Identity, incentives and the value of information

We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

Dynamic Activity-Related Incentives for Physical Activity.

The present studies adopted the theoretical framework of activity- and purpose-related incentives (Rheinberg, 2008) to explain the maintenance of physical activity. We hypothesized that activity-related incentives (e.g., “fun”) increase more than purpose-related incentives (e.g., “health”) between the initiation and maintenance phase of physical activity. Additionally, change in activity-related incentives was hypothesized to be a better predictor of maintenance of physical activity than change in purpose-related incentives. Two correlative field studies with rehabilitation patients (Study 1) and Nordic Walkers (Study 2) were conducted to test the hypotheses. Participants’ incentives of physical activity were measured at the beginning of exercising and two weeks (Study 1; T2) and three months (Study 2; T2) later. At T2, participants were asked for their current physical activity. Both studies showed a greater change of activity-related incentives than purpose-related incentives. Furthermore, change in activity-related incentives was more predictive of the maintenance of physical activity than change in purpose-related incentives. The results showed the important role of activity-related incentives in maintenance of physical activity. The theoretical contribution to physical activity maintenance research and practical implications for health promotion programs were discussed.

Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Disciplining Investment Incentives: A Lost Cause?

An E15 Initiative think piece: Investment incentives rank among the most important policy instruments governments employ to influence the locational decisions of multinational firms. In the wake of the recent increase in locational competition and the growing impact of investment incentives and support measures for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the need for enhanced disciplines on investment incentives has gained political and academic salience. This think piece explores the evolution of investment incentives from a development and rule-making perspective. It summarises the existing literature and examines current practices and recent trends in FDI flows and the use of various investment incentives. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons for the observed stalemate in attempts at disciplinary rule-making. The paper concludes by putting forth recommendations for data gathering and transparency that could further the move toward improved global governance founded on the increasing complementarities of trade, investment, and competition law and policy as the core pillars of a more open, inclusive, and just world economy.