Does Climbing the ‘Social Ladder’ Increase Life Satisfaction? A Comparison of the UK and Switzerland

It is a widely held belief that status and wealth affect subjective well-being (SWB). This is reflected in the efforts of many people to climb up the ‘social ladder’ and to transcend their social background. By being upwardly mobile, they hope to benefit from various rewards they believe to be associated with desirable societal positions. However, findings from a range of disciplines provide evidence that these benefits are not to be taken for granted. Thus, we decided investigate the question of how upward social mobility impacts life satisfaction, the cognitive component of SWB.

Weather and War – Economic and social vulnerability in Switzerland at the end of the First World War

Neutral Switzerland – not embedded in the fighting forces – yet was involved in the Great War mainly in economical terms. Since Switzerland is a landlocked country especially agriculture became an important topic of war economy in regard to food security. Until 1916 national food supply was limited but could be maintained through barter trade. In 1916 a crisis on both supply and production level occurred and led to a decline in food availability and to immense price risings causing social turmoil. This paper aims to outline the factors of vulnerability in respect of food in Switzerland during the First World War and further it will show different coping strategies that were undertaken during that time. The paper takes the work of Mario Aeby and Christian Pfister (University of Bern) into consideration that pointed out to weather anomalies during the years 1916 and 1917 aggravating the already tense food situation. Arguing for an overlap of supply and production crisis the paper focuses on agricultural and economic history including environmental impacts. Further the paper addresses the question of what makes a food system resilient to such unforeseen impacts.

Capturing socially motivated linguistic change. How the use of gender-fair language afffects support for social initiatives in Austria and Poland.

Gender-fair language consists of the symmetric linguistic treatment of women and men instead of using masculine forms as generics. In this study, we examine how the use of gender-fair language affects readers' support for social initiatives in Poland and Austria. While gender-fair language is relatively novel in Poland, it is well established in Austria. This difference may lead to different perceptions of gender-fair usage in these speech communities. Two studies conducted in Poland investigate whether the evaluation of social initiatives (Study 1: quotas for women on election lists; Study 2: support for women students or students from countries troubled by war) is affected by how female proponents (lawyers, psychologists, sociologists, and academics) are referred to, with masculine forms (traditional) or with feminine forms (modern, gender-fair). Study 3 replicates Study 2 in Austria. Our results indicate that in Poland, gender-fair language has negative connotations and therefore, detrimental effects particularly when used in gender-related contexts. Conversely, in Austria, where gender-fair language has been implemented and used for some time, there are no such negative effects. This pattern of results may inform the discussion about formal policies regulating the use of gender-fair language.

Religion as Social Reality. A Take on the Emic–Etic Debate in Light of John Searle’s Philosophy of Society

In this article I argue that the shift from a private to a public–social understanding of religion raises new ontological and epistemological questions for the scientific study of religion\s. These questions are deeply related to three central features of the emic– etic debate, namely the problems of intentionality, objectivity, and comparison. Focusing on these interrelated issues, I discuss the potential of John Searle’s philoso- phy of society for the scientific study of religion\s. Considering the role of intentional- ity at the social level, I present Searle’s concept of “social ontology” and discuss its epistemological implications. To clarify Searle’s position regarding the objectivity of the social sciences, I propose a heuristic model contrasting different stances within the scientific study of religion\s. Finally, I explore some problematic aspects of Searle’s views for a comparative study of religion\s, and sketch a solution within his frame- work. I shall argue that a distinction between the epistemological and ontological dimensions of religious affairs would help clarify the issues at stake in the past and future of the emic–etic debate.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The Social Geography of Education: Neighborhood, Class Composition, and the Educational Achievement of Elementary School Students in Zurich, Switzerland

Despite an impressive amount of research and policy intervention no robust pattern of neighborhood effects on educational attainment has previously been identified. Adequate theoretical modeling and the sensitivity of the results to the method of the study are the major challenges in this area of research. This paper elaborates the social mechanisms of neighborhood effects and applies various methodological approaches to test them. Using data from Switzerland, the research reported here has detected heterogeneous effects of neighborhood on elementary school students’ educational achievement in Zurich. Although modest in comparison with the effects of classroom composition, these effects appear to be mediated primarily through social integration into a local peer network and are differentiated according to students’ gender and their social origin.

Three Experimental Approaches to Measure the Social Context Dependence of Prejudice Communication and Discriminatory Behavior

Empirical research on discrimination is faced with crucial problems stemming from the specific character of its object of study. In democratic societies the communication of prejudices and other forms of discriminatory behavior is considered socially undesirable and depends on situational factors such as whether a situation is considered private or whether a discriminatory consensus can be assumed. Regular surveys thus can only offer a blurred picture of the phenomenon. But also survey experiments intended to decrease the social desirability bias (SDB) so far failed in systematically implementing situational variables. This paper introduces three experimental approaches to improve the study of discrimination and other topics of social (un-)desirability. First, we argue in favor of cognitive context framing in surveys in order to operationalize the salience of situational norms. Second, factorial surveys offer a way to take situational contexts and substitute behavior into account. And third, choice experiments – a rather new method in sociology – offer a more valid method of measuring behavioral characteristics compared to simple items in surveys. All three approaches – which may be combined – are easy to implement in large-scale surveys. Results of empirical studies demonstrate the fruitfulness of each of these approaches.

Racing against Time: Varying Patterns of Social Mobilization in Serbia and Georgia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, a number of actors started to engage in the power struggle for the opportunities to shape the new order in successive nation-states. In Serbia and Georgia historically hegemonic Orthodox Christian churches were among the firsts in the frontlines for political and economic power. More than a decade has passed since the so-called Coloured Revolutions in Georgia and Serbia, and the Orthodox churches still remain participants of an ongoing socio-political transition of these states. The revival of public role of religion appeared temporary in Serbia followed by a gradual decline of an influence of the Orthodox Church over political life and legal process. However, in Georgia the public and political role of religion increased rather than declined albeit changed shape. Examining the degree to which the two Orthodox churches can influence the political agenda in Serbia and Georgia, the paper attempts to understand how church-State relations work in practice. By bringing rich empirical data from the field (70 interviews with (arch)bishops, priests and religious clerics in Georgia and Serbia added to field observations), the paper reflects on the themes under which the two Orthodox churches mobilize public protest in Serbia and Georgia. The paper further looks at varying State responses and their broader implication for church-state problematique.

The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy: Ideological Roots of Inequality

The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy examines how implementing American tropes in policy design inadvertently frustrates policy goals. It investigates multiple market-oriented designs including funding for private organizations to deliver public services, funding for individuals to buy services, and policies incentivizing or mandating private actors to provide social policy. The author shows that these solutions often not only fail to achieve social goals, but, in fact, actively undermine them, for example saddling the poor with debt or encouraging discrimination. The book carefully details the mechanisms through which this occurs, for example a mismatch between program goals and either contract terms or individual preferences. The author examines several policies in depth, covering universal social insurance programs like healthcare and pensions, as well as smaller interventions like programs for the homeless. The author builds the argument using detailed empirical evidence as well as anecdote, keeping the book accessible and entertaining.

Managing social policy under federalism: The challenges of hybrid funding and program delivery

This paper discusses generally the question of the level of government that should be used to administer different social policies. The chapter focuses on the Medicaid program, looking at recent state-level changes in health insurance for the poor and long-term care policy. Particular attention will be paid to the question of how states have used their new freedoms to outsource public insurance to the private sector and on the consequent differences in outcomes across states. Notably, this paper will be drawn from my forthcoming book “The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy” (Palgrave, MacMillan, November, 2015).