The Increasing Importance of Administrative Practices in the Shaping of the Welfare State

Dans cet article, nous analysons les changements de l' Etat-providence suédois a l' exemple des services municipaux de soins pour personnes agées. On montre qu'il est possible de tracer des processus de transformation à trois niveaux. Analysées comme phénomènes complèmentaires cela montre à quelle envergure les pratiques administratives sont devenues le lieu primordial de la mise en forme de l' Etat-providence. L'incorporation du managérialisme, comme mode prévalent de gouvernance et d'organisation de services et des politiques sociales mène a la conclusion qu'on devient temoin d'une transformation d' un regime (d Etat-providence) moral et politique à un regime administratif. Dans le dernier paragraphe, nous argumentons que cette transformation affaiblit la citoyenneté sociale et transfère les valeurs et principes de la politique sociale a la sphère administrative. Nous argumentons dès lors que cette perspective analytique a des implications plus larges pour la charactérization des “Welfare regimes” et pour l'analyse des différences transnationales.

Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.