M-Functionals of Multivariate Scatter

This survey provides a self-contained account of M-estimation of multivariate scatter. In particular, we present new proofs for existence of the underlying M-functionals and discuss their weak continuity and differentiability. This is done in a rather general framework with matrix-valued random variables. By doing so we reveal a connection between Tyler's (1987) M-functional of scatter and the estimation of proportional covariance matrices. Moreover, this general framework allows us to treat a new class of scatter estimators, based on symmetrizations of arbitrary order. Finally these results are applied to M-estimation of multivariate location and scatter via multivariate t-distributions.

The structure of the debate on EU integration issues. A comparative analysis of party communication in the EP 2014 elections

The results of Eurosceptic parties in the recent European parliament election provide further evidence that the “permissive consensus” on European integration blurred. This paper focuses on the structure of the debate on EU integration issues. Which EU integration issues and positions do parties put forward? Can the debate on EU integration issues be subsumed in one or several dimensions? Do they reflect national political conflicts such as the left-right and the ‘new politics’/cultural divide? Or do they form one unique or several EU-specific dimensions, e.g. national sovereignty versus integration? In order to address these questions, this paper departs from the assumption that debate on European integration is multidimensional in its nature and therefore entails a multitude of issue areas. In other words, it does not look at how socio-economic and cultural issues are related to European integration but focuses on its components, i.e. particular EU-specific policies such as EU-wide employment, environment, immigration and monetary policy. The paper departs from the cleavage theory on political di-visions and different approaches transferring them to EU politics. Two points should be noted; first, this paper does not compare the debate on European integration issues between the national level and the EU level, but whether domestic divisions are reflected at the EU level. Second, it is not concerned with the general ideo-logical profile of political parties on EU integration issues, but on EU issues that parties communicated through press releases. By doing this, the paper is concerned with the salient EU issues that parties touch upon.

Perceptual Training in Beach Volleyball Defence: Different Effects of Gaze-Path Cueing on Gaze and Decision-Making

For perceptual-cognitive skill training, a variety of intervention methods has been proposed, including the so-called “color-cueing method” which aims on superior gaze-path learning by applying visual markers. However, recent findings challenge this method, especially, with regards to its actual effects on gaze behavior. Consequently, after a preparatory study on the identification of appropriate visual cues for life-size displays, a perceptual-training experiment on decision-making in beach volleyball was conducted, contrasting two cueing interventions (functional vs. dysfunctional gaze path) with a conservative control condition (anticipation-related instructions). Gaze analyses revealed learning effects for the dysfunctional group only. Regarding decision-making, all groups showed enhanced performance with largest improvements for the control group followed by the functional and the dysfunctional group. Hence, the results confirm cueing effects on gaze behavior, but they also question its benefit for enhancing decision-making. However, before completely denying the method’s value, optimisations should be checked regarding, for instance, cueing-pattern characteristics and gaze-related feedback.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Learning Spike-Based Population Codes by Reward and Population Feedback

We investigate a recently proposed model for decision learning in a population of spiking neurons where synaptic plasticity is modulated by a population signal in addition to reward feedback. For the basic model, binary population decision making based on spike/no-spike coding, a detailed computational analysis is given about how learning performance depends on population size and task complexity. Next, we extend the basic model to n-ary decision making and show that it can also be used in conjunction with other population codes such as rate or even latency coding.

Code-specific learning rules improve action selection by populations of spiking neurons

Population coding is widely regarded as a key mechanism for achieving reliable behavioral decisions. We previously introduced reinforcement learning for population-based decision making by spiking neurons. Here we generalize population reinforcement learning to spike-based plasticity rules that take account of the postsynaptic neural code. We consider spike/no-spike, spike count and spike latency codes. The multi-valued and continuous-valued features in the postsynaptic code allow for a generalization of binary decision making to multi-valued decision making and continuous-valued action selection. We show that code-specific learning rules speed up learning both for the discrete classification and the continuous regression tasks. The suggested learning rules also speed up with increasing population size as opposed to standard reinforcement learning rules. Continuous action selection is further shown to explain realistic learning speeds in the Morris water maze. Finally, we introduce the concept of action perturbation as opposed to the classical weight- or node-perturbation as an exploration mechanism underlying reinforcement learning. Exploration in the action space greatly increases the speed of learning as compared to exploration in the neuron or weight space.

Improving memory in elderly adults by instructing them in professional actors' learning strategies

This study examined a new type of cognitive intervention. For four weeks, participants (ages 65 to 82) were instructed in professional acting techniques, followed by rehearsal and performance of theatrical scenes. Although the training was not targeted in any way to the tasks used in pre- and post-testing, participants produced significantly higher recall and recognition scores after the intervention. It is suggested that the cognitive effort involved in analyzing and adopting theatrical characters' motivations (and then experiencing those characters' mental/emotional states during performance) is responsible for the observed improvement. A secondary strand of this study showed that participants who were given annotated scripts in which the implied goals of the characters were made explicit demonstrated significantly faster access to the stored material, as measured by a computer latency task.

