Somos todos canibais: antropofagia, corpo e educação sensível

Cette étude présente l anthropophagie comme une notion théorique et experiementale du corps qui réhabilite le sensible et réveille le monde perçu. L argumentation fait ressortir la dimension sensible du corps et de la connaissance, en considerant sa sensibilité et motricité, corps qui ne se sépare pas de la nature et de l histoire, en actuant dans le monde comme présence vive, originaire, en mouvement ; en supposant un sujet qui, au même temps que construit ses propres senses, il dépend de l expérience de l autre et du monde, en créant et en recréant la culture, et il agrandit le processus de connaître, de sentir, de penser, d agir, d être, de se transformer. Cette attitude annonce une connaissance sensible et un corps qui est suscetible de sensations, mais d expréssions aussi, de communication, de création, aspects indispensables pour se pensar l éducation comme un space sensible, d apprantissage et réssignification de la culture ; que dévient possible la communion avec le corps, le temps, le space ; qu enseigne à réapprendre à voir le monde, que considère la réversibilité des senses et l esthésie comme champs de l expérience sensible et de l imputation des senses ; qu évoque la beauté des multiples léctures du vécu et qu agrandit la compréhension du soi et de l autre. L objectif de ce travail est comprendre l anthropophagie comme une attitude du corps et de la connaisance sensible, qu approfondit la rélation de l être au monde, la rélation avec l autre et permet la création de senses culturelles, ésthetiques et éxistentielles our l éducation. Nos présentons l attitude phénomologique de Maurice Merleau-Ponty comme référence théorique et méthodologique de notre recherche. Il s agit d une attitude de la pensée qui place la conaissance au centre de nos expériences vécues au monde ; une attitude qui ne propose pas un sens définitif des choses et des personnes et qui contribue pour la compréhension de l anthropophagie, du corps, du sensible, du monde et de l autre, en indiquant des développements de ces réflexions pour l éducation. En créant des horizonts de sense et strastégies de pérception sur l anthopophagie, nos considérons comme choix notre expérience vécu, comme les voyages; atelier d extension avec des élèves du cours de Technologie en Production Culturelle de l Institut Fédéral d Éducation, Science et Technologie du Rio Grande do Norte-IFRN, Campus Cidade Alta ; l anthropophagie comme élement de l Art Moderne Brésilien ; les créations et les récits des élèves ; images ; filmes et livres recherchés ; dialogues avec les penseurs Lévi-Strauss, Montaigne et Oswald de Andrade, qui constituent nos principales références conceptuelles et qui ont permis traversé des savoirs et promouvoir un dialogue entre divers champs de connaissance, comme l Anthropologie, la Philosophie, l Art et l Éducation. Ces stratégies constituent le resultat partiel et inachevé d un processus de connaisance de soi et de l autre, que permet de revivre des mémoires, faire ressortir des couleurs, des senses, des goûts, des découvertes sensibles et encourageantes sur la connaissance, sur l art, des découvertes sur soi même, sur l autre, sur le monde, sur la vie, indiquant que l éducation peut être un processus fort sensible, dans lequel le corps est une présence indispensable, aussi comme le toucher, le créer, les delires, les affections, les encontres et l invention

A morada do pensamento: um encontro com Platão na busca da natureza do sentido em Frege

The ontological investigation of sense, from German philosopher Gottlob Frege s point of view, has, as its foundation, the understanding of reference, representation, thought and sense s categories. According to Frege s writings, On Sense and Reference, and Thoughts Logical Investigations, sense carries itself the solution for the problem of identity s relation. Sense gives us the knowledge s increment that identity doesn t give. But still there is a problem: the definition of sense's nature. Sense couldn t have its nature strictly defined because, in this case, it would be reduced to reference s category and thus, sense would be identified with the own extra-linguistic object, and this is a misconception. But Frege said that thought must be considered as the sense of the sentence. So, with this close relationship between sense and thought, a new goal in this investigation is putt in focus: thought. To Frege, thought is not a simple subjective performance of thinking, it is not a subjective representation, but it is an objective content that is real, eternal, and that exists by itself in a third realm . Thought exists in a realm beyond the world of subjective representations and beyond the world of sensible perception. From this point, the present investigation went back to Plato s World of Ideas. So, the platonic thinking was included in this debate about the metaphysic of the third realm in Frege, trying to clarify the original concepts of knowledge, reality and truth. To achieve this objective, the following dialogues had been included in our research: Theaetetus, Republic and Phaedo. And the following fregean questions had been brought to Plato's scope: how happens the new knowledge? What is the third realm s reality? What is the relation between truth and thought? Doing that we could see as much some of the platonic origins of Frege's approach, as some differences between this two philosophers

Merleau-Ponty: uma ontologia do visível

This work discusses the ontology of the visible at the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), which points to a depth and opacity of the perceived world that oppose transparency of geometric world thought by René Descartes (1596-1650). At first we approached the Cartesian discourse developed in Dioptrics Descartes, the first of three scientific discourses published in 1637, being introduced by the famous Discourse method. In this sense, this research discusses the mechanistic explanation that the modern philosopher has the vision, process comprising the formation of images on the retina and its communication to the brain, and the subsequent reading performed by an immaterial mind. Discusses the notion of image as a result of the interpretation of the spirit because, for Descartes, is not the eye that sees, but the spirit that reads and decodes the signals that the body receives the world. At another point, reflected on the criticism of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the thought of overflight present in Dioptrics Descartes. Therefore, it takes as its reference the third part of the book The Eye and the Spirit (1961), in which the intellectualist approach of vision is considered a failed attempt to move away from the visible to rebuild it from anywhere . In this sense, it reflects on a new ontology proposed by Merleau-Ponty thinking being without departing from the puzzles of the body and vision. Puzzles that show a promiscuity between the seer and the seen, between sentient and sensitive. Thus, this paper discusses how visibility was treated by the contemporary philosopher, not as something to be judged by the spirit to get a real nature of things, but as a manifestation of the same things. Finally, this research explores the ontology of the visible in merleaupontiano thought, an ontology that does not rebuild or appropriates visible by a thought of overflight, but what you do from your own visibility as compared original and constant with depth in the world.

Merleau-Ponty: uma ontologia do visível

This work discusses the ontology of the visible at the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), which points to a depth and opacity of the perceived world that oppose transparency of geometric world thought by René Descartes (1596-1650). At first we approached the Cartesian discourse developed in Dioptrics Descartes, the first of three scientific discourses published in 1637, being introduced by the famous Discourse method. In this sense, this research discusses the mechanistic explanation that the modern philosopher has the vision, process comprising the formation of images on the retina and its communication to the brain, and the subsequent reading performed by an immaterial mind. Discusses the notion of image as a result of the interpretation of the spirit because, for Descartes, is not the eye that sees, but the spirit that reads and decodes the signals that the body receives the world. At another point, reflected on the criticism of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the thought of overflight present in Dioptrics Descartes. Therefore, it takes as its reference the third part of the book The Eye and the Spirit (1961), in which the intellectualist approach of vision is considered a failed attempt to move away from the visible to rebuild it from anywhere . In this sense, it reflects on a new ontology proposed by Merleau-Ponty thinking being without departing from the puzzles of the body and vision. Puzzles that show a promiscuity between the seer and the seen, between sentient and sensitive. Thus, this paper discusses how visibility was treated by the contemporary philosopher, not as something to be judged by the spirit to get a real nature of things, but as a manifestation of the same things. Finally, this research explores the ontology of the visible in merleaupontiano thought, an ontology that does not rebuild or appropriates visible by a thought of overflight, but what you do from your own visibility as compared original and constant with depth in the world.