Exchange Market Pressure on the Pound-Dollar Exchange Rate: 1925-1931

An investigation of exchange market pressure against the pound sterling during the inter-war period. The main findings are that a) the behavior of UK fundamentals relative to those of the USA help to explain exchange market pressure against the pound; b) during the run up to devaluation in September 1931 the monetary authorities in the UK were acting to reduce domestic credit; but that c) additional pressure was brought against the pound from speculative sources. These findings relate to current thinking on the choice of exchange rate regime as even well behaved fundamentals may not be sufficient to sustain a currency on its peg.

Efficient Unit Root Tests of real Exchange Rates in the Post-Bretton Woods Era

We apply the efficient unit-roots tests of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996), and Elliott (1998) to twenty-one real exchange rates using monthly data of the G-7 countries from the post-Bretton Woods floating exchange rate period. Our results indicate that, for eighteen out of the twenty-one real exchange rates, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 10% significance level or better using the Elliot et al (1996) DF-GLS test. The unit-root null hypothesis is also rejected for one additional real exchange rate when we allow for one endogenously determined break in the time series of the real exchange rate as in Perron (1997). In all, we find favorable evidence to support long-run purchasing power parity in nineteen out of twenty-one real exchange rates. Second, we find no strong evidence to suggest that the use of non-U.S. dollar-based real exchange rates tend to produce more favorable result for long-run PPP than the use of U.S. dollar-based real exchange rates as Lothian (1998) has concluded.

Non-Parametric Tests of Real Exchange rates in the Post-Bretton Woods Era

This paper examines the mean-reverting property of real exchange rates. Earlier studies have generally not been able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit-root in real exchange rates, especially for the post-Bretton Woods floating period. The results imply that long-run purchasing power parity does not hold. More recent studies, especially those using panel unit-root tests, have found more favorable results, however. But, Karlsson and Löthgren (2000) and others have recently pointed out several potential pitfalls of panel unit-root tests. Thus, the panel unit-root test results are suggestive, but they are far from conclusive. Moreover, consistent individual country time series evidence that supports long-run purchasing power parity continues to be scarce. In this paper, we test for long memory using Lo's (1991) modified rescaled range test, and the rescaled variance test of Giraitis, Kokoszka, Leipus, and Teyssière (2003). Our testing procedure provides a non-parametric alternative to the parametric tests commonly used in this literature. Our data set consists of monthly observations from April 1973 to April 2001 of the G-7 countries in the OECD. Our two tests find conflicting results when we use U.S. dollar real exchange rates. However, when non-U.S. dollar real exchange rates are used, we find only two cases out of fifteen where the null hypothesis of an unit-root with short-term dependence can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of long-term dependence using the modified rescaled range test, and only one case when using the rescaled variance test. Our results therefore provide a contrast to the recent favorable panel unit-root test results.

The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland

In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spending is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal balance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms - as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.

Three-agent Peer Evaluation

I show that every rule for dividing a dollar among three agents impartially (so that each agent's share depends only on her evaluation by her associates) underpays some agent by at least one-third of a dollar for some consistent profile of evaluations. I then produce an impartial division rule that never underpays or overpays any agent by more than one-third of a dollar, and for most consistent evaluation profiles does much better.

International Money and Finance

We discuss the effectiveness of pegged exchange rate regimes from an historical perspective, drawing conclusions for their effectiveness today. Starting with the classical gold standard period, we point out that a succession of pegged regimes have ended in failure; except for the first, which was ended by the outbreak of World War I, all of the others we discuss have been ended by adverse economic developments for which the regimes themselves were partly responsible. Prior to World War II the main problem was a shortage of monetary gold that we argue is implicated as a cause of the Great Depression. After World War II, more particularly from the late-1960s, the main problem has been a surfeit of the main international reserve asset, the US dollar. This has led to generalized inflation in the 1970s and into the 1980s. Today, excessive dollar international base money creation is again a problem that could have serious consequences for world economic stability.