22 resultados para Epistemology and Dialectic

em BORIS: Bern Open Repository and Information System - Berna - Suiça


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In this paper we continue Feferman’s unfolding program initiated in (Feferman, vol. 6 of Lecture Notes in Logic, 1996) which uses the concept of the unfolding U(S) of a schematic system S in order to describe those operations, predicates and principles concerning them, which are implicit in the acceptance of S. The program has been carried through for a schematic system of non-finitist arithmetic NFA in Feferman and Strahm (Ann Pure Appl Log, 104(1–3):75–96, 2000) and for a system FA (with and without Bar rule) in Feferman and Strahm (Rev Symb Log, 3(4):665–689, 2010). The present contribution elucidates the concept of unfolding for a basic schematic system FEA of feasible arithmetic. Apart from the operational unfolding U0(FEA) of FEA, we study two full unfolding notions, namely the predicate unfolding U(FEA) and a more general truth unfolding UT(FEA) of FEA, the latter making use of a truth predicate added to the language of the operational unfolding. The main results obtained are that the provably convergent functions on binary words for all three unfolding systems are precisely those being computable in polynomial time. The upper bound computations make essential use of a specific theory of truth TPT over combinatory logic, which has recently been introduced in Eberhard and Strahm (Bull Symb Log, 18(3):474–475, 2012) and Eberhard (A feasible theory of truth over combinatory logic, 2014) and whose involved proof-theoretic analysis is due to Eberhard (A feasible theory of truth over combinatory logic, 2014). The results of this paper were first announced in (Eberhard and Strahm, Bull Symb Log 18(3):474–475, 2012).

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Monte Carlo simulations arrive at their results by introducing randomness, sometimes derived from a physical randomizing device. Nonetheless, we argue, they open no new epistemic channels beyond that already employed by traditional simulations: the inference by ordinary argumentation of conclusions from assumptions built into the simulations. We show that Monte Carlo simulations cannot produce knowledge other than by inference, and that they resemble other computer simulations in the manner in which they derive their conclusions. Simple examples of Monte Carlo simulations are analysed to identify the underlying inferences.

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Statistical physicists assume a probability distribution over micro-states to explain thermodynamic behavior. The question of this paper is whether these probabilities are part of a best system and can thus be interpreted as Humean chances. I consider two strategies, viz. a globalist as suggested by Loewer, and a localist as advocated by Frigg and Hoefer. Both strategies fail because the system they are part of have rivals that are roughly equally good, while ontic probabilities should be part of a clearly winning system. I conclude with the diagnosis that well-defined micro-probabilities under-estimate the robust character of explanations in statistical physics.

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The talk starts out with a short introduction to the philosophy of probability. I highlight the need to interpret probabilities in the sciences and motivate objectivist accounts of probabilities. Very roughly, according to such accounts, ascriptions of probabilities have truth-conditions that are independent of personal interests and needs. But objectivist accounts are pointless if they do not provide an objectivist epistemology, i.e., if they do not determine well-defined methods to support or falsify claims about probabilities. In the rest of the talk I examine recent philosophical proposals for an objectivist methodology. Most of them take up ideas well-known from statistics. I nevertheless find some proposals incompatible with objectivist aspirations.

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Since the end of the Cold War, political new beginnings have increasingly been linked to questions of transitional justice. The contributions to this collection examine a series of cases from across the African continent where peaceful ‘new beginnings’ have been declared after periods of violence and where transitional justice institutions played a role in defining justice and the new socio-political order. Three issues seem to be crucial to the understanding of transitional justice in the context of wider social debates on justice and political change: the problem of ‘new beginnings’, of finding a foundation for that which explicitly breaks with the past; the discrepancies between lofty promises and the messy realities of transitional justice in action; and the dialectic between logics of the exception and the ordinary, employed to legitimize or resist transitional justice mechanisms. These are the particular focus of this Introduction.

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N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we are likely to live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the computer hardware does provide a material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the simulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hardware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather than, say, galaxies.