In search of the internal structure of the processes underlying interval timing in the sub-second and the second range: A confirmatory factor analysis approach

One of the earliest accounts of duration perception by Karl von Vierordt implied a common process underlying the timing of intervals in the sub-second and the second range. To date, there are two major explanatory approaches for the timing of brief intervals: the Common Timing Hypothesis and the Distinct Timing Hypothesis. While the common timing hypothesis also proceeds from a unitary timing process, the distinct timing hypothesis suggests two dissociable, independent mechanisms for the timing of intervals in the sub-second and the second range, respectively. In the present paper, we introduce confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to elucidate the internal structure of interval timing in the sub-second and the second range. Our results indicate that the assumption of two mechanisms underlying the processing of intervals in the second and the sub-second range might be more appropriate than the assumption of a unitary timing mechanism. In contrast to the basic assumption of the distinct timing hypothesis, however, these two timing mechanisms are closely associated with each other and share 77% of common variance. This finding suggests either a strong functional relationship between the two timing mechanisms or a hierarchically organized internal structure. Findings are discussed in the light of existing psychophysical and neurophysiological data.

Complete Genome Sequence of Bovine Pestivirus Strain PG-2, a Second Member of the Tentative Pestivirus Species Giraffe

We report the complete genome sequence of bovine pestivirus strain PG-2. The sequence data from this virus showed that PG-2 is closely related to the giraffe pestivirus strain H138. PG-2 and H138 belong to one pestivirus species that should be considered an approved member of the genus Pestivirus.

Weather and War – Economic and social vulnerability in Switzerland at the end of the First World War

Neutral Switzerland – not embedded in the fighting forces – yet was involved in the Great War mainly in economical terms. Since Switzerland is a landlocked country especially agriculture became an important topic of war economy in regard to food security. Until 1916 national food supply was limited but could be maintained through barter trade. In 1916 a crisis on both supply and production level occurred and led to a decline in food availability and to immense price risings causing social turmoil. This paper aims to outline the factors of vulnerability in respect of food in Switzerland during the First World War and further it will show different coping strategies that were undertaken during that time. The paper takes the work of Mario Aeby and Christian Pfister (University of Bern) into consideration that pointed out to weather anomalies during the years 1916 and 1917 aggravating the already tense food situation. Arguing for an overlap of supply and production crisis the paper focuses on agricultural and economic history including environmental impacts. Further the paper addresses the question of what makes a food system resilient to such unforeseen impacts.

“Delendum est Imperium Ottomanorum“: War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and the End of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire’s status as a full member of the international community of civilized states, which was bound by the rules of international law, had been challenged again and again during the formative period of the international law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. When the First World War began, it was the first global military conflict, in which these rules of international law were put to the test. In the case of the Ottoman Empire quite a few questions were not yet settled, not least because the country was still bound by unequal treaties and because it had never ratified the renewed Hague Rules of Land Warfare of 1907, which it had only signed under reservations. Against this background the contribution will therefore focus on the debate amongst legal scholars on violations of the laws of war (and humanity) in regard to the Ottoman Empire during the First World War.

Achievements and Prospects of Tef Improvement - Proceedings of the Second International Workshop, November 7-9, 2011, Debre Zeit, Ethiopia

These proceedings on ‘Achievements and Prospects of tef Improvement’ is the outcome of the Second International Tef Workshop held at Debre Zeit (Ethiopia), the location which represents the major tef growing areas in the country as well as the oldest and biggest center on tef research. As an indigenous crop, the bulk of tef research is carried out in the country by scientists based at various higher-learning and research institutions. Hence, unlike major crops of the world such as wheat and rice, research on tef benefited little from modern improvement techniques. However, in the recent years, there is an increasing interest by several researchers and funding organizations in developed nations to promote tef research and development through implementation of modern genetic and genomic tools. The recent efforts and progresses made on tef research and development were presented and discussed in detail at the workshop. The tef research and development in Ethiopia has recently shown tremendous improvement. This is witnessed by the decision of the Ethiopian government to award a Gold Medal in November 2012 to our Institute for the discovery and promotion of a very popular Quncho variety. At this juncture, I would like to congratulate all involved in research and development of tef as the achievement was obtained due to concerted efforts of the tef community. The editors of the proceedings did a wonderful job of undertaking the painstaking task of editing all 23 manuscripts presented at the workshop. In addition, the proceedings include a 44-point roadmap for future tef research and development which can be used as a guideline for researchers, development workers and policy makers. I would like to extend my thanks to sponsors of the workshop and the publication of the proceedings.

