Legal Implications of the Use of Export Taxes in Addressing Carbon Leakage: Competing Border Adjustment Measures

The prevailing uncertainties about the future of the post-Kyoto international legal framework for climate mitigation and adaptation increase the likelihood of unilateral trade interventions that aim to address climate policy concerns, as exemplified by the controversial European Union initiative to include the aviation industry in its emissions trading system. The emerging literature suggests that border carbon adjustment (BCA) measures imposed by importing countries would lead to substantial legal complications in relation to World Trade Organization law and hence to possible trade disputes. Lack of legal clarity on BCAs is exacerbated by potential counter or pre-emptive export restrictions that exporting countries might impose on carbon-intensive products. In this context, this paper investigates the interface between legal and welfare implications of competing unilateral BCA measures. It argues that carbon export taxes will be an inevitable part of the future climate change regime in the absence of a multilateral agreement. It also describes the channels through which competing BCAs may lead to trade conflicts and political complications as a result of their distributional and welfare impacts at the domestic and global levels.

Border tax adjustments: Can energy and carbon taxes be adjusted at the border?

Will die Schweiz mit unilateralen energie- und klimapolitischen Massnahmen ambitionierte Ziele verfolgen, dann erfahren energieintensive Sektoren Nachteile im internationalen Wett- bewerb. Produktionsverlagerungen und „carbon leakage“ sind die Folgen, was nicht im Sinne der Schweizer Wirtschaft und der globalen Klimaziele ist. Mit Grenzausgleichsmassnahmen (BAM) kann die Schweiz ihre energieintensiven Betriebe nicht vor internationalen Wettbe- werbsnachteilen schützen. Weiter kommt hinzu, dass die Einführung von BAM aus rechtli- cher Sicht „riskant“ ist und bei einem Schweizer Alleingang mit hohen Vollzugshürden ge- rechnet werden muss. Für die Schweiz macht eine Einführung von BAM nur im Rahmen ei- ner grösseren Klimakoalition Sinn (bspw. zusammen mit der EU). Alternativen zu BAM sind die einfacher und autonom umsetzbaren Ausnahmeregelungen für energieintensive Betriebe oder Output-based-allocation-Systeme.

Scarring Effects of Early Unemployment among Young Workers with Vocational Credentials in Switzerland

Background Using a unique, longitudinal survey that follows school-to-work transitions of pupils who participated in PISA 2000, this paper investigates adverse consequences, so-called scarring effects, of early unemployment among young adults who acquired vocational credentials in Switzerland. Methods As social, individual and contextual factors influence both early unemployment and later employment outcomes, taking into account endogeneity is of utmost importance when investigating scarring effects. In this regard we make use of nearest-neighbour propensity score matching and set up statistical control groups. Results Our results suggest that young adults who hold vocational credentials are more likely to be neither in employment nor in education, and to earn less and be more dissatisfied with their career progress later in work life than they would be, had they not experienced early unemployment. Conclusions We conclude that unemployment scarring also affects young adults with vocational credentials in a liberal labour market setting that otherwise allows for smooth school-to-work transitions. This finding runs counter to expectations that standardised vocational degrees, a liberal and flexible labour market structure, and predominantly short unemployment spells protect young skilled workers from scarring in case they happen to experience early career instability.

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.