[A million football fans in a city of 120,000 inhabitants--a nightmare for emergency medicine and disaster management? Euro 2008 and the "Orange wonder of Berne"]

The 2008 European Football Championship 2008 (Euro 08) is the largest sporting event ever organized in Switzerland. One million visitors came to the city of Berne during the event and the local airport in Bern/Belp registered 261 extra flights. For each football game there were 33,000 fans in the stadium and 100,000 fans in the public viewing zones.The ambulance corps and the Department of Emergency Medicine (ED) at Inselspital, University Hospital Berne, were responsible for basic medical care and emergency medical management. Injuries and illnesses were analyzed by a standardized score (NACA score). The preparation strategy as well as costs and patient numbers are presented in detail.A total of 30 additional ambulance vehicles were used, 4,723 additional working days (one-third medical professionals) were accumulated, 662 ambulance calls were registered and 240 persons needed medical care (62% Swiss, 28% Dutch and 10% other nationalities). Among those needing treatment 51 were treated in 1 of the 4 city hospitals. No injuries with NACA grades VI and VII occurred (NACA I: 4, NACA II: 17, NACA III: 16, NACA IV: 10 and NACA V: 4 patients). The city of Berne compensated the Inselspital Bern with a total of 112,603 Euros for extra medical care costs. The largest amount was spent on security measures (50,300 Euros) and medical staff (medical doctors 22,600 Euros, nurses 29,000 Euros). Because of the poor weather and the exemplary behavior of the fans, the course of events was rather peaceful.

Re-Conceptualizing the Global Digital Divide

The article seeks a re-conceptualization of the global digital divide debate. It critically explores the predominant notion, its evolution and measurement, as well as the policies that have been advanced to bridge the digital divide. Acknowledging the complexity of this inequality, the article aims at analyzing the disparities beyond the connectivity and skills barriers. Without understating the first two digital divides, it is argued that as the Internet becomes more sophisticated and more integrated into economic, social, and cultural processes, a “third” generation of divides becomes critical. These divides are drawn not at the entry to the net but within the net itself, and limit access to content. The increasing barriers to content, though of a diverse nature, all relate to some governance characteristics inherent in cyberspace, such as global spillover of local decisions, regulation through code, and proliferation of self- and co-regulatory models. It is maintained that as the practice of intervention intensifies in cyberspace, multiple and far-reaching points of control outside formal legal institutions are created, threatening the availability of public goods and making the pursuit of public objectives difficult. This is an aspect that is rarely addressed in the global digital divide discussions, even in comprehensive analyses and political initiatives such as the World Summit on the Information Society. Yet, the conceptualization of the digital divide as impeded access to content may be key in terms of ensuring real participation and catering for the long-term implications of digital technologies.

The WTO and Food Security: What’s Wrong with the Rules?

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is the predominant multilateral legal framework governing agricultural trade. The objective of the AoA is to liberalise trade in agriculture through reductions in tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies. The AoA has not, however, ‘levelled the playing field’ and has not resulted in the equitable distribution of food, particularly for the poorer developing countries. On the other hand, support for small farmers does not ensure food security for the poor. While food security has no simple solutions such as “free trade is good for you”, reform proposals for trade rules which only address agricultural policy instruments fail to account for consumer and other interests: neither tariff reductions and subsidy disciplines, nor safeguards and other measures of producer protection can automatically increase food security. Rather, what is needed is the full and proper implementation of a number of commitments which the international community has already entered into in various human rights treaties, but which even the envisaged results of the now failed Doha Round negotiations could not ensure without revisiting relevant multilateral trade and investment rules.

The story of Community preference for food security

"Préférence communautaire" is an in-built notion of the CAP since its inception with the Treaty of Rome (1957). Its’ simple objective laid down at the Stresa Conference in 1958 is to prefer community produce over imports wherever possible, while at the same time promoting agricultural exports and FDI (“vocation exportatrice de l’Europe”). Does this contrast or correlate with the notion of “food sovereignty” which originated in 1996 as a notion of small farmer self-sufficiency (Via Campesina), and which now has found its way into the official EC discourse? Recent CAP reforms indeed seem to continue banking on border protection and on the occasional export subsidy. Nonetheless, coming together with claims to mitigate climate change, “food sovereignty” à la CAP fails to acknowledge efficiency losses at home and negative spillover effects on the right to food of food exporting developing countries. This chapter asks whether new non-tariff and domestic support measures are just new wine in the old cask of fortress Europe, together with the FDI promotion instruments of the FED and others. Might the increasing dynamics and new challenges of agricultural trade and investment lead to lower market and production shares for European farms? It concludes that in the medium term the WTO Green Box has the only legal and effective tools to promote EU agriculture and food.

