exports and prices show the steady growth rates. It can be thought that per capita GDPs are in the same level and development stages are similar in these two countries. It is assumed that these two economies have the same export market and export goods are competing in it. If one country has an expansion of monetary policy, price increase and interest rate decrease. Then, exchange rate decrease. Exports and GDP will increase through this phenomenon. At the same time, this expanded monetary policy affects another country through the trade. This mutual relationship between two countries can be expressed by the Nash-equilibrium in the Game theory. In this paper, macro-econometric models of Polish and Hungarian economies are built and the Nash- equilibrium is introduced into them.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.