Perceptual learning of motion discrimination by mental imagery.

Perceptual learning can occur when stimuli are only imagined, i.e., without proper stimulus presentation. For example, perceptual learning improved bisection discrimination when only the two outer lines of the bisection stimulus were presented and the central line had to be imagined. Performance improved also with other static stimuli. In non-learning imagery experiments, imagining static stimuli is different from imagining motion stimuli. We hypothesized that those differences also affect imagery perceptual learning. Here, we show that imagery training also improves motion direction discrimination. Learning occurs when no stimulus at all is presented during training, whereas no learning occurs when only noise is presented. The interference between noise and mental imagery possibly hinders learning. For static bisection stimuli, the pattern is just the opposite. Learning occurs when presented with the two outer lines of the bisection stimulus, i.e., with only a part of the visual stimulus, while no learning occurs when no stimulus at all is presented.

Sustainable Wastewater Management: Is it Possible to Regulate Micropollution in the Future by Learning from the Past? A Policy Analysis

This paper applies a policy analysis approach to the question of how to effectively regulate micropollution in a sustainable manner. Micropollution is a complex policy problem characterized by a huge number and diversity of chemical substances, as well as various entry paths into the aquatic environment. It challenges traditional water quality management by calling for new technologies in wastewater treatment and behavioral changes in industry, agriculture and civil society. In light of such challenges, the question arises as to how to regulate such a complex phenomenon to ensure water quality is maintained in the future? What can we learn from past experiences in water quality regulation? To answer these questions, policy analysis strongly focuses on the design and choice of policy instruments and the mix of such measures. In this paper, we review instruments commonly used in past water quality regulation. We evaluate their ability to respond to the characteristics of a more recent water quality problem, i.e., micropollution, in a sustainable way. This way, we develop a new framework that integrates both the problem dimension (i.e., causes and effects of a problem) as well as the sustainability dimension (e.g., long-term, cross-sectoral and multi-level) to assess which policy instruments are best suited to regulate micropollution. We thus conclude that sustainability criteria help to identify an appropriate instrument mix of end-of-pipe and source-directed measures to reduce aquatic micropollution.

Forest regeneration capacity and its enhancement by forest management and silviculture in Cabo Delgado

SDC has been involved in rural development in Cabo Delgado for more than 30 years. Shortly after the independence of Mozambique, projects in water supply and integrated rural development were initiated. The silvoagropastoral project FO9 based in Mueda was a very early experience in forestry in Cabo Delgado. Andreas Kläy was responsible for the forestry sector in FO9 for 3 years in the early 1980s and had an opportunity to initiate an exchange of ideas and experience in rural development theory and approaches with Yussuf Adam, who was doing research in human anthropology and history in the province. 25 years later, the current situation of forest management in Cabo Delgado was reassessed, with a specific focus on concessions in the North. The opportunity for a partnership between the MITI SA, the University of Eduardo Mondlane, and CDE was created on the basis of this preliminary study1. The aim of this partnership is to generate knowledge and develop capacity for sustainable forest management. The preliminary study showed that “…we have to face weaknesses and would like to start a learning process with the main institutions, organisations, and stakeholder groups active in forest management and research in the North of Cabo Delgado. This learning process will involve studies supported by competent research institutions and workshops …” The specific objectives of ESAPP project Q804 are the following: 1. Contribute to understanding of the forestry sector; 2. Capacity development for professionals and academics; 3. Support for the private sector and the local forest service; 4. Support data generation at Cabo Delgado's Provincial Service; 5. Capacity development for Swiss academic institutions (CDE and ETHZ). A conceptual planning platform was elaborated as a basis for cooperation and research in the partnership (cf. Annex 1). The partners agreed to work on two lines of research: biophysical and socio-economic. In order to ensure a transdisciplinary approach, disciplinary research is anchored in common understanding in workshops based on the LforS methods. These workshops integrate the main stakeholders in the local context of the COMADEL concession in Nangade District managed by MITI SA, and take place in the village of Namiune. The research team observed that current management schemes consist mainly of strategies of nature mining by most stakeholders involved. Institutional settings - formal and informal - have little impact due to weak capacity at the local level and corruption. Local difficulties in a remote rural area facilitate external access to resources and are perpetuated by the loss of benefits. The benefits of logging remain at the top level (economic and political elites). The interests of the owners of the concession in stopping the loss of resources caused by this regime offers a unique opportunity to intervene in the logic of resource degradation and agony in rural development and forest management.