Transformation of the Financial Sector in Indonesia

Introduction : The source and deployment of finance are central issues in economic development. Since 1966, when the Soeharto Administration was inaugurated, Indonesian economic development has relied on funds in the form of aid from international organizations and foreign countries. After the 1990s, a further abundant inflow of capital sustained a rapid economic development. Foreign funding was the basis of Indonesian economic growth. This paper will describe the mechanism for allocating funds in the Indonesian economy. It will identify the problems this mechanism generated in the Indonesian experience, and it will attempt to explain why there was a collapse of the financial system in the wake of the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. History of the Indonesian Financial system The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It can be said that before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact commonly attributed to economic disruptions like the consecutive runs of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the Soekarno Administration. After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory system of financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, was introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis of the current financial system in Indonesia was built up. 　　　The Indonesian financial structure was significantly altered at the first financial reform of 1983. Between 1966 and 1982, the banking sector consisted of Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) and the state-owned banks. There was also a system for distributing the abundant public revenue derived from the soaring oil price of the 1970s. The public finance distribution function, incorporated in Indonesian financial system, changed after the successive financial reforms of 1983 and 1988, when there was a move away from the monopoly-market style dominated by state-owned banks (which was a system of public finance distribution that operated at the discretion of the government) towards a modern market mechanism. The five phases of development The Indonesian financial system developed in five phases between 1966 and the present time. The first period (1966-72) was its formative period, the second (1973-82) its policy based finance period under soaring oil prices, the third (1983-91) its financial-reform period, the fourth (1992-97) its period of expansion, and the fifth (1998-) its period of financial restructuring. The first section of this paper summarizes the financial policies operative during each of the periods identified above. In the second section changes to the financial sector in response to policies are examined, and an analysis of these changes shows that an important development of the financial sector occurred during the financial reform period. In the third section the focus of analysis shifts from the general financial sector to particular commercial banks’ performances. In the third section changes in commercial banks’ lending and fund-raising behaviour after the 1990s are analysed by comparing several banking groups in terms of their ownership and foundation time. The last section summarizes the foregoing analyses and examines the problems that remain in the Indonesian financial sector, which is still undergoing restructuring.

Financial Policies and Dynamic Game Simulation in Poland and Hungary

Recently, steady economic growth rates have been kept in Poland and Hungary. Money supplies are growing rather rapidly in these economies. In large, exchange rates have trends of depreciation. Then, exports and prices show the steady growth rates. It can be thought that per capita GDPs are in the same level and development stages are similar in these two countries. It is assumed that these two economies have the same export market and export goods are competing in it. If one country has an expansion of monetary policy, price increase and interest rate decrease. Then, exchange rate decrease. Exports and GDP will increase through this phenomenon. At the same time, this expanded monetary policy affects another country through the trade. This mutual relationship between two countries can be expressed by the Nash-equilibrium in the Game theory. In this paper, macro-econometric models of Polish and Hungarian economies are built and the Nash- equilibrium is introduced into them.

Real exchange rate appreciation, resource boom, and policy reform in Myanmar

In the five-year period from 2006 to 2011, the real exchange rate of the Myanmar kyat appreciated 200 percent, signifying that the value of the US dollar in Myanmar diminished to one third of its previous level. While the resource boom is suspected as a source of the real exchange rate appreciation, its aggravation is related to administrative controls on foreign exchange and imports. First, foreign exchange controls prevented replacement of the negotiated transactions of foreign exchange with the bank intermediation. This hampered government interventions in the market. Second, import controls repressed imports, aggravating excess supply of foreign exchange. Relaxation of administrative controls is necessary for moderating currency appreciation.

Central bank intervention and exchange rate behaviour : empirical evidence for India

This paper examines the causal relationship between central bank intervention and exchange returns in India. Using monthly data from December 1997 to December 2011, the empirical results derived from the CCF approach of Cheung and Ng (1996) suggest that there is causality-in-variance from exchange rate returns to central bank intervention, but not vice versa. These findings are robust in the sense that they hold in cases where the returns were measured from either the spot rate or the forward rate. Therefore, the results of this paper suggest that the Indian central bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market to respond to exchange rate volatility, although the volatility has not been influenced by central bank intervention in the form of net purchases of foreign currency in the market.

Deposit dollarization in Myanmar

Myanmar has peculiar conditions of deposit dollarization that were shaped by administrative controls. On the one hand, restrictive controls encouraged the accumulation of foreign currency deposits (FCD). On the other hand, foreign currency loans (FCL) were not practiced officially; therefore, FCD was not utilized for credit. Given the adverse effects and persistence of dollarization in other dollarized economies and the recent recovery of local currency deposits in Myanmar, this paper opts for the prohibition of FCL and offers policy measures for de-dollarization.

Transition from black to official markets for foreign exchange in Myanmar

We address the puzzle why the black market for foreign exchange thrives in Myanmar despite the successful unification of multiple exchange rates. A closer look at the black market reveals that its enduring competitiveness stems from its lower transaction costs. A question arising from this observation is how the official market, namely banks, can compete with and replace the black market. Our empirical analysis based on an original questionnaire survey of private export firms regarding their choices of currency trading modes suggests that banks can attract exporters by exploiting the economies of scope between currency trading and lending.