Applications of random set theory in econometrics

In recent years, the econometrics literature has shown a growing interest in the study of partially identified models, in which the object of economic and statistical interest is a set rather than a point. The characterization of this set and the development of consistent estimators and inference procedures for it with desirable properties are the main goals of partial identification analysis. This review introduces the fundamental tools of the theory of random sets, which brings together elements of topology, convex geometry, and probability theory to develop a coherent mathematical framework to analyze random elements whose realizations are sets. It then elucidates how these tools have been fruitfully applied in econometrics to reach the goals of partial identification analysis.

Statistical inference for the optimal approximating model

In the setting of high-dimensional linear models with Gaussian noise, we investigate the possibility of confidence statements connected to model selection. Although there exist numerous procedures for adaptive (point) estimation, the construction of adaptive confidence regions is severely limited (cf. Li in Ann Stat 17:1001–1008, 1989). The present paper sheds new light on this gap. We develop exact and adaptive confidence regions for the best approximating model in terms of risk. One of our constructions is based on a multiscale procedure and a particular coupling argument. Utilizing exponential inequalities for noncentral χ2-distributions, we show that the risk and quadratic loss of all models within our confidence region are uniformly bounded by the minimal risk times a factor close to one.

Voter Participation in the 1998 Bundestag Elections: A Theoretical Modification and Empirical Application of Downs’ Theory of Voter Participation

This article seeks to contribute to the illumination of the so-called 'paradox of voting' using the German Bundestag elections of 1998 as an empirical case. Downs' model of voter participation will be extended to include elements of the theory of subjective expected utility (SEU). This will allow a theoretical and empirical exploration of the crucial mechanisms of individual voters' decisions to participate, or abstain from voting, in the German general election of 1998. It will be argued that the infinitely low probability of an individual citizen's vote to decide the election outcome will not necessarily reduce the probability of electoral participation. The empirical analysis is largely based on data from the ALLBUS 1998. It confirms the predictions derived from SEU theory. The voters' expected benefits and their subjective expectation to be able to influence government policy by voting are the crucial mechanisms to explain participation. By contrast, the explanatory contribution of perceived information and opportunity costs is low.