Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: (1) ‘Are parties biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens?’; and (2) ‘Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of under-representation of women and poor citizens in the party system?’ A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of under-representation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help in closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

Minority Rights and Humanitarianism: The international campaign for the Ukrainians in Poland, 1930-31

In October 1930, violent action of the Polish security forces against the Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia resulted in an international campaign for the Ukrainians in Poland. Its central claim was the condemnation of these incidents as a violation of the Minorities Treaty of the League of Nations. The article focuses on the involved British extra-parliamentary groups and their international federations as well as leftist intellectuals, socialist parties and the Labour and Socialist International. In most cases, the commitment of the activists was motivated by the desire to expose a humanitarian scandal while the implementation of minority rights played a minor role. When it turned out that the first reports had presented an exaggerated version of the events, they shifted their focus to the Polish opposition whose persecution started in November 1930.

Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison

Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

Europeanization in parliament and in the press

Europeanization challenges national democratic systems. As part and parcel of the broader internationalization of politics, Europeanization is associated with a shift from policymaking within majoritarian, elected representative bodies towards technocratic decisions among non-majoritarian and non-elected bodies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2008, Lavenex 2013). It is thus said to weaken the influence of citizens and parliaments on the making of policies and to undermine democratic collective identity (Lavenex 2013, Schimmelfennig 2010). The weakening of national parliaments has been referred to as “de-parliamentarisation” (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008) and has nurtured a broader debate regarding the democratic deficit in the EU. While not being a member of the EU, Switzerland has not remained unaffected by these changes. As discussed in the contribution by Fischer and Sciarini, state executive actors take the lead in Switzerland's European policy. They are responsible for the conduct of international negotiations, they own the treaty making power, and it is up to them to decide whether they wish to launch a negotiation with the EU. In addition, the strong take-it or leave-it character of Europeanized acts limits the room for manoeuver of the parliamentary body also in the ratification phase. Among the public, the rejection of the treaty on the European constitution has definitely closed the era of “permissive consensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009). However, the process of European unification remains far remote from the European public. In Switzerland, the strongly administrative character of international legislation hinders public discussion (Vögeli 2007). In such a context, the media may serve as cue for the public: By delivering information about the extent and nature of Europeanized policymaking, the media enable citizens to form their own opinions and to hold their representatives accountable. In this sense media coverage may not only be considered an indicator of the information delivered to the public, but it may also enhance the democratic legitimacy of Europeanized policymaking (for a similar argument, see Tresch and Jochum 2005). While the previous contributions to this debate have examined the Europeanization of Swiss (primary and secondary) legislation, we take a closer look at two additional domestic arenas that are both supposed to be under pressure due to Europeanization: The parliament and the media. To that end, we rely on data gathered in a research project that two of us carried out in the context of the NCCR Democracy.1 While this project was primarily interested in the mediatization of decision-making processes in Switzerland, it also investigated the conditional role played by internationalization/Europeanization. For our present purposes, we shall exploit the two data-sets that were developed as part of a study of the political agenda-setting power of the media (Sciarini and Tresch 2012, 2013, Tresch et al. 2013): A data-set on issue attention in parliamentary interventions (initiatives, motions, postulates,2 interpellations and questions) and a data-set on issue attention in articles from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ). The data covers the years 1995 to 2003 and the coding of issues followed the classification system developed in the “Policy Agendas Project” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

The structure of the debate on EU integration issues. A comparative analysis of party communication in the EP 2014 elections

The results of Eurosceptic parties in the recent European parliament election provide further evidence that the “permissive consensus” on European integration blurred. This paper focuses on the structure of the debate on EU integration issues. Which EU integration issues and positions do parties put forward? Can the debate on EU integration issues be subsumed in one or several dimensions? Do they reflect national political conflicts such as the left-right and the ‘new politics’/cultural divide? Or do they form one unique or several EU-specific dimensions, e.g. national sovereignty versus integration? In order to address these questions, this paper departs from the assumption that debate on European integration is multidimensional in its nature and therefore entails a multitude of issue areas. In other words, it does not look at how socio-economic and cultural issues are related to European integration but focuses on its components, i.e. particular EU-specific policies such as EU-wide employment, environment, immigration and monetary policy. The paper departs from the cleavage theory on political di-visions and different approaches transferring them to EU politics. Two points should be noted; first, this paper does not compare the debate on European integration issues between the national level and the EU level, but whether domestic divisions are reflected at the EU level. Second, it is not concerned with the general ideo-logical profile of political parties on EU integration issues, but on EU issues that parties communicated through press releases. By doing this, the paper is concerned with the salient EU issues that parties touch upon.

