Intervenção judicial nas sociedades limitadas em face da liberdade de iniciativa

The judicial intervention in limited liability company goes through several issues of legislative and hermeneutics origin, based considerably on the small importance given to freedom of economic initiative by the participants in the process of formation and application of the law. In addition, Brazilian law, due to incompleteness, inconsistency or lack of valid grounds, put the judge in a procedural delicate situation. Being forced to judge, the judiciary faces severe uncomfortable interpretive situations, of which derive solutions of dubious constitutionality and affecting, significantly, the dynamics of business activity. In this context, and considering the limited liability company as an expression of free enterprise, corresponding to a lawful association of people in order to undertake economically, in exercise of his freedom of contracting and professional action, intended to be offered safe parameters of constitutionality for judicial intervention in limited liability company in the hypothesis of (i) transfer of corporate shares, (ii) attachment of corporate shares, (iii) dismissal of directors, (iv) appointment of judicial stakeholders, (v) exclusion of shareholders and (vi ) trespass. The hypothetical-deductive approach was adopted, building hypotheses to overcome the gaps and unconstitutionality of the law and subjecting them to tests, reviews, and comparisons with hypothetical facts and case law in order to determine the constitutional validity of the proposed solutions. The procedure aimed to reconcile the historical, comparative, dialectical and scientific methods. The roots of temporal institutes were researched as well as current solutions provided by national and compared law. From problematizations point, addressed by the constitutional interpretation of the law and jurisprudence, responses that bring out the unconstitutionality of certain conceptions were headed

Contribuição ao estudo da isonomia na tributação sob a perspectiva da ordem econômica

The study aims to investigate the limits of state intervention via induction on Economic Order, especially in cases regarding tax equality, through the analysis of their effects on economic development and on free competition from the perspective of economic efficiency and the Constitution. Thus, the work seeks to demonstrate that the achievement of equality in taxation is important in that it strengthens the economic relations in terms of efficiency, protects competition and fosters economic development to reduce regional and social inequalities and other constitutional desiderata. A dissertation is characterized by interdisciplinarity and was divided into two parts. The first is to discuss the legal meaning of equality from the doctrinal analysis of the principle and the relationship between equality and justice in the economic sense without rejecting its philosophical content. It is noteworthy that hermeneutics and the philosophy of language are useful tools for achieving equality in presenting the pragmatic methodologies applicable to the subject in terms of corrective justice. Based on these general assumptions, is going to study the tax equality and their characteristics, the corollary of the ability to pay and its relation to the economic capacity and the issue of progressivity in taxation as an ideal of distributive justice. The second part concerns the legal foundations of Economic Order and its relation to extrafiscality as a means of economic regulation in order to investigate the efficiency of this induction in order to promote economic development, free competition and tax equality itself to reduce inequalities and distributing wealth. Within this context, we investigated the scope of the constitutional principles of economic order, free enterprise and free competition, and favored differential treatment for small and medium enterprises, the issue of regional development for the reduction of regional and social inequalities, the problem the "fiscal war" and finally the efficiency from the perspective of Economic Analysis of Law

Imunidade recíproca e livre concorrência: considerações acerca de sua fruição por empresas estatais

This study begins with a brief overview of tax immu nities in general, dealing with the concept, legal, doctrinal ratings and limits. Then enters into the reciprocal immunity, since its birth in the United States, its justifica tions, until her current developments in the Brazilian Supreme Court, which has expanded it quite considerably. That Court has extended to state owned enterprises, even if pa id by public prices or rates, or if acts somewhat away from its essential functions, es pecially if they are public services provider. Given this linkage, these are also treate d in own topic, grounded in newer doctrinal proposals and less attached to historical formalisms (see such Supremacy of Public Interest over Private one). Public services are approached in its diversity, oblivious to traditional monolithic nature and accu stomed to the modern doctrine of fundamental human rights. It deals also the princip les of free enterprise and free competition, given that the public service provider s have lived intensely in this environment, be they public or private agents. In d ialectical topic, these institutes are placed in joint discussion, all in an attempt to in vestigate their interactions and propose criteria less generic and removed from real ity, to assess the legitimacy of the mutual enjoyment of immunity by certain agents. Sev eral cases of the Court are analyzed individually, checking in each one the app lication of the proposed criteria, such logical-deductive activity and theory of pract ice approach. At the end, the conclusions refer to a reciprocal immunity less rhe torical and ideological and more pragmatic and consequentialist. It is proposed the end to the general rules or abstract formulas of subsumption, with concerns on the one h and the actual maintenance of the federal pact, and on the other by a solid econo mic order without inapt advantages to certain players, which flatly contradicts the co nstitutional premises.