9 resultados para Shareholder

em BORIS: Bern Open Repository and Information System - Berna - Suiça


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This paper examines whether Swiss firms maximize shareholder value. To find out, we survey the goals of 313 listed and unlisted firms. We then examine whether managers’ decisions are consistent with their goals and analyze whether performance corresponds to intentions. Our results show that most managers pursue conflicting targets. Many also declare that they do not maximize shareholder value. And those who claim they do sometimes rely on investment criteria that are inconsistent with that target. Finally, we find that share-price performance is marginally better when managers claim to maximize shareholder value, particularly when stock prices have fallen.

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The staid Union Bank of Switzerland, in a very close vote, won the support of its shareholders in its battle against an attempt by dissidents to guide the way the nation's biggest bank is run. The special shareholder vote, held in a packed Zurich sports hall, was one of the most keenly awaited events in recent Swiss financial histroy. The Wall Street Journal, November 23, 1994

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Among the possible consequences of agency problems between owners and managers is a tendency by managers to make investment decisions for their firms that are deliberately aimed at reducing firm risk, as a means to control managers' personal wealth risk. The literature has suggested that such behavior may occur to the detriment of shareholder wealth, and that mrgers may be a particular class of investment decisions for which the behavior would be observable. We test these hypotheses empirically, but find no evidence from our merger sample that risk reduction for the aqquiring firm is the typical outcome nor that, when it occurs, it is differentially costly for shareholders.

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If workers are wealth maximizers, codetermination should lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced firm leverage, higher and more stable salaries, and more capital-intensive production processes. Unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising wokers' morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm, shareholder wealth and firm value will decline. An analysis of West Germany's case, however, indicates that codetermination has little, if any, effect on corporate operations and performance.

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Unter dem Stichwort Say on Pay (SoP) haben in den letzen Jahren die meisten Länder der EU und die USA den Aktionären Abstimmungsrechte im Zusammenhang mit der Vergütung des Top-Managements eingeräumt. Zwischen den einzelnen Ländern bestehen jedoch erhebliche Unterschiede hinsichtlich der konkreten Ausgestaltung des SoP. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Wirkungen unterschiedlicher Gestaltungsoptionen des SoP auf die Anreizgestaltung und den Nutzen des Managements und der Aktionäre im Rahmen eines einfachen linearen Agency Modells. Dabei erweisen sich das vorvertragliche bindende SoP und das bedingt verpflichtende, nachvertragliche bindende SoP gegenüber den anderen untersuchten Varianten als überlegen. Während das konsultative SoP an seiner mangelnden Durchsetzbarkeit leidet, bietet das nachvertragliche bindende SoP Anreize für opportunistisches Verhalten auf Seiten der Aktionäre und führt deshalb zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten. In Ergänzung der Modellanalyse wird ein Überblick über die wichtigsten empirischen und experimentellen Studien zum Thema SoP gegeben und deren Inhalt im Lichte der Modellergebnisse diskutiert. Most countries of the European Union as well as the US recently introduced shareholder votes on the remuneration of executives, also referred to as “Say on Pay” (SoP). Interestingly, legislators in different jurisdictions opted for quite dissimilar voting right regimes. We provide an overview of the main regulatory approaches and discuss the potential impact of variations in SoP design on the structure of compensation contracts and the utility of shareholders and executives. We find that pre-contractual SoP and conditional post-contractual SoP with binding consequences are in the best interest of shareholders. By contrast, advisory SoP typically suffers from lacking enforceability. We also find that post-contractual SoP with binding consequences results in efficiency losses because it fuels moral hazard on the part of shareholders. We complement the theoretical analysis with a discussion of recent empirical and experimental studies on Say on Pay.