Cognitive response control in writer's cramp

Disturbances of the motor and sensory system as well as an alteration of the preparation of movements have been reported to play a role in the pathogenesis of dystonias. However, it is unclear whether higher aspects of cortical – like cognitive – functions are also involved. Recently, the NoGo-anteriorization (NGA) elicited with a visual continuous performance test (CPT) during recording of a 21-channel electroencephalogram has been proposed as an electrophysiological standard-index for cognitive response control. The NGA consists of a more anterior location of the positive area of the brain electrical field associated with the inhibition (NoGo-condition) compared with that of the execution (Go-condition) of a prepared motor response in the CPT. This response control paradigm was applied in 16 patients with writer’s cramp (WC) and 14 age matched healthy controls. Topographical analysis of the associated event-related potentials revealed a significant (P < 0.05) NGA effect for both patients and controls. Moreover, patients with WC showed a significantly higher global field power value (P < 0.05) in the Go-condition and a significantly higher difference-amplitude (P < 0.05) in the NoGo-condition. A source location analysis with the low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) method demonstrated a hypoactivity for the Go-condition in the parietal cortex of the right hemisphere and a hyperactivity in the NoGo-condition in the left parietal cortex in patients with WC compared with healthy controls. These results indicate an altered response control in patients with WC in widespread cortical brain areas and therefore support the hypothesis that the pathogenesis of WC is not restricted to a pure sensory-motor dysfunction.

The bivalency effect represents an interference-triggered adjustment of cognitive control: an ERP study

When bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two different tasks) occur occasionally among univalent stimuli, performance is slowed on subsequent univalent stimuli even if they have no overlapping stimulus features. This finding has been labeled the bivalency effect. It indexes an adjustment of cognitive control, but the underlying mechanism is not well understood yet. The purpose of the present study was to shed light on this question, using event-related potentials. We used a paradigm requiring predictable alternations between three tasks, with bivalent stimuli occasionally occurring on one task. The results revealed that the bivalency effect elicited a sustained parietal positivity and a frontal negativity, a neural signature that is typical for control processes implemented to resolve interference. We suggest that the bivalency effect reflects interference, which may be caused by episodic context binding.

Action crisis and cost–benefit thinking: A cognitive analysis of a goal-disengagement phase

The present research is based on the notion that disengagement from goals is not a discrete event but a process (Klinger, 1975). A critical phase in this process is when difficulties and setbacks in striving for a goal accumulate. This critical phase is termed here as an action crisis. Given the profound effects that people's thoughts have on their self-regulatory efficiency, it is essential to understand the cognitive correlates of an action crisis. In two experimental lab and two correlational field studies, the hypothesis that goal-related costs and benefits become cognitively highly accessible during an action crisis was tested and supported. Participants who were experiencing an action crisis in such diverse goal areas as intimate relationships, sports, and university studies, thought about goal-related costs and benefits more intensively and frequently in comparison to participants who were not in an action crisis. In an incidental learning task they recognized more of cost–benefit-items and less of implementation-items than the control group. Results are interpreted in terms of action phase specific mindsets (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012).

The Struggle of Giving Up Personal Goals – Affective, Physiological, and Cognitive Consequences of an Action Crisis.

A critical phase in goal striving occurs when setbacks accumulate and goal disengagement becomes an issue. This critical phase is conceptualized as an action crisis and assumed to be characterized by an intrapsychic conflict in which the individual becomes torn between further goal pursuit and goal disengagement. Our theorizing converges with Klinger’s conceptualization of goal disengagement as a process, rather than a discrete event. Two longitudinal field studies tested and found support for the hypothesis that an action crisis not only compromises an individual’s psychological and physiological well-being, but also dampens the cognitive evaluation of the respective goal. In Study 3, marathon runners experiencing an action crisis in their goal of running marathons showed a stronger cortisol secretion and a lower performance in the race 2 weeks later. Results are interpreted in terms of action-phase–specific mindsets with a focus on self-regulatory processes in goal disengagement.

Failure cue priming and impaired cognitive performance—analyses of avoidance motivation as a mediator and fear of failure as a moderator.

The present research investigates whether and how learned symbols for failure reduce task performance. We tested the effect of number priming in two countries with different learning histories for numbers. Priming numbers associated with failure (6 in Germany and 1 in Switzerland) were hypothesized to reduce performance. As expected, in Switzerland, priming with the failure number 1 reduced performance (Study 1), whereas in Germany, priming with the failure number 6 impaired performance in analogy tasks (Study 2). Study 2 additionally analyzed the mechanism and showed that the relationship between failure number priming and performance was mediated by evoked avoidance motivation and that dispositional fear of failure moderated this mediation.

