Impact of proton pump inhibitor use on magnesium homoeostasis: a cross-sectional study in a tertiary emergency department.

BACKGROUND To date, the use of proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) has been associated with a low risk of hypomagnesaemia and associated adverse outcomes. We hypothesised that a better risk estimate could be derived from a large cohort of outpatients admitted to a tertiary emergency department (ED). METHODS A cross-sectional study was performed in 5118 patients who had measurements of serum magnesium taken on admission to a large tertiary care ED between January 2009 and December 2010. Hypomagnesaemia was defined as a serum magnesium concentration < 0.75 mmol/l. Demographical data, serum electrolyte values, data on medication, comorbidities and outcome with regard to length of hospital stay and mortality were analysed. RESULTS Serum magnesium was normally distributed where upon 1246 patients (24%) were hypomagnesaemic. These patients had a higher prevalence of out-of-hospital PPI use and diuretic use when compared with patients with magnesium levels > 0.75 mmol/l (both p < 0.0001). In multivariable regression analyses adjusted for PPIs, diuretics, renal function and the Charlson comorbidity index score, the association between use of PPIs and risk for hypomagnesaemia remained significant (OR = 2.1; 95% CI: 1.54-2.85). While mortality was not directly related to low magnesium levels (p = 0.67), the length of hospitalisation was prolonged in these patients even after adjustment for underlying comorbid conditions (p < 0.0001). CONCLUSION Use of PPIs predisposes patients to hypomagnesaemia and such to prolonged hospitalisation irrespective of the underlying morbidity, posing a critical concern.

Segmented filamentous bacterium uses secondary and tertiary lymphoid tissues to induce gut IgA and specific T helper 17 cell responses.

Segmented filamentous bacterium (SFB) is a symbiont that drives postnatal maturation of gut adaptive immune responses. In contrast to nonpathogenic E. coli, SFB stimulated vigorous development of Peyer's patches germinal centers but paradoxically induced only a low frequency of specific immunoglobulin A (IgA)-secreting cells with delayed accumulation of somatic mutations. Moreover, blocking Peyer's patch development abolished IgA responses to E. coli, but not to SFB. Indeed, SFB stimulated the postnatal development of isolated lymphoid follicles and tertiary lymphoid tissue, which substituted for Peyer's patches as inductive sites for intestinal IgA and SFB-specific T helper 17 (Th17) cell responses. Strikingly, in mice depleted of gut organized lymphoid tissue, SFB still induced a substantial but nonspecific intestinal Th17 cell response. These results demonstrate that SFB has the remarkable capacity to induce and stimulate multiple types of intestinal lymphoid tissues that cooperate to generate potent IgA and Th17 cell responses displaying only limited target specificity.

Fetal megacystis: experience of a single tertiary center in Switzerland over 20 years

OBJECTIVES Megacystis (MC) is rare and often associated with other structural and chromosomal anomalies. In euploid cases with early oligohydramnios, prognosis is poor mainly due to pulmonary hypoplasia and renal damage. We report our experience of the past 20 years. METHODS A retrospective review of cases with prenatally diagnosed MC was performed. Complete prenatal as well as postnatal medical records from 1989 to 2009 were reviewed focusing on diagnostic precision, fetal interventions [vesicocentesis (VC), vesicoamniotic shunt (VAS)], short- and long-term outcome, and potential prognostic factors. RESULTS 68 cases were included. Follow-up was available in 54 cases (9 girls and 45 boys including 3 cases with aneuploidy). We found 39 isolated MC at sonography (5 girls and 34 boys). 24 fetuses with isolated MC underwent VC and VAS at 19.6 ± 6.3 and 20 ± 4.9 weeks of gestation, respectively. Survival rate was higher in male than in female fetuses (51 vs. 33%). Renal problems occurred in 4/14 prenatally treated fetuses and in 1/10 when cases with prune belly syndrome (PBS) were excluded from the analysis. CONCLUSIONS Our study shows that a careful selection of cases with MC excluding fetuses with PBS and early treatment has still the potential to improve outcome.

