Limited managerial attention and corporate aging

As firms have more assets in place, more of management’s limited attention is focused on managing assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they have fewer growth options and a lower ability to generate new growth options. This simple theory predicts that Tobin’s q falls with age. Further, competition in the product market is expected to slow down the decrease in Tobin’s q because it forces firms to look for alternative sources of rents. Similarly, greater competition in the labor market reduces the decrease in Tobin’s q with age because old firms are in a better position to hire employees that can help with innovation. In contrast, competition in the market for corporate control should accelerate the decline because it forces management to focus more on managing assets in place whose performance is more directly observable than on developing growth options where results may not be observable for some time. We find strong support for these predictions in tests using exogenous variation in competition.

Corporate Aging and Takeover Risk

Although growth opportunities fade and profitability declines as firms mature, older firms are no more likely to be acquired than young firms are. This article documents and explains that phenomenon. We argue that, because mature organizations are rationally less flexible, they are more costly to integrate and therefore comparatively unattractive acquisition candidates. The evidence supports this explanation of the negative age dependence of takeover hazard. The evidence also shows that negative exogenous shocks to merger benefits further reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms. We test many alternative explanations and find no evidence that they can explain the hazard decline.

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

Limited managerial attention and corporate aging

As firms have more assets in place, more of management’s limited attention is focused on managing assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they have fewer growth options and a lower ability to generate new growth options. This simple theory predicts that Tobin’s q falls with age. Further, competition in the product market is expected to slow down the decrease in Tobin’s q because it forces firms to look for alternative sources of rents. Similarly, greater competition in the labor market reduces the decrease in Tobin’s q with age because old firms are in a better position to hire employees that can help with innovation. In contrast, competition in the market for corporate control should accelerate the decline because it forces management to focus more on managing assets in place whose performance is more directly observable than on developing growth options where results may not be observable for some time. We find strong support for these predictions in tests using exogenous variation in competition

Corporate dividencs and seasoned equity issues: an empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.

Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: the experience of a comprehensive sample

The sample used includes tender offers, mergers, acquisitions of privately held corporations, and comprehensive acquisitions of other firms' assets. According to the results, the majority of bid announcements prompt significant stock price increases, especially when controlling for partial anticipation problems and relative acquisition size. Furthermore, there is little evidence that firms that engage in "bad" acquisitions are more likely to be taken over.

Corporate bankruptcy and managers' self-serving behavior

We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.

Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination

If workers are wealth maximizers, codetermination should lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced firm leverage, higher and more stable salaries, and more capital-intensive production processes. Unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising wokers' morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm, shareholder wealth and firm value will decline. An analysis of West Germany's case, however, indicates that codetermination has little, if any, effect on corporate operations and performance.

Business and Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainability: Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility?

This article analyses public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the field of sustainable development from an international relations perspective with insights from the business and ethics literature. We argue that the role of business in these types of arrangements has not been sufficiently explored. After presenting three ways of approaching PPPs to stress the many facets of partnerships across the public–private divide, we discuss the emergence of these novel forms of governance from a demand side and contrast such a functionalist reading with the supply side. Then we look at the micro-economic incentives for corporations to engage in such endeavours. We develop arguments derived from the dominant literature to provide an analytical framework for explaining business participation. Finally, we discuss the role of PPPs in light of input and output legitimacy. We conclude by alluding to the emergence of an expectation-capacity gap and normative issues related to the global PPP architecture.