First generation versus second generation drug-eluting stents for the treatment of bifurcations: 5-year follow-up of the LEADERS all-comers randomized trial.

BACKGROUND Historically, percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) of bifurcation lesions was associated with worse procedural and clinical outcomes when compared with PCI of non-bifurcation lesions. Newer generation drug-eluting stents (DES) might improve long-term clinical outcomes after bifurcation PCI. METHODS AND RESULTS The LEADERS trial was a 10-center, assessor-blind, non-inferiority, all-comers trial, randomizing 1,707 patients to treatment with a biolimus A9(TM) -eluting stent (BES) with an abluminal biodegradable polymer or a sirolimus-eluting stent (SES) with a durable polymer (ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT00389220). Five-year clinical outcomes were compared between patients with and without bifurcation lesions and between BES and SES in the bifurcation lesion subgroup. There were 497 (29%) patients with at least 1 bifurcation lesion (BES = 258; SES = 239). At 5-year follow-up, the composite endpoint of cardiac death, myocardial infarction (MI) and clinically-indicated (CI) target vessel revascularization (TVR) was observed more frequently in the bifurcation group (26.6% vs. 22.4%, P = 0.049). Within the bifurcation lesion subgroup, no differences were observed in (cardiac) death or MI rates between BES and SES. However, CI target lesion revascularization (TLR) (10.1% vs. 15.9%, P = 0.0495), and CI TVR (12.0% vs. 19.2%, P = 0.023) rates were significantly lower in the BES group. Definite/probable stent thrombosis (ST) rate was numerically lower in the BES group (3.1% vs. 5.9%, P = 0.15). Very late (>1 year) definite/probable ST rates trended to be lower with BES (0.4% vs. 3.1%, P = 0.057). CONCLUSIONS In the treatment of bifurcation lesions, use of BES led to superior long-term efficacy compared with SES. Safety outcomes were comparable between BES and SES, with an observed trend toward a lower rate of very late definite/probable ST between 1 and 5 years with the BES. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Report of the Second European Zebrafish Principal Investigator Meeting in Karlsruhe, Germany, March 21-24, 2012.

The second European Zebrafish Principal Investigator (PI) Meeting was held in March, 2012, in Karlsruhe, Germany. It brought together PIs from all over Europe who work with fish models such as zebrafish and medaka to discuss their latest results, as well as to resolve strategic issues faced by this research community. Scientific discussion ranged from the development of new technologies for working with fish models to progress in various fields of research such as injury and repair, disease models, and cell polarity and dynamics. This meeting also marked the establishment of the European Zebrafish Resource Centre (EZRC) at Karlsruhe that in the future will serve as an important focus and community resource for zebrafish- and medaka-based research.

Bilateral deep brain stimulation: the placement of the second electrode is not necessarily less accurate than that of the first one.

BACKGROUND Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is recognized as an effective treatment for movement disorders. We recently changed our technique, limiting the number of brain penetrations to three per side. OBJECTIVES The first aim was to evaluate the electrode precision on both sides of surgery since we implemented this surgical technique. The second aim was to analyse whether or not the electrode placement was improved with microrecording and macrostimulation. METHODS We retrospectively reviewed operation protocols and MRIs of 30 patients who underwent bilateral DBS. For microrecording and macrostimulation, we used three parallel channels of the 'Ben Gun' centred on the MRI-planned target. Pre- and post-operative MRIs were merged. The distance between the planned target and the centre of the implanted electrode artefact was measured. RESULTS There was no significant difference in targeting precision on both sides of surgery. There was more intra-operative adjustment of the second electrode positioning based on microrecording and macrostimulation, which allowed to significantly approach the MRI-planned target on the medial-lateral axis. CONCLUSION There was more electrode adjustment needed on the second side, possibly in relation with brain shift. We thus suggest performing a single central track with electrophysiological and clinical assessment, with multidirectional exploration on demand for suboptimal clinical responses.