The long arm of time pressure at work: Cognitive failure and commuting near-accidents

This study tests whether cognitive failures mediate effects of work-related time pressure and time control on commuting accidents and near-accidents. Participants were 83 employees (56% female) who each commuted between their regular place of residence and place of work using vehicles. The Workplace Cognitive Failure Scale (WCFS) asked for the frequency of failure in memory function, failure in attention regulation, and failure in action execution. Time pressure and time control at work were assessed by the Instrument for Stress Oriented Task Analysis (ISTA). Commuting accidents in the last 12 months were reported by 10% of participants, and half of the sample reported commuting near-accidents in the last 4 weeks. Cognitive failure significantly mediated the influence of time pressure at work on near-accidents even when age, gender, neuroticism, conscientiousness, commuting duration, commuting distance, and time pressure during commuting were controlled for. Time control was negatively related to cognitive failure and neuroticism, but no association with commuting accidents or near-accidents was found. Time pressure at work is likely to increase cognitive load. Time pressure might, therefore, increase cognitive failures during work and also during commuting. Hence, time pressure at work can decrease commuting safety. The result suggests a reduction of time pressure at work should improve commuting safety.

Age affects the adjustment of cognitive control after a conflict: evidence from the bivalency effect

Age affects cognitive control. When facing a conflict, older adults are less able to activate goal-relevant information and inhibit irrelevant information. However, cognitive control also affects the events after a conflict. The purpose of this study was to determine whether age affects the adjustment of cognitive control following a conflict. To this end, we investigated the bivalency effect, that is, the performance slowing occurring after the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with features for two tasks). In two experiments, we tested young adults (aged 20-30) and older adults (aged 65-85) in a paradigm requiring alternations between three tasks, with bivalent stimuli occasionally occurring on one task. The young adults showed a slowing for all trials following bivalent stimuli. This indicates a widespread and long-lasting bivalency effect, replicating previous findings. In contrast, the older adults showed a more specific and shorter-lived slowing. Thus, age affects the adjustment of cognitive control following a conflict.

Learning to drive: learners' self-reported cognitive failure level predicts driving instructor's observation rating of driving performance

OBJECTIVES Evidence increases that cognitive failure may be used to screen for drivers at risk. Until now, most studies have relied on driving learners. This exploratory pilot study examines self-report of cognitive failure in driving beginners and error during real driving as observed by driving instructors. METHODS Forty-two driving learners of 14 driving instructors filled out a work-related cognitive failure questionnaire. Driving instructors observed driving errors during the next driving lesson. In multiple linear regression analysis, driving errors were regressed on cognitive failure with the number of driving lessons as an estimator of driving experience controlled. RESULTS Higher cognitive failure predicted more driving errors (p < .01) when age, gender and driving experience were controlled in analysis. CONCLUSIONS Cognitive failure was significantly associated with observed driving errors. Systematic research on cognitive failure in driving beginners is recommended.

Grapheme-color synaesthesia is associated with a distinct cognitive style

In this study we investigated whether synaesthesia is associated with a particular cognitive style. Cognitive style refers to preferred modes of information processing, such as a verbal style or a visual style. We reasoned that related to the enriched world of experiences created by synaesthesia, its association with enhanced verbal and visual memory, higher imagery and creativity, synaesthetes might show enhanced preference for a verbal as well as for a visual cognitive style compared to non-synaesthetes. In Study 1 we tested a large convenience sample of 1046 participants, who classified themselves as grapheme-color, sound-color, lexical-gustatory, sequence-space, or as non-synaesthetes. To assess cognitive style, we used the revised verbalizer-visualizer questionnaire (VVQ), which involves three independent cognitive style dimensions (verbal style, visual-spatial style, and vivid imagery style). The most important result was that those who reported grapheme-color synaesthesia showed higher ratings on the verbal and vivid imagery style dimensions, but not on the visual-spatial style dimension. In Study 2 we replicated this finding in a laboratory study involving 24 grapheme-color synaesthetes with objectively confirmed synaesthesia and a closely matched control group. Our results indicate that grapheme-color synaesthetes prefer both a verbal and a specific visual cognitive style. We suggest that this enhanced preference, probably together with the greater ease to switch between a verbal and a vivid visual imagery style, may be related to cognitive advantages associated with grapheme color synaesthesia such as enhanced memory performance and creativity.

When language of instruction and language of application differ: Cognitive costs of bilingual mathematics learning

Bilingual education programs implicitly assume that the acquired knowledge is represented in a language-independent way. This assumption, however, stands in strong contrast to research findings showing that information may be represented in a way closely tied to the specific language of instruction and learning. The present study aims to examine whether and to which extent cognitive costs appear during arithmetic learning when language of instruction and language of retrieving differ. Thirty-nine high school students participating in a bilingual education program underwent a four-day training on multiplication and subtraction problems in one language (German or French), followed by a test session in which they had to solve trained as well as untrained problems in both languages. We found that cognitive costs related to language switching appeared for both arithmetic operations. Implications of our findings are discussed with respect to bilingual education as well as to cognitive mechanisms underlying different arithmetic operations.