Os ciclos econômicos eleitorais e o Programa Bolsa-Família

A partir da disseminação do conhecimento sobre voto econômico no meio político, o incremento da renda real criado pelo Bolsa Família pode criar incentivos para que os governantes aumentem o valor dos repasses ou ampliem a base de famílias cadastradas com intuito de aumentar suas chances de reeleição. A hipótese testada nesse trabalho foi de que o governo influencia os gastos do Programa Bolsa Família e os aumentam anormalmente em períodos pré-eleitorais. Para testar essa hipótese, foram usadas as séries temporais de gastos mensais com o programa e de número de famílias beneficiárias desde janeiro de 2004 até dezembro de 2014. Para isso foram utilizados modelos estatísticos para identificar se estes gastos aumentam anormalmente em períodos que antecedem eleições, controlados por outros fatores que podem influenciar os gastos do programa, tais como PIB Nacional, Receitas e Despesas do Tesouro Nacional, Inflação e Desemprego. Os resultados sugerem a ocorrência de ciclos eleitorais nas eleições presidenciais, nos quais há uma aceleração no número de famílias inscritas no Bolsa Família nos três meses anteriores à campanha com a consequente aceleração dos gastos do programa no mesmo período, porém não há redução no número de famílias inscritas após as eleições e, por fim, que não existem efeitos no período das eleições locais.

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.

On the positive correlation between income inequality and unemployment

Several empirical studies in the literature have documented the existence of a positive correlation between income inequalitiy and unemployment. I provide a theoretical framework under which this correlation can be better understood. The analysis is based on a dynamic job search under uncertainty. I start by proving the uniqueness of a stationary distribution of wages in the economy. Drawing upon this distribution, I provide a general expression for the Gini coefficient of income inequality. The expression has the advantage of not requiring a particular specification of the distribution of wage offers. Next, I show how the Gini coefficient varies as a function of the parameters of the model, and how it can be expected to be positively correlated with the rate of unemployment. Two examples are offered. The first, of a technical nature, to show that the convergence of the measures implied by the underlying Markov process can fail in some cases. The second, to provide a quantitative assessment of the model and of the mechanism linking unemployment and inequality.

Towards a measure of income inequality freed from the volatility caused by variations in the rate of unemployment

By mixing together inequalities based on cyclical variables, such as unemployment, and on structural variables, such as education, usual measurements of income inequality add objects of a di§erent economic nature. Since jobs are not acquired or lost as fast as education or skills, this aggreagation leads to a loss of relavant economic information. Here I propose a di§erent procedure for the calculation of inequality. The procedure uses economic theory to construct an inequality measure of a long-run character, the calculation of which can be performed, though, with just one set of cross-sectional observations. Technically, the procedure is based on the uniqueness of the invariant distribution of wage o§ers in a job-search model. Workers should be pre-grouped by the distribution of wage o§ers they see, and only between-group inequalities should be considered. This construction incorporates the fact that the average wages of all workers in the same group tend to be equalized by the continuous turnover in the job market.

Land taxes in a Latin American context

Since Henry George (1839-1897) economists have been arguing that a tax on unimproved land is an ideal tax on efficiency grounds. Output taxes, on the other hand, have distortionary effects on the economy. This paper shows that under asymmetric information output taxes might be used along with land tax in order to implement an optimal taxation scheme in a Latin American context, i.e., where land rental markets are relatively thin, land property provides non-agricultural payoffs and there is nonrevenue objectives of land taxation. Also, the model has two implications that can be tested empirically: (i) there is evasion when schemes based only on land taxes are implemented; (ii) this evasion is more severe for large landholders.

The optimality of the Friedman rule when some distorting taxes are exogenous

This paper investigates the optimality of the Friedman rule in a two-sector small open economy. That policy prescription is found to be a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency. If a planner can select all conceivable distorting taxes, then, for some initial values of public debt, money balances and foreign assets, it is possible to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation. If the planner can select only some of these tax rates, then second-best policies may also satisfy the Friedman rule. However, this last result depends on the set of tax instruments the planner can choose from.

Three applications of the marginal cost of public funds concept

This paper illustrates the use of the marginal cost of public funds concept in three contexts. First, we extend Parry’s (2003) analysis of the efficiency effects excise taxes in the U.K., primarily by incorporating the distortion caused by imperfect competition in the cigarette market and distinguishing between the MCFs for per unit and ad valorem taxes on cigarettes. Our computations show, contrary to the standard result in the literature, that the per unit tax on cigarettes has a slightly lower MCF than the ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Second, we calculate the MCF for a payroll tax in a labour market with involuntary unemployment, using the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model as our framework. Our computations, based on Canadian labour market data, indicate that incorporating the distortion caused by involuntary unemployment raises the MCF by 25 to 50 percent. Third, we derive expressions for the distributionally-weighted MCFs for the exemption level and the marginal tax rate for a “flat tax”, such as the one that has been adopted by the province of Alberta. This allows us to develop a restricted, but tractable, version of the optimal income tax problem. Computations indicate that the optimal marginal tax rate may be quite high, even with relatively modest pro-poor distributional preferences.

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.