The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis: What Does The Beast Look Like?

The concept of legitimacy has many facets. The article reviews from a politics and law perspective the diagnosis of an ``institution in crisis''. This article is divided into three sections. It starts with a cautionary note on existing fallacies about assessing multilateral intergovernmental institutions and discusses competing schools of thought that approach the World Trade Organization (WTO) with varying perceptions of democracy and legitimacy. Section II takes up the actual debate on redesigning the WTO and directs attention to the question of balancing input and output legitimacy. Section III sketches potential avenues of research that have been neglected in the past.

The Democratizing Effects of Multilateral Organizations: A Cautionary Note on the WTO

The field of international relations has been obsessed with democracy and democratization and its effects on international cooperation for a long time. More recently, research has turned its focus on how international organizations enhance democracy. This article contributes to this debate and applies a prominent liberal framework to study the ‘outside-in’ effects of the World Trade Organization. The article offers a critical reading of democratization through IO membership. It provides for an assessment of the dominant framework put forward by Keohane et al. (2009). In doing so, it develops a set of empirical strategies to test conjectured causal mechanisms with respect to the WTO, and illustrates the potential application by drawing on selected empirical evidence from trade politics. Finally, it proposes a number of analytical revisions to the liberal framework and outlines avenues for future research.

Keeping citizens, companies, and organizations informed by Web KnowARR

For the main part, electronic government (or e-government for short) aims to put digital public services at disposal for citizens, companies, and organizations. To that end, in particular, e-government comprises the application of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to support government operations and provide better governmental services (Fraga, 2002) as possible with traditional means. Accordingly, e-government services go further as traditional governmental services and aim to fundamentally alter the processes in which public services are generated and delivered, after this manner transforming the entire spectrum of relationships of public bodies with its citizens, businesses and other government agencies (Leitner, 2003). To implement this transformation, one of the most important points is to inform the citizen, business, and/or other government agencies faithfully and in an accessible way. This allows all the partaking participants of governmental affairs for a transition from passive information access to active participation (Palvia and Sharma, 2007). In addition, by a corresponding handling of the participants' data, a personalization towards these participants may even be accomplished. For instance, by creating significant user profiles as a kind of participants' tailored knowledge structures, a better-quality governmental service may be provided (i.e., expressed by individualized governmental services). To create such knowledge structures, thus known information (e.g., a social security number) can be enriched by vague information that may be accurate to a certain degree only. Hence, fuzzy knowledge structures can be generated, which help improve governmental-participants relationship. The Web KnowARR framework (Portmann and Thiessen, 2013; Portmann and Pedrycz, 2014; Portmann and Kaltenrieder, 2014), which I introduce in my presentation, allows just all these participants to be automatically informed about changes of Web content regarding a- respective governmental action. The name Web KnowARR thereby stands for a self-acting entity (i.e. instantiated form the conceptual framework) that knows or apprehends the Web. In this talk, the frameworks respective three main components from artificial intelligence research (i.e. knowledge aggregation, representation, and reasoning), as well as its specific use in electronic government will be briefly introduced and discussed.

Gender-Fair Language in Organizations: Attracting Potential Leaders and Promoting the Organizational Image of Gender Equality

In many languages, masculine generics are the traditional way of referring to women and men. However, gender-fair forms (e.g., feminine-masculine word pairs) can enhance gender equality: for instance, they counteract male biases in mental associations (Stahlberg et al., 2007) and evoke more neutral perceptions of gender-stereotypical professions (Merkel et al., 2013). Compared to masculine forms, use of gender-fair language in advertisements for leadership positions also helps to achieve gender equality in hiring decisions (e.g., use of German Geschäftsführerin/Geschäftsführer 'CEO fem/masc' instead of Geschäftsführer 'CEO masc', cf. Horvath & Sczesny, 2012). The present research investigates how potential applicants react to the use of gender-fair vs. masculine forms in German job ads for leadership positions (Study 1) and how the respective organization is perceived in response to these forms (Study 2). In Study 1, 251 participants showed higher intentions to apply for a leadership position when it was advertised with a feminine-masculine word pair instead of a masculine form; this was mediated by job appeal and organizational attraction. In Study 2, 154 participants perceived the organization as more discriminatory when masculine forms were used. This was mediated by the organizational image of gender equality. Thus, gender-fair language affects the social perception of a job and the respective organization and can impact social behavior in an organizational context.

Inseparable, incapable, or invisible: Why public organizations award no-bid contracts

No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.