Effects of Study Area Size on Geographic Characterizations of Health Events: Prostate Cancer Incidence in Southern New England, USA, 1994-1998.

ABSTRACT : BACKGROUND : We consider how representations of geographic variation in prostate cancer incidence across Southern New England, USA may be affected by selection of study area and/or properties of the statistical analysis. METHOD : A spatial scan statistic was used to monitor geographic variation among 35,167 incident prostate cancer cases diagnosed in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island from 1994 to 1998, in relation to the 1990 populations of men 20+ years of age living in that region. Results from the combined-states analysis were compared to those from single-states. Impact of scanning procedures set to examine up to 50% or no more than10% of at-risk populations also was evaluated. RESULTS : With scanning set to 50%, 5 locations in the combined-states analysis were identified with markedly distinct incidence rates. Fewer than expected cases were estimated for nearly all Connecticut, Rhode Island and West Central Massachusetts, whereas census tracts on and around Cape Cod, and areas of Southwestern Connecticut and adjacent to greater Boston were estimated to have yielded more than expected incidence. Results of single-state analyses exhibited several discrepancies from the combined-states analysis. More conservative scanning found many more locations with varying incidence, but discrepancies between the combined- and single-state analysis were fewer. CONCLUSION : It is important to acknowledge the conditional nature of spatial analyses and carefully consider whether a true cluster of events is identified or artifact stemming from selection of study area size and/or scanning properties.

Varying Injurer Costs of Care, Negligence, and Self-Selection

Standard economic models of negligence set a single standard of care to which all injurers must conform. When injurers differ in their costs of care, this leads to distortions in individual care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a negligence rule that induces optimal care by all injurers by means of self-selection. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard is set at the optimal care of the lowest cost injurer, and (2) liability increases gradually rather than abruptly as care falls below this standard. The results are consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.

On Negligence Rules and Self-Selection

Economic models of negligence ordinarily involve a single standard of care that all injurers must meet to avoid liability. When injurers differ in their costs of care, however, this leads to distortions in their care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a generalized negligence rule that induces injurers to self-select their optimal care levels. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard of care is maximal, and (2) liability increases gradually as injurers depart further from this standard. The results are broadly consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.