Executive compensation and the performance of the firm

A sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest-paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

The Taxation of Bonuses and its Effect on Executive Compensation - Evidence from the UK Experience

This paper explores the reaction of compensation components awarded to executive directors of UK financial institutions following the adoption of the bonus tax in December 2009. Excessive bonuses are blamed for encouraging risk taking and are regarded as one of the pull factors of the financial crisis. The British government attempted to reduce bonuses and accordingly corporate risk-taking by means of a special tax on cashbased bonuses. Using a comprehensive dataset on executive compensation we show that the introduction of the bonus tax decreased the net cash bonuses awarded to directors by about 43%, accompanied however by a simultaneous increase in other compensation components leaving both variable as well as total compensation unaffected. Hence, the incidence of the bonus tax was borne by the firms which compensated their managers for the decrease in cash-based compensation by awarding them different forms of pay. Consistent with this finding our data also suggests that firms reduced dividend pay-outs as a consequence of the bonus tax.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Determination of Pelvic Orientation from Ultrasound Images Using Patch-SSMs and a Hierarchical Speed of Sound Compensation Strategy

In the field of computer assisted orthopedic surgery (CAOS) the anterior pelvic plane (APP) is a common concept to determine the pelvic orientation by digitizing distinct pelvic landmarks. As percutaneous palpation is - especially for obese patients - known to be error-prone, B-mode ultrasound (US) imaging could provide an alternative means. Several concepts of using ultrasound imaging to determine the APP landmarks have been introduced. In this paper we present a novel technique, which uses local patch statistical shape models (SSMs) and a hierarchical speed of sound compensation strategy for an accurate determination of the APP. These patches are independently matched and instantiated with respect to associated point clouds derived from the acquired ultrasound images. Potential inaccuracies due to the assumption of a constant speed of sound are compensated by an extended reconstruction scheme. We validated our method with in-vitro studies using a plastic bone covered with a soft-tissue simulation phantom and with a preliminary cadaver trial.

Canadian Cardiovascular Society 2009 Consensus Conference on the management of adults with congenital heart disease: executive summary

With advances in pediatric cardiology and cardiac surgery, the population of adults with congenital heart disease (CHD) has increased. In the current era, there are more adults with CHD than children. This population has many unique issues and needs. They have distinctive forms of heart failure, and their cardiac disease can be associated with pulmonary hypertension, thromboemboli, complex arrhythmias and sudden death.Medical aspects that need to be considered relate to the long-term and multisystemic effects of single-ventricle physiology, cyanosis, systemic right ventricles, complex intracardiac baffles and failing subpulmonary right ventricles. Since the 2001 Canadian Cardiovascular Society Consensus Conference report on the management of adults with CHD, there have been significant advances in the understanding of the late outcomes, genetics, medical therapy and interventional approaches in the field of adult CHD. Therefore, new clinical guidelines have been written by Canadian adult CHD physicians in collaboration with an international panel of experts in the field. The present executive summary is a brief overview of the new guidelines and includes the recommendations for interventions. The complete document consists of four manuscripts that are published online in the present issue of The Canadian Journal of Cardiology, including sections on genetics, clinical outcomes, recommended diagnostic workup, surgical and interventional options, treatment of arrhythmias, assessment of pregnancy and contraception risks, and follow-up requirements. The complete document and references can also be found at www.ccs.ca or www.cachnet.org.

Can imagined whole-body rotations improve vestibular compensation?

Unilateral damage to the labyrinth and the vestibular nerve cause rotational vertigo, postural imbalance, oculomotor disorders and spatial disorientation. Electrophysiological investigations in animals revealed that such deficits are partly due to imbalanced spontaneous activity and sensitivity to motion in neurons located in the ipsilesional and contralesional vestibular nuclei. Neurophysiological reorganizations taking place in the vestibular nuclei are the basis of the decline of the symptoms over time, a phenomenon known as vestibular compensation. Vestibular compensation is facilitated by motor activity and sensory experience, and current rehabilitation programs favor physical activity during the acute stage of a unilateral vestibular loss. Unfortunately, vestibular-defective patients tend to develop strategies in order to avoid movements causing imbalance and nausea (in particular body movements towards the lesioned side), which impedes vestibular compensation. Neuroanatomical evidence suggests a cortical control of postural and oculomotor reflexes based on corticofugal projections to the vestibular nuclei and, therefore, the possibility to manipulate vestibular functions through top-down mechanisms. Based on evidence from neuroimaging studies showing that imagined whole-body movements can activate part of the vestibular cortex, we propose that mental imagery of whole-body rotations to the lesioned and to the healthy side will help rebalancing the activity in the ipsilesional and contralesional vestibular nuclei. Whether imagined whole-body rotations can improve vestibular compensation could be tested in a randomized controlled study in such patients beneficiating, or not, from a mental imagery training. If validated, this hypothesis will help developing a method contributing to reduce postural instability and falls in vestibular-defective patients. Imagined whole-body rotations thus could provide a simple, safe, home-based and self-administered therapeutic method with the potential to overcome the inconvenience related to physical movements.