Prazer com razão: análise e crítica da ética sexual Kantiana

This work aims to present the foundations of Kantian ethics concerning to moral judgments about sexual practices. It shows that the sexual act, for the philosopher, inevitably degrades individuals who are taking part of it, given its objectifying nature, manifested in the usage of individuals as mere means to obtain pleasure. To solve this quandary of nature since humanity is an end in itself, by the virtue of being bearer of rationality and cannot, therefore, be treated as mere means Kant claims that marriage is morally the appropriate locus for the exercise of sexuality, given the reciprocity forged there, preventing degradation. In marriage, the bond established between the impulse of nature to the conservation of the species achieved through the sexual intercourse opened to procreation and the duty of man in regarding himself as an animal being preserving the species without degrading the person is accomplished in a fully moral way. This text clarifies that the justification for the assumption of this solution is fixed at two developments of the categorical imperative: the formulas of the law of nature and humanity. Despite the fact the first brings significant contributions to human relations through the concept of reciprocity, the second establishes a normative role for the teleological argument of sexuality, becoming an obstacle in kantian's practical philosophy. To overcome that obstacle, we outline a critics which relies on the studies of Michel Foucault about sex and the power techniques related to them, producer of a scientia sexualis in the Western, demonstrating that the moral of the philosopher from Königsberg is also present in this project somehow. Finally, in a foucaultian's reading of kantian Aufklärung, we recognize that, to propose new ethical possibilities of the experience of sexuality, it is necessary to think and create new relational spaces in which the subject takes autonomously the government of self.

Os efeitos do reconhecimento da diversidade sexual como um direito humano pelo sistema interamericano de proteção

La diversidad sexual emerge en las Américas como una de las cuestiones más importantes en relación con la protección y promoción de los derechos humanos. A partir de la democratización de la mayor parte de los Estados Sudamericanos en los años 80, se ha iniciado una discusión acerca de la ampliación del concepto de igualdad con el fin de introducir el derecho a la diferencia como otra expresión de la dignidad de la persona humana, cuyos estudios fueron encabezado de lo que se llamaba La hermenéutica de la Diversidad. En este escenario, el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos aparece como el principal responsable por el proceso de reconocimiento de la diversidad sexual como un derecho humano, lo que permite la asignación de temas tales como la sexualidad y el género en la agenda de los principales órganos regionales de protección de derechos humanos, así como en la agenda de algunos Estados, que por su promoción de políticas de diversidad han llegado a ser considerados empresarios normativos en relación con el libre ejercicio de la sexualidad humana. En este sentido, se pretende con esta tesis analizar el proceso de reconocimiento de la diversidad sexual como un derecho humano en el marco del sistema interamericano de protección, comprobando el potencial normativo de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay con respecto a la adopción de normas internas promoción de la diversidad sexual. También tenemos la intención de analizar la norma internacional llamada Convención Interamericana contra todas las formas de discriminación e intolerancia como el primer tratado producido por el sistema interamericano para la protección de la sexualidad como un derecho digno de protección. La investigación ha demostrado que después de la posición adoptada por la Comisión y la Corte Interamericana respecto al ejercicio de la sexualidad, países como Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay promovieron un progreso significativo en el campo de las libertades individuales y en el campo de las políticas públicas de asignación de la sexualidad como un derecho que necesita de una protección efectiva del Estado

O direito fundamental à igualdade no contexto da identidade sexual no Brasil: um estudo da situação jurídico-constitucional com ênfase no exame da suposta inconstitucionalidade por omissão do legislador civil

This dissertation analyses the Brazilian Supreme Court’s judgement in the Non-compliance Action of the Fundamental Precept 132/RJ and in the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 4277/DF, which created in the country the same-sex civil union. In This decision, the STF interpreted according to the constitution Article 1.723 of the Civil Code, invoking several fundamentals reaffirmed in the Constitution. From all these laws invoked by the Supreme Court to support the pretorian creation, the content of consitutional Law regarding equality is the only that corresponds, and it is sufficient to evidence the necessity of the creation, by legislator, of the institute for civil rights, since the Constitution forbids distinctions that is not expressly provided for in the Constitution (Art. 3º, IV, of Federal Constitution). In this way, Article 226, § 3º is not an exception capable of satisfying the condition of the consitutional foresight because although it protect, according its content only the civil union “between the man and the woman”, it is not able to forbid the creation, by legislator, of another kinds of families, including the same-sex civil union. As such, the reasoning, now legitimate according to the legislator, is not support the creation of institute by Constitutional Court, because the Court may enforce the Law, interpreting in the purviews allowed by the legal text and its constitutionality. In regard to the civil union of individuos of the same sex, the Court could not deduce that such union was implied by Law, like the interpretation according to the Constitution given by judges, on grounds of semantic purviews of the words man and woman, existents in both articles. The Court could not created it either, exceeding the legal system role. So, upon the institute creation, the STF, exceeded two limits: the interpretation and Law enforcement.