Um estudo sobre as origens da Lógica Matemáitca

The present study has as objective to explaining about the origins of the mathematical logic. This has its beginning attributed to the autodidactic English mathematician George Boole (1815-1864), especially because his books The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847) and An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854) are recognized as the inaugural works of the referred branch. However, surprisingly, in the same time another mathematician called Augutus of Morgan (1806-1871) it also published a book, entitled Formal Logic (1847), in defense of the mathematic logic. Even so, times later on this same century, another work named Elements of Logic (1875) it appeared evidencing the Aristotelian logic with Richard Whately (1787-1863), considered the better Aristotelian logical of that time. This way, our research, permeated by the history of the mathematics, it intends to study the logic produced by these submerged personages in the golden age of the mathematics (19th century) to we compare the valid systems in referred period and we clarify the origins of the mathematical logic. For that we looked for to delineate the panorama historical wrapper of this study. We described, shortly, biographical considerations about these three representatives of the logic of the 19th century formed an alliance with the exhibition of their point of view as for the logic to the light of the works mentioned above. In this sense, we aspirated to present considerations about what effective Aristotelian´s logic existed in the period of Boole and De Morgan comparing it with the new emerging logic (the mathematical logic). Besides of this, before the textual analysis of the works mentioned above, we still looked for to confront the systems of Boole and De Morgan for we arrive to the reason because the Boole´s system was considered better and more efficient. Separate of this preponderance we longed to study the flaws verified in the logical system of Boole front to their contemporaries' production, verifying, for example, if they repeated or not. We concluded that the origins of the mathematical logic is in the works of logic of George Boole, because, in them, has the presentation of a new logic, matematizada for the laws of the thought similar to the one of the arithmetic, while De Morgan, in your work, expand the Aristotelian logic, but it was still arrested to her

Uma reavaliação do pensamento lógico de George Boole à luz da história da matemática

The aim of the present study is to reevaluate the logical thought of the English mathematician George Boole (1815 - 1864). Thus, our research centers on the mathematical analysis of logic in the context of the history of mathematics. In order to do so, we present various biographical considerations about Boole in the light of events that happened in the 19th century and their consequences for mathematical production. We briefly describe Boole's innovations in the areas of differential equations and invariant theory and undertake an analysis of Boole's logic, especially as formulated in the book The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, comparing it not only with the traditional Aristotelian logic, but also with modern symbolic logic. We conclude that Boole, as he intended, expanded logic both in terms of its content and also in terms of its methods and formal elaboration. We further conclude that his purpose was the mathematical modeling of deductive reasoning, which led him to present an innovative formalism for logic and, because the different ways it can be interpreted, a new conception of mathematics

Deciding difference logic in a Nelson-Oppen combination framework

O método de combinação de Nelson-Oppen permite que vários procedimentos de decisão, cada um projetado para uma teoria específica, possam ser combinados para inferir sobre teorias mais abrangentes, através do princípio de propagação de igualdades. Provadores de teorema baseados neste modelo são beneficiados por sua característica modular e podem evoluir mais facilmente, incrementalmente. Difference logic é uma subteoria da aritmética linear. Ela é formada por constraints do tipo x − y ≤ c, onde x e y são variáveis e c é uma constante. Difference logic é muito comum em vários problemas, como circuitos digitais, agendamento, sistemas temporais, etc. e se apresenta predominante em vários outros casos. Difference logic ainda se caracteriza por ser modelada usando teoria dos grafos. Isto permite que vários algoritmos eficientes e conhecidos da teoria de grafos possam ser utilizados. Um procedimento de decisão para difference logic é capaz de induzir sobre milhares de constraints. Um procedimento de decisão para a teoria de difference logic tem como objetivo principal informar se um conjunto de constraints de difference logic é satisfatível (as variáveis podem assumir valores que tornam o conjunto consistente) ou não. Além disso, para funcionar em um modelo de combinação baseado em Nelson-Oppen, o procedimento de decisão precisa ter outras funcionalidades, como geração de igualdade de variáveis, prova de inconsistência, premissas, etc. Este trabalho apresenta um procedimento de decisão para a teoria de difference logic dentro de uma arquitetura baseada no método de combinação de Nelson-Oppen. O trabalho foi realizado integrando-se ao provador haRVey, de onde foi possível observar o seu funcionamento. Detalhes de implementação e testes experimentais são relatados

Of madness and many-valuedness: an investigation into Suszko's Thesis

Suszko’s Thesis is a philosophical claim regarding the nature of many-valuedness. It was formulated by the Polish logician Roman Suszko during the middle 70s and states the existence of “only but two truth values”. The thesis is a reaction against the notion of many-valuedness conceived by Jan Łukasiewicz. Reputed as one of the modern founders of many-valued logics, Łukasiewicz considered a third undetermined value in addition to the traditional Fregean values of Truth and Falsehood. For Łukasiewicz, his third value could be seen as a step beyond the Aristotelian dichotomy of Being and non-Being. According to Suszko, Łukasiewicz’s ideas rested on a confusion between algebraic values (what sentences describe/denote) and logical values (truth and falsity). Thus, Łukasiewicz’s third undetermined value is no more than an algebraic value, a possible denotation for a sentence, but not a genuine logical value. Suszko’s Thesis is endorsed by a formal result baptized as Suszko’s Reduction, a theorem that states every Tarskian logic may be characterized by a two-valued semantics. The present study is intended as a thorough investigation of Suszko’s thesis and its implications. The first part is devoted to the historical roots of many-valuedness and introduce Suszko’s main motivations in formulating the double character of truth-values by drawing the distinction in between algebraic and logical values. The second part explores Suszko’s Reduction and presents the developments achieved from it; the properties of two-valued semantics in comparison to many-valued semantics are also explored and discussed. Last but not least, the third part investigates the notion of logical values in the context of non-Tarskian notions of entailment; the meaning of Suszko’s thesis within such frameworks is also discussed. Moreover, the philosophical foundations for non-Tarskian notions of entailment are explored in the light of recent debates concerning logical pluralism.