The Swiss Schools have been Governed by Local Lay Authorities

After the introduction of the liberal-democratic constitutions in the Swiss cantons in the first half of the 1830ies the grid of existing schools has been systemized and broadly expanded. The school systems have ever since been characterized by one key element: a special local authority type called „Schulkommission“ or „Schulpflege“. They take the form of committees consisting of laymen that are appointed by democratic elections like all the other executive bodies on the different federal levels in Switzerland. When it comes to their obligations and activities these community level school committees conform very much to the school boards in the American and Canadian school systems. They are accountable for the selection and supervision of the teachers. They approve decisions about the school careers of pupils and about curricular matters like the choice of school books. Normally their members are elected by the local voters for four year terms of office (reelection remains possible) and with regard to pedagogics they normally are non-professionals. The board members are responsible for classes and teachers assigned to them and they have to go to see them periodically. These visitations and the board meetings each month together with the teachers enable the board members to attain a deep insight into what happens in their schools over the course of their term of office. But they are confronted as laymen with a professional teaching staff and with educational experts in the public administration. Nevertheless this form of executive power by non-professionals is constitutive for the state governance in the Swiss as well as in other national political environments. It corresponds to the principles of subsidiarity and militia and therefore allows for a strong accentuation of liberty and the right of self-determination, two axioms at the very base of democratic federalist ideology. This governance architecture with this strong accent on local anchorage features substantial advantages for the legitimacy and acceptability of political and administrative decisions. And this is relevant especially in the educational area because the rearing of the offspring is a project of hope and, besides, quite costly. In the public opinion such supervision bodies staffed by laymen seem to have certain credibility advances in comparison with the professional administration. They are given credit to be capable of impeding the waste of common financial resources and of warranting the protection and the fostering of the community’s children at once. Especially because of their non-professional character they are trusted to be reliably immune against organizational blindness and they seem to be able to defend the interests of the local community against the standardization and centralization aspirations originating from the administrational expertocracy. In the paper these common rationales will be underpinned by results of a comprehensive historical analysis of the Session protocols of three Bernese school commissions from 1835 to 2005.

Swiss Air Traffic Policy: Noise Between Berne and Berlin

This article looks at the negotiations between Switzerland and Germany on air traffic regulation with the help of negotiation analysis tools. A number of factors pre-eminent in the literature on negotiation processes and outcomes are presented and critically assessed. In particular arguments of “power”, which are often insufficiently explored in analysing interstate cooperation, are brought back into the picture. The article argues that structural power best explains the negotiation results while domestic politics and information asymmetries both account for non-ratification of the treaty. Institutionalist arguments on the constraining effects of international norms and institutions as well as explanations focusing on negotiation skills are of minor importance. Moreover, the nature of the Swiss intra-governmental setting at the federal level did not encourage the Swiss negotiators to exploit all means during the different stages of the bargaining process. The article concludes by illuminating a number of policy observations in the broader context of Swiss foreign relations and indicating avenues for further research

The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis: What Does The Beast Look Like?

The concept of legitimacy has many facets. The article reviews from a politics and law perspective the diagnosis of an ``institution in crisis''. This article is divided into three sections. It starts with a cautionary note on existing fallacies about assessing multilateral intergovernmental institutions and discusses competing schools of thought that approach the World Trade Organization (WTO) with varying perceptions of democracy and legitimacy. Section II takes up the actual debate on redesigning the WTO and directs attention to the question of balancing input and output legitimacy. Section III sketches potential avenues of research that have been neglected in the past.

Principals, agents, and the European Union’s foreign economic policies

In the introduction to this collection on the principal–agent approach and the European Union’s (EU) foreign economic policies we briefly present the EU’s institutional structure for policy-making in trade, monetary, development and international competition and financial policy. We also offer some data on the extent of the EU’s involvement in the international economy. Our discussion of the principal–agent approach and how it can be applied to an analysis of the EU’s foreign economic policies forms the basis of the following contributions. It allows us to formulate three questions that are of particular interest for applications of the principal–agent approach to the EU. Finally, we summarize the various studies included in this collection.

Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and ‘Missing Delegation’

This paper analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agency is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the paper analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this ‘puzzle of missing delegation’. The paper concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency.

Who Is in Love with Multilateralism? Treaty Commitment in the Post-Cold War Era

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral treaties have again become a central vehicle for international cooperation. In this article, we study states’ commitment to 76 multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 and 2005. The article offers a systematic account of present-day multilateral treaty-making efforts and asks what explains variation in states’ participation as witnessed in the act of treaty ratification.We test existing explanations and provide a novel argument that accounts for the strong participation of new European democracies in multilateral treaties. We find that regime type and being part of the European Union (EU) strongly affect treaty ratification. New EU democracies, in particular, are much more likely to ratify multilateral treaties than are other new democracies.

Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has worked quite well, research has not paid sufficient attention to the weakest actors in the system. This paper addresses the puzzle of missing cases of least-developed countries initiating WTO disputes settlement procedures. It challenges the existing literature on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement which predominantly focuses on legal capacity and economic interests. The paper provides an argument that the small universe of ‘actionable cases’, the option of free riding and the assessment of the perceived opportunity costs related to other foreign policy priorities better explain the absence of cases. In addition (and somewhat counterintuitively), we argue that the absence of cases is not necessarily bad news and shows how the weakest actors can use the dispute settlement system in a ‘lighter version’ or in indirect ways. The argument is empirically assessed by conducting a case study on four West African cotton-producing countries (C4) and their involvement in dispute settlement.

The Democratizing Effects of Multilateral Organizations: A Cautionary Note on the WTO

The field of international relations has been obsessed with democracy and democratization and its effects on international cooperation for a long time. More recently, research has turned its focus on how international organizations enhance democracy. This article contributes to this debate and applies a prominent liberal framework to study the ‘outside-in’ effects of the World Trade Organization. The article offers a critical reading of democratization through IO membership. It provides for an assessment of the dominant framework put forward by Keohane et al. (2009). In doing so, it develops a set of empirical strategies to test conjectured causal mechanisms with respect to the WTO, and illustrates the potential application by drawing on selected empirical evidence from trade politics. Finally, it proposes a number of analytical revisions to the liberal framework and outlines avenues for future research.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

The Hidden World of Multilateralism? Treaty Commitments of Newly Democratized States in Europe

Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.

The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been proliferating for the last twenty years. A large literature has studied various aspects of this phenomenon. Until recently, however, many large-N studies have paid only scant attention to variation across PTAs in terms of content and design. Our contribution to this literature is a new dataset on the design of trade agreements that is the most comprehensive in terms of both variables coded and agreements covered. We illustrate the dataset’s usefulness in re-visiting the questions if and to what extent PTAs impact trade flows. The analysis shows that on average PTAs increase trade flows, but that this effect is largely driven by deep agreements. In addition, we provide evidence that provisions that tackle behind-the-border regulation matter for trade flows. The dataset’s contribution is not limited to the PTA literature, however. Broader debates on topics such as institutional design and the legalization of international relations will also benefit from the novel data.