The Complexity of Non-Iterated Probabilistic Justification Logic

The logic PJ is a probabilistic logic defined by adding (noniterated) probability operators to the basic justification logic J. In this paper we establish upper and lower bounds for the complexity of the derivability problem in the logic PJ. The main result of the paper is that the complexity of the derivability problem in PJ remains the same as the complexity of the derivability problem in the underlying logic J, which is π[p/2] -complete. This implies that the probability operators do not increase the complexity of the logic, although they arguably enrich the expressiveness of the language.

Probabilistic Justification Logic

We present a probabilistic justification logic, PPJ, to study rational belief, degrees of belief and justifications. We establish soundness and completeness for PPJ and show that its satisfiability problem is decidable. In the last part we use PPJ to provide a solution to the lottery paradox.

Beyond a logic of effectiveness: Horizontal coordination, democratic legitimacy and accountability

Horizontal coordination, where actors join together to accomplish a common task, has been applauded for its output legitimacy. However, such processes often face challenges due to opposition from local actors who raise concerns about democratic legitimacy and accountability. Moving beyond a logic of effectiveness, we aim to show how and why other forms of legitimacy such as input and throughput dimensions also affect horizontal coordination, in addition to output criteria. Beyond the assumed positive relationship between coordination and effectiveness, we additionally expect horizontal coordination to be (a) impeded by local actors' fear of losing democratic legitimacy; and (b) fostered by accountability in terms of the steering capacity of the state. A comparative case study analysis of water supply structures at the regional level in Switzerland shows, in contrast to our expectation, that effectiveness has mixed impacts on horizontal coordination. Rather than being solely a positive factor for horizontal coordination, certain output criteria such as financial redistribution are found to be a key hindrance. We also find that democratic legitimacy may, indeed, impede horizontal coordination whereas increased accountability positively affects such coordination.