Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint Traces

We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to the residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.

Executive compensation and the performance of the firm

A sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest-paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs.

Mergers, executive risk reduction and stockholder wealth

Among the possible consequences of agency problems between owners and managers is a tendency by managers to make investment decisions for their firms that are deliberately aimed at reducing firm risk, as a means to control managers' personal wealth risk. The literature has suggested that such behavior may occur to the detriment of shareholder wealth, and that mrgers may be a particular class of investment decisions for which the behavior would be observable. We test these hypotheses empirically, but find no evidence from our merger sample that risk reduction for the aqquiring firm is the typical outcome nor that, when it occurs, it is differentially costly for shareholders.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

Merger decisions and executive stock ownership in acquiring firms

This study supports the proposition that managerial welfare affects merger decisions. The abnormal stock returns experienced by bidder firms, from the time of the announcement of a merger bid through the stockholder approval date, are positively relaterd to the percentage of own-company stock held by the senior management of the bidder. The results suggest that substantial amounts of own-company share ownership help align the interests of stockholders and management.