Limites formais e materiais ao controle de constitucionalidade pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal

This document approaches the formal and material limits of the constitucionalidade control for the Supreme Federal Court, iniating with the study of the Constitution, detaching its evolution, nature and meanings, passing for its historical evolution, offering still a unconstitutionality concept. Is work the principles as material Constitution, making the distinction entere principles and rules, detaching the characteristics of the principles constitutional, and the basic principle of the Constituition. It analyzes metodologics the historical parameters and of the brazilian system of constitutionality control and detaches the paper of the Supreme Federal Court as positive legislator. It observes the beddings of the constitutionality control and the legitimacy of the Supreme Federal Court. Is examines the performance of the Supreme Federal Court in face of the principle of the legal security. Is offers a vision on the experience of the control of constitutionality in other constries. It still approaches the control of constitutionality in Brazil, detaching the critical points of its formal and material limits. Is verifies the application of the principles constitutional for the Supreme Federal Court in the diffuse control and the intent control of constitutionality, as well as the performance of the Supreme Federal Court ahead of the unconstitutional omissions. It brings to the debate the new perspectives how much to the formal and material limits of the control of constitutionality for the Supreme Federal Court. Objective to elaborate considerations concerning the limits of the constitutional jurisdiction from the model of Constituition, the character politican of the difficulties with respect to the definition of its formal and material limits from the performance of the Supreme Federal Court

A objetivação do controle concreto de constitucionalidade nas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal

The independence of the United States and the revolutions that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century led to the birth of the written constitution, with a mission to limit the power of the State and to ensure fundamental rights to citizens. Thus, the Constitution has become the norm and ultimate founding of the State. Because of this superiority felt the need to protect her, emerging from that constitutional jurisdiction, taking control of constitutionality of provisions his main instrument. In Brazil, the constitutionality control began with the Constitution of 1891, when "imported" the American model, which is named after incidental diffuse model of judicial review. Indeed, allowed that any judge or court could declare the unconstitutionality of the law or normative act in a concrete case. However, the Brazilian Constituent did not bring the U.S. Institute of stare decisis, by which the precedents of higher courts eventually link the below. Because of this lack, each tribunal Brazilian freely decide about the constitutionality of a rule, so that the decision took effect only between the parties to the dispute. This prompted the emergence of conflicting decisions between judicantes organs, which ultimately undermine legal certainty and the image of the judiciary. As a solution to the problem, was incorporated from the 1934 Constitution to rule that the Senate would suspend the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. With the introduction of abstract control of constitutionality, since 1965, the Supreme Court went on to also have the power to declare the invalidity of the provision unconstitutional, effectively against all without the need for the participation of the Senate. However, it remained the view that in case the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of the fuzzy control law by the Senate would continue with the competence to suspend the law unconstitutional, thus the decision of the Praetorium Exalted restricted parties. The 1988 Constitution strengthened the abstract control expanding legitimized the Declaratory Action of Unconstitutionality and creating new mechanisms of abstract control. Adding to this, the Constitutional Amendment. No. 45/2004 brought the requirement of general repercussion and created the Office of Binding Precedent, both to be applied by the Supreme Court judgments in individual cases, thus causing an approximation between the control abstract and concrete constitutional. Saw themselves so that the Supreme Court, to be the guardian of the Constitution, its action should be directed to the trial of issues of public interest. In this new reality, it becomes more necessary the participation of the Senate to the law declared unconstitutional in fuzzy control by the Supreme Court can reach everyone, because such an interpretation has become obsolete. So, to adapt it to this reality, such a rule must be read in the sense that the Senate give publicity to the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, since mutated constitutional

A missão política do Supremo Tribunal Federal: análise de sua importância como corte constitucional para o controle do poder no Brasil

The following study proposes an analysis of the politic process which the brazilian constitutional justice faces, emphasizing the Supremo Tribunal Federal . For that purpose, we start by examining the intimate relationship between Politics and Law, in view of the most recent social systems theories, so that the political system is distinguished by the exclusiveness of using the physical force, intending to make coletive tying decisions, and the juridical system as a congruent generalization of the expectations towards the rules and principles, brought together under an interdependence by which both gather legitimacy and effectiveness. In this manner we can notice the political effects of the constitutional interpretation conducted by Judges as well as by other juridical professionals, because these ones decrease the overload of expectations which are pointed to the Judicature. Constitutional interpretation is democratized since the participative democracy arises and stablishes a permanent state of awareness around the exercise of power and favours the preservation of the pluralism (counter-majoritary principle) where we can find the origin of the democratic nature of constitutional courts, once, in most cases, their members are not elected by the people. After that, we analyse the historical posture of the Supremo Tribunal Federal as a constitutional court in Brazil, so we can realize the attempts to make it vulnerable to the appeals of governability and economical aims, agains which this court somehow has resisted, stressing its particularities. At the end, it s concluded that even the so-called acts of government, whose judiciary control is mostly repelled, are subjected to a constitutional analysis, last frontier to be explored by the Supremo Tribunal Federal in its role of exposing our republican Constitution