Electronic medical record systems, data quality and loss to follow-up: survey of antiretroviral therapy programmes in resource-limited settings

OBJECTIVE: To describe the electronic medical databases used in antiretroviral therapy (ART) programmes in lower-income countries and assess the measures such programmes employ to maintain and improve data quality and reduce the loss of patients to follow-up. METHODS: In 15 countries of Africa, South America and Asia, a survey was conducted from December 2006 to February 2007 on the use of electronic medical record systems in ART programmes. Patients enrolled in the sites at the time of the survey but not seen during the previous 12 months were considered lost to follow-up. The quality of the data was assessed by computing the percentage of missing key variables (age, sex, clinical stage of HIV infection, CD4+ lymphocyte count and year of ART initiation). Associations between site characteristics (such as number of staff members dedicated to data management), measures to reduce loss to follow-up (such as the presence of staff dedicated to tracing patients) and data quality and loss to follow-up were analysed using multivariate logit models. FINDINGS: Twenty-one sites that together provided ART to 50 060 patients were included (median number of patients per site: 1000; interquartile range, IQR: 72-19 320). Eighteen sites (86%) used an electronic database for medical record-keeping; 15 (83%) such sites relied on software intended for personal or small business use. The median percentage of missing data for key variables per site was 10.9% (IQR: 2.0-18.9%) and declined with training in data management (odds ratio, OR: 0.58; 95% confidence interval, CI: 0.37-0.90) and weekly hours spent by a clerk on the database per 100 patients on ART (OR: 0.95; 95% CI: 0.90-0.99). About 10 weekly hours per 100 patients on ART were required to reduce missing data for key variables to below 10%. The median percentage of patients lost to follow-up 1 year after starting ART was 8.5% (IQR: 4.2-19.7%). Strategies to reduce loss to follow-up included outreach teams, community-based organizations and checking death registry data. Implementation of all three strategies substantially reduced losses to follow-up (OR: 0.17; 95% CI: 0.15-0.20). CONCLUSION: The quality of the data collected and the retention of patients in ART treatment programmes are unsatisfactory for many sites involved in the scale-up of ART in resource-limited settings, mainly because of insufficient staff trained to manage data and trace patients lost to follow-up.

Legal Implications of the Use of Export Taxes in Addressing Carbon Leakage: Competing Border Adjustment Measures

The prevailing uncertainties about the future of the post-Kyoto international legal framework for climate mitigation and adaptation increase the likelihood of unilateral trade interventions that aim to address climate policy concerns, as exemplified by the controversial European Union initiative to include the aviation industry in its emissions trading system. The emerging literature suggests that border carbon adjustment (BCA) measures imposed by importing countries would lead to substantial legal complications in relation to World Trade Organization law and hence to possible trade disputes. Lack of legal clarity on BCAs is exacerbated by potential counter or pre-emptive export restrictions that exporting countries might impose on carbon-intensive products. In this context, this paper investigates the interface between legal and welfare implications of competing unilateral BCA measures. It argues that carbon export taxes will be an inevitable part of the future climate change regime in the absence of a multilateral agreement. It also describes the channels through which competing BCAs may lead to trade conflicts and political complications as a result of their distributional and welfare impacts at the domestic and global levels.

Regulatory Objectives for Contemporary Electronic Communications : Talking Business or Talking Culture?

The common mantra in telecommunications regulatory fora (be it national, regional or international) now goes along the lines of 'deregulation-good; regulation-bad' and competition is said to be the ultimate answer to basically every question. A generalised dictum like this is in itself suspicious and even more so, when it refers to a sector such as telecommunications, which has a history of heavy regulation and has been the very epitome of state intervention. In the contemporary environment of vibrant communications, subcribing to a purely 'black-or-white' aproach may be, to put it mildly, unsafe. Before answering the question of appropriate regulatory model for communications markets, it is essential to figure out what goals are to be pursued in order to consider what kind of measures could bring about their attainment. In the words of Robert Bork, 'only when the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules'. Against this backdrop, the present paper looks into the goals and objectives of telecommunications regulation, their complexity and inherent tension between commercial and public interests.

