Identity, incentives and the value of information

We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

Dynamic Activity-Related Incentives for Physical Activity.

The present studies adopted the theoretical framework of activity- and purpose-related incentives (Rheinberg, 2008) to explain the maintenance of physical activity. We hypothesized that activity-related incentives (e.g., “fun”) increase more than purpose-related incentives (e.g., “health”) between the initiation and maintenance phase of physical activity. Additionally, change in activity-related incentives was hypothesized to be a better predictor of maintenance of physical activity than change in purpose-related incentives. Two correlative field studies with rehabilitation patients (Study 1) and Nordic Walkers (Study 2) were conducted to test the hypotheses. Participants’ incentives of physical activity were measured at the beginning of exercising and two weeks (Study 1; T2) and three months (Study 2; T2) later. At T2, participants were asked for their current physical activity. Both studies showed a greater change of activity-related incentives than purpose-related incentives. Furthermore, change in activity-related incentives was more predictive of the maintenance of physical activity than change in purpose-related incentives. The results showed the important role of activity-related incentives in maintenance of physical activity. The theoretical contribution to physical activity maintenance research and practical implications for health promotion programs were discussed.

Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.