Three-agent Peer Evaluation
Data(s) |
01/08/2008
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Resumo |
I show that every rule for dividing a dollar among three agents impartially (so that each agent's share depends only on her evaluation by her associates) underpays some agent by at least one-third of a dollar for some consistent profile of evaluations. I then produce an impartial division rule that never underpays or overpays any agent by more than one-third of a dollar, and for most consistent evaluation profiles does much better. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200828 http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=econ_wpapers |
Publicador |
DigitalCommons@UConn |
Fonte |
Economics Working Papers |
Palavras-Chave | #division function #impartial #consensual #Economics |
Tipo |
text |