Three “Bali Deliverables” for more Food Security

As the clock is ticking for a positive outcome at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in Bali in December 2013, agricultural negotiators are scrambling to find solutions to issues such as tariff-rate quota (TRQ) administration and export competition in order to improve trade flows. The main issue seems to be whether WTO rules applying to public stockpiles in developing countries need to be changed or temporarily suspended as a means to enhance national food security. This paper is based on a note submitted to the ICTSD-IPC Expert Group “Meeting on Agriculture and Food Security – Policy Options for MC9 and beyond” (Geneva, June 2013). It lists the policy instruments impacting on global, national and (urban and rural) household food security – “The Food Security Tool Box” – and asks which immediate decisions the WTO Ministers might take in this field despite the political difficulties such as continued agro-dumping practices or the “land grab” issue. Three such “deliverables” are outlined: (i) regional and “virtual” food security schemes could be allowed to provide reserves to other countries without violating the obligation to “form an integral part of a food security programme identified in national legislation” (Agreement on Agriculture, Annex II, para 3); (ii) TRQ under-fills could be improved by mandatory enquiries into low fill rate situations; and (iii) World Food Program (WFP) and other non-commercial food purchases could be exempted from export restrictions and prohibitions. High ambitions for Bali seem to be misplaced. A more realistic yet real progress could restore the dwindling credibility of the WTO as a forum for trade negotiations.

Do WTO rules improve or impair the right to food?

The global food crisis of 2007–08 seems to be forgotten. Media attention at the time focused on food riots in Haiti and Mozambique, while world leaders and more than a dozen international organizations gathered for several food summits, calling for immediate relief measures. But not a single government seems to remember its obligations under the Right to Food (R2F) which the United Nations (UN) had enshrined back in 1948. Today we have to acknowledge that the R2F still lacks an adequate response under the present multilateral rules and disciplines applying to food production and trade. This chapter examines the present rules and disciplines under the AoA and of those contemplated in the Doha Development Round. Here we find that despite claims to the contrary they contribute precious little to the R2F. Some of the present rules, or the lack thereof, can even act as disincentives for global and national food security. Various forms of production and export subsidies, food aid abuse and export restrictions, are still WTO-legal, with few remedies available to food insecure developing countries. This amounts to a violation of their R2F obligations by many WTO Members.

The effects of anti-infective preventive measures on the occurrence of biologic implant complications and implant loss: a systematic review.

PURPOSE To systematically appraise whether anti-infective protocols are effective in preventing biologic implant complications and implant loss after a mean observation period ≥ 10 years after loading. MATERIALS AND METHODS An electronic search of Medline via PubMed and Embase via Ovid databases complemented by manual search was conducted up to October 31, 2012. Studies were included provided that they were published in English, German, French, or Italian, and conducted on ≥ 20 partially and fully edentulous patients with dental implants and regular (≥ 1×/year) supportive periodontal therapy (SPT) over a mean observation period ≥ 10 years. Assessment of the identified studies and data extraction were performed independently by two reviewers. Authors were contacted if required. Collected data were reported by descriptive methods. RESULTS The initial electronic search resulted in the identification of 994 titles from Medline via PubMed and 531 titles from Embase via Ovid databases, respectively. After elimination of duplicate titles and exclusion of 60 full-text articles, 143 articles were analyzed, resulting in 15 studies eligible for qualitative analysis. The implant survival rate ranged from 85.7% to 99.2% after a mean observation period ≥ 10 years. One comparative study assessed the effects of regular SPT on the occurrence of biologic complications and implant loss. Overall, regular diagnosis and implementation of anti-infective therapeutic protocols were effective in the management of biological complications and prevention of implant loss. Residual probing depths at the end of active periodontal therapy and development of reinfection during supportive periodontal therapy (SPT) represented a significant risk for the onset of peri-implantitis and implant loss. Comparative studies indicated that implant survival and success rates were lower in periodontally compromised vs noncompromised patients. CONCLUSIONS In order to achieve high long-term survival and success rates of dental implants and their restorations, enrollment in regular SPT including anti-infective preventive measures should be implemented. Therapy of peri-implant mucositis should be considered as a preventive measure for the onset of peri-implantitis. Completion of active periodontal therapy should precede implant placement in periodontally compromised patients.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?