Quantifying entrepreneurship and its impact on local economic performance: A spatial assessment in rural Switzerland

Regional and rural development policies in Europe increasingly emphasize entrepreneurship to mobilize the endogenous economic potential of rural territories. This study develops a concept to quantify entrepreneurship as place-dependent local potential to examine its impact on the local economic performance of rural territories in Switzerland. The short-to-medium-term impact of entrepreneurship on the economic performance of 1706 rural municipalities in Switzerland is assessed by applying three spatial random effects models. Results suggest a generally positive relationship between entrepreneurship and local development: rural municipalities with higher entrepreneurial potential generally show higher business tax revenues per capita and a lower share of social welfare cases among the population, although the impact on local employment is less clear. The explanatory power of entrepreneurship in all three models, however, was only moderate. This finding suggests that political expectations of fostering entrepreneurship to boost endogenous rural development in the short-to-medium term should be damped.

Tropical cyclone-related socio-economic losses in the western North Pacific region

The western North Pacific (WNP) is the area of the world most frequently affected by tropical cyclones (TCs). However, little is known about the socio-economic impacts of TCs in this region, probably because of the limited relevant loss data. Here, loss data from Munich RE's NatCatSERVICE database is used, a high-quality and widely consulted database of natural disasters. In the country-level loss normalisation technique we apply, the original loss data are normalised to present-day exposure levels by using the respective country's nominal gross domestic product at purchasing power parity as a proxy for wealth. The main focus of our study is on the question of whether the decadal-scale TC variability observed in the Northwest Pacific region in recent decades can be shown to manifest itself economically in an associated variability in losses. It is shown that since 1980 the frequency of TC-related loss events in the WNP exhibited, apart from seasonal and interannual variations, interdecadal variability with a period of about 22 yr – driven primarily by corresponding variations of Northwest Pacific TCs. Compared to the long-term mean, the number of loss events was found to be higher (lower) by 14% (9%) in the positive (negative) phase of the decadal-scale WNP TC frequency variability. This was identified for the period 1980–2008 by applying a wavelet analysis technique. It was also possible to demonstrate the same low-frequency variability in normalised direct economic losses from TCs in the WNP region. The identification of possible physical mechanisms responsible for the observed decadal-scale Northwest Pacific TC variability will be the subject of future research, even if suggestions have already been made in earlier studies.

Monopsony Power, Pay Structure and Training

Although interest in monopsonistic influences on labor market outcomes has revived in recent years, only a few empirical studies provide direct evidence on this topic. In this article, the authors analyze the effect of monopsony power on pay structure, using a direct measure of labor market thinness. The authors find evidence of monopsony power, as firms facing fewer local competitors offer lower wages to skilled labor and trainees, but not to unskilled labor. The findings have important implications for the economic theory of training, as most recent models assume monopsonistic pay-setting for skilled labor, but not for trainees.

Defining Regulatory Objectives for Contemporary Electronic Communications : Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Goal evaluation is an essential element of the process of designing regulatory frameworks. Lawyers and legal scholars do however tend to ignore it. The present paper stresses the importance of pinpointing the precise regulatory objectives in the fluid environment of electronic communications, since, due to their technological and economic development, they have become the vital basis for communication and distribution of information in modern societies. The paper attempts an analysis of the underlying regulatory objectives in contemporary communications and seeks to put together the complex puzzle of economic and societal issues.

Sex as a source of power? Backlash against self-sexualizing women

Although women are thought to possess sexual power, they risk social and economic penalties (i.e., backlash; Rudman, 1998) when they self-sexualize (i.e., assert their power; Cahoon & Edmonds, 1989; Glick, Larsen, Johnson, & Branstiter, 2005). Why? Drawing on the status incongruity hypothesis (SIH), which predicts backlash against powerful women because they challenge the gender hierarchy, we expected prejudice against self-sexualizing women to be explained by a dominance penalty rather than a communality deficit (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). Two experiments supported this hypothesis, and Experiment 3 further showed that the dominance penalty was explained by ascribing power motives to self-sexualized women. These findings extend the SIH’s utility to the domain of self-sexualization and illuminate the scope of people’s discomfort with female power. Implications for the advancement of gender equality are discussed.

From the Sea to Paris and back: On the interdependence of economic warfare, weather conditions and the submarine campaign 1916-1917

Starting of from Avner Offer’s comment that the First World War was not only a war of steel and gold, but also of bread and potatoes (1989: 1) and my own research on British as well as Australian preparations for economic warfare and based on sources from the entente as well as the central powers but also from the United States, Canada and Australia, may presentation will focus on the interdependence of the measures taken by entente as well as central power authorities in the second half of 1916. Already a year before both sides had become aware that this war would not only be decided on the battlefield, but that the issues of primary as well as secondary resources would be decisive. Accordingly measures that could strike the enemy in this field were discussed and put into place more and more and this at time, when weather conditions caused a reduction of harvest all over Europe, Northern America and Argentina.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.