Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Clinical outcome and predictors for adverse events after transcatheter aortic valve implantation with the use of different devices and access routes

Background Transcatheter aortic valve implantation (TAVI) is a treatment option for high-risk patients with severe aortic stenosis. Previous reports focused on a single device or access site, whereas little is known of the combined use of different devices and access sites as selected by the heart team. The purpose of this study is to investigate clinical outcomes of TAVI using different devices and access sites. Methods A consecutive cohort of 200 patients underwent TAVI with the Medtronic CoreValve Revalving system (Medtronic Core Valve LLC, Irvine, CA; n = 130) or the Edwards SAPIEN valve (Edwards Lifesciences LLC, Irvine, CA; n = 70) implanted by either the transfemoral or transapical access route. Results Device success and procedure success were 99% and 95%, respectively, without differences between devices and access site. All-cause mortality was 7.5% at 30 days, with no differences between valve types or access sites. Using multivariable analysis, low body mass index (<20 kg/m2) (odds ratio [OR] 6.6, 95% CI 1.5-29.5) and previous stroke (OR 4.4, 95% CI 1.2-16.8) were independent risk factors for short-term mortality. The VARC-defined combined safety end point occurred in 18% of patients and was driven by major access site complications (8.0%), life-threatening bleeding (8.5%) or severe renal failure (4.5%). Transapical access emerged as independent predictor of adverse outcome for the Valve Academic Research Consortium–combined safety end point (OR 3.3, 95% CI 1.5-7.1). Conclusion A heart team–based selection of devices and access site among patients undergoing TAVI resulted in high device and procedural success. Low body mass index and history of previous stroke were independent predictors of mortality. Transapical access emerged as a risk factor for the Valve Academic Research Consortium–combined safety end point.

Endovascular Treatment of Acute Stroke: Evolution and Selection of Techniques and Instruments Based on Thrombus Imaging.

Mechanical thrombectomy provides higher recanalization rates than intravenous or intra-arterial thrombolysis. Finally this has been shown to translate into improved clinical outcome in six multicentric randomized controlled trials. However, within cohorts the clinical outcomes may vary, depending on the endovascular techniques applied. Systems aiming mainly for thrombus fragmentation and lacking a protection against distal embolization have shown disappointing results when compared to recent stent-retriever studies or even to historical data on local arterial fibrinolysis. Procedure-related embolic events are usually graded as adverse events in interventional neuroradiology. In stroke, however, the clinical consequences of secondary emboli have so far mostly been neglected and attributed to progression of the stroke itself. We summarize the evolution of instruments and techniques for endovascular, image-guided, microneurosurgical recanalization in acute stroke, and discuss how to avoid procedure-related embolic complications.