Institutions for sustainable governance of forests: Equity, robustness and cross-level interactions in Mawlyngbna, Meghalaya, India

This study adopts Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework in empirical fieldwork to explain how local forestry institutions affect forest ecosystems and social equity in the community of Mawlyngbna in North-East India. Data was collected through 26 semi-structured interviews, participatory timeline development, policy documents, direct observation, periodicals, transect walks, and a concurrent forest-ecological study in the village. Results show that Mawlyngbna's forests provide important sources of livelihood benefits for the villagers. However, ecological disturbance and diversity varies among the different forest ownership types and forest-based livelihood benefits are inequitably distributed. Based on a bounded rationality approach, our analysis proposes a set of causal mechanisms that trace these observed social-ecological outcomes to the attributes of the resource system, resource units, actors and governance system. We analyse opportunities and constraints of interactions between the village, regional, and state levels. We discuss how Ostrom’s design principles for community-based resource governance inform the explanation of robustness but have a blind spot in explaining social equity. We report experiences made using the SES framework in empirical fieldwork. We conclude that mapping cross-level interactions in the SES framework needs conceptual refinement and that explaining social equity of forest governance needs theoretical advances.

Alpine Common Property Institutions under Change: Conditions for Successful and Unsuccessful Collective Action by Alpine Farmers in the Canton of Grisons, Switzerland

The protection and sustainable management of alpine summer pastures has been stated as a goal in Swiss national law since 1996, and direct payments from the state for summer pasturing have been tied to sustainability criteria since 2000. This reflects the increasing value of the alpine cultural landscape as a public good. However, provision of this public good remains in the hands of local farmers and their local common pool resource (CPR) institutions for managing alpine pastures. These institutions are increasingly struggling to maintain their institutional arrangements, particularly regarding the work needed to maintain the pastures. This paper examines two cases of local CPR institutions for managing alpine pastures in the Swiss Canton of Grisons that manifest different institutional developments in light of changing conditions. The differences in how these institutions reacted to change and the impacts this has had on the provision of the CPR are explained by focusing on relative prices, bargaining power, and ideology as drivers of institutional change that are often neglected within common property research. Key words: summer pasture management, institutional change, bargaining power, ideology

Shaping Institutions for Natural Resource Management

This InfoResources Focus tries to clarify challenges people face when shaping institutions for sustainable NRM and discusses key elements for implementing processes of institutional change. Emphasis is put on local institutions embedded in national, regional and global institutional schemes.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Cohort Study on the Association Between Helmet Use and Traumatic Brain Injury in Snowboarders From a Swiss Tertiary Trauma Center.

BACKGROUND Since the introduction of helmets in winter sports there is on-going debate on whether they decrease traumatic brain injuries (TBI). METHODS This cohort study included 117 adult (≥ 16 years) snowboarders with TBI admitted to a level I alpine trauma center in Switzerland between 2000/2001 and 2010/2011. The primary objective was to examine the association between helmet use and moderate-to-severe TBI. Secondary objectives were to describe the epidemiology of TBI during the past decade in relation to increased helmet use. RESULTS Of 691 injured snowboarders evaluated, 117 (17%) suffered TBI. Sixty-six percent were men (median age, 23 years). Two percent of accidents were fatal. Ninety-two percent of patients sustained minor, 1% moderate, and 7% severe TBI according to the Glasgow coma scale. Pathologic computed tomography findings were present in 16% of patients, 26% of which required surgery. Eighty-three percent of TBIs occurred while riding on-slope. There was no trend in the TBI rate during the studied period, although helmet use increased from 10% to 69%. Comparing patients with and without a helmet showed no significant difference in odds ratios for the severity of TBI. However, of the 5 patients requiring surgery only 1 was wearing a helmet. Off-piste compared with on-slope snowboarders showed an odds ratio of 26.5 (P = 0.003) for sustaining a moderate-to-severe TBI. CONCLUSIONS Despite increased helmet use we found no decrease in TBI among snowboarders. The possibility of TBI despite helmet use and the dangers of riding off-piste should be a focus of future prevention programs.