Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one

Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Sistemas de produção de carvão vegetal existentes no Brasil: uma análise de viabilidade econômica

O carvão vegetal tem um papel de destaque entre as biomassas consumidas no Brasil. Seu uso em larga escala na indústria siderúrgica para a produção de ferro gusa fez do país um dos maiores produtores e consumidores mundiais de carvão vegetal. A matéria-prima abundante, bem como a falta de preocupação com fatores ambientais e sociais, permitiu no passado que se atentasse apenas ao fator econômico; e a tecnologia de produção deste combustível/insumo se desenvolveu muito pouco ao longo de quase toda a sua história no Brasil até os anos mais recentes. Nas duas últimas décadas, quando se intensificou a preocupação social e ambiental e esses fatores ganharam relevância na análise da viabilidade de projetos tanto a serem implantados, quanto já existentes, a produção de carvão vegetal passou a ser identificada como extremamente rudimentar e impactante ao meio ambiente e sociedade onde se localiza. Neste trabalho buscou-se analisar a viabilidade econômica de quatro sistemas de produção de carvão existentes no Brasil. O sistema mais rudimentar, comumente chamado de “rabo quente”, um sistema ainda de alvenaria, com um pouco mais desenvolvimento tecnológico conhecido como forno retangular, e dois sistemas que utilizam fornos metálicos para buscar menor tempo do processo de carbonização (devido ao mais rápido resfriamento do sistema) e que têm, ambos, uma preocupação ambiental maior e buscam emitir menos poluentes e oferecer uma condição de trabalho mais adequada, refletindo também positivamente sob o aspecto sócio-ambiental. Percebe-se que em termos de implantação, obviamente, os sistemas que envolvem um pouco mais de tecnologia são bem mais dispendiosos em investimento inicial, porém, há resultados animadores do ponto de vista de retorno do investimento e possibilidades de agregação de valor que tendem a atrair o investimento especialmente dos grandes grupos siderúrgicos consumidores, que têm se preocupado cada vez mais em investir tanto na produção de matéria-prima, com grandes áreas de reflorestamento, quanto na produção sustentável do carvão vegetal.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.