Old captains at the helm: chairman age and firm performance

This paper examines whether the chairmen of the boards (COBs) impose their life cycles on the firms over which they preside. Using a large sample of unlisted firms, we find a robust negative relation between COB age and firm performance. COBs age much like ‘ordinary’ people. Their cognitive abilities deteriorate, and they experience significant shifts in motivation. Deteriorating cognitive abilities are the main driver of the performance effect that we observe. The results imply that succession planning problems in unlisted firms are real. Mandatory retirement age clauses cannot solve these problems.

Risiken und Nebenwirkungen der gegenwärtigen Währungspolitik

Bis anhin verfolgt die SNB ihre Mindestkurspolitik souverän. Es gilt, die Risiken zu erkennen und sich auf deren Eintreten vorzubereiten. Eine veränderte Anlagestrategie könnte diese Risiken eindämmen. Eine Ausdehnung der Interventionen würde eine aktivere Rolle der SNB als Investorin bedingen.

Aktiensplits vor der Tür

Eine typische Schweizer Aktie kostete Anfang März 2001 über CHF 1000. Das ist ein Weltrekord. In keinem Land liegen die Aktienkurse auch nur annähernd so hoch. Mit einer Gesetzesänderung wird der Mindestnennwert per 1. Mai 2001 von CHF 10 auf 1 Rp. herabgesetzt. Dies ermöglicht Schweizer Gesellschaften, die Kurse ihrer Aktien durch Splits auf international übliche Werte zu vermindern. Wie verbreitet ist dieses Bedürfnis? Welche Auswirkungen haben Aktiensplits auf die Börsenbewertung? Welche Vorteile sind damit verbunden? Was ist der «optimale» Börsenkurs? Welche Gesellschaften sind primäre Splitkandidaten? Antworten auf diese Fragen finden sich im vorliegenden Aufsatz.

Limited managerial attention and corporate aging

As firms have more assets in place, more of management’s limited attention is focused on managing assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they have fewer growth options and a lower ability to generate new growth options. This simple theory predicts that Tobin’s q falls with age. Further, competition in the product market is expected to slow down the decrease in Tobin’s q because it forces firms to look for alternative sources of rents. Similarly, greater competition in the labor market reduces the decrease in Tobin’s q with age because old firms are in a better position to hire employees that can help with innovation. In contrast, competition in the market for corporate control should accelerate the decline because it forces management to focus more on managing assets in place whose performance is more directly observable than on developing growth options where results may not be observable for some time. We find strong support for these predictions in tests using exogenous variation in competition.

Corporate Aging and Takeover Risk

Although growth opportunities fade and profitability declines as firms mature, older firms are no more likely to be acquired than young firms are. This article documents and explains that phenomenon. We argue that, because mature organizations are rationally less flexible, they are more costly to integrate and therefore comparatively unattractive acquisition candidates. The evidence supports this explanation of the negative age dependence of takeover hazard. The evidence also shows that negative exogenous shocks to merger benefits further reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms. We test many alternative explanations and find no evidence that they can explain the hazard decline.