Tracing the Evidence: The Use of Evaluation Results in Direct-Democratic Campaigns

Although research on direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland has intensified in the last decade, detailed information on the use of evidence in campaigns is still lacking. Our research aims to contribute both to research on direct democracy and to research on evidence-based policy making, by analyzing how evaluation results are used in directdemocratic campaigns. In this conceptual paper, the formulation of our hypothesis is based on a model of evaluation influence that traces the different uses of evaluation results in the process of a direct-democratic campaign. We assume that the policy analytical capacity of individual members in parliament, government and administration in the (pre)-parliamentary process fosters the use of evidence in campaigns. In the course of the campaign, symbolic use of evaluation in the form of justification, persuasion or mobilization prevails. We assume that the media is an important player in making transparent how political actors use evidence to support their positions. Evidence itself often remains ambiguous and uncertain, and evaluations are influenced by the values of the evaluator. To be able to make the right decisions, therefore, citizens should learn about possible interpretations in argumentative processes. For us, the context of direct democracy in Switzerland provides the setting for such a discourse that, besides evidence, brings up different opinions, values and beliefs.

Institutionelle Regeln oder politische Kultur? Faktoren der parlamentarischen Mitgliederfluktuation in der Schweiz

Die Frage, ob es institutionelle Regeln oder Merkmale der politischen Kultur sind, die den personellen Wechsel in Parlamenten erklären, wird auf subnationaler Ebene für alle 26 kantonalen Legislativen der Schweiz für den Zeitraum zwischen 1960 und 2012 untersucht. Die Befunde zeigen, dass sowohl institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen als auch kulturelle Merkmale bedeutende Beiträge zur Erklärung der kantonalen Unterschiede der Parlamentsfluktuation bieten. Während Massnahmen wie die Senkung der Anzahl Parlamentsmandate und die Amtszeitbeschränkung einen direkten und starken Einfluss auf die Fluktuationsrate haben, erweisen sich die Höhe der finanziellen Vergütungen und institutionelle Regeln zur Stärkung des Parlaments gegenüber der Exekutive ohne nachhaltigen Einfluss. Langfristige politisch-kulturelle Merkmale wie die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Sprachraum sind mindestens ebenso wichtig wie einzelne institutionelle Arrangements. Als relativ unbedeutend zur Erklärung der kantonalen Niveauunterschiede parlamentarischer Mitgliederfluktuation erweisen sich sozioökonomische und demographische Faktoren – mit Ausnahme des Urbanisierungsgrads.

The Marginal Impact of ENGOs in Different Types of Democratic Systems

Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) play a major role in pushing states towards more ambitious environmental policies. However, demonstrating that this presumption is in fact true is rather difficult, because the same system structures of democracies that may create more opportunities for ENGO activities are also, on their own, conducive to better environmental policies. This leaves open the possibility that the additional (marginal) impact of ENGOs on policy making is smaller than presumed. In trying to disentangle these effects, this paper examines the influence of ENGOs contingent on key structural characteristics of democratic systems. We develop the argument that presidential systems with a plurality electoral rule per se tend to provide more environmental public goods, which induces a smaller marginal impact of ENGOs. Conversely, parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral rule are likely to provide fewer environmental public goods, which allows for a larger marginal impact of ENGOs. We find robust empirical support for these hypotheses in analyses that focus on the ratification behavior of 75 democracies vis-à-vis 250 international environmental agreements in 1973–2002.

Who Is Influential and Why? The Determinants of Reputational Power

Power is one of the most fundamental concepts in political science, and it is a crucial aspect of decision-making structures. The distribution of power between political actors and coalitions of actors informs us about who is actually able to influence decision-making processes. It is thus no surprise that power is a centerpiece of our assessment of political decision-making in Switzerland. In line with the main argument of this book, Chapter 3 has uncovered important changes in decision-making structures, which resulted in a rebalancing of power between governing parties, interest groups and state executive actors. Conjecturing about the reasons that may account for these changes, we pointed to factors of an organizational and institutional nature. For example, we put forward the decline of pre-parliamentary procedures oriented towards corporatist intermediation as a possible explanation for the weakening of interest groups. More generally, in several chapters it has been suggested that there is a relationship between the institutional design of a decision-making process, the related importance of decision-making phases and an actor's participation in these phases on the one hand, and the power of actors (and coalitions of actors) on the other. In addition, the analyses carried out in Chapters 2 to 5 draw our attention to the differences in power structure across decision-making processes or types of processes.