A Reestruturação produtiva e o surgimento de um novo padrão de ação sindical no Brasil

This work is focused on understanding the most important issues originated from the current Brazilian productive restructuring and its impacts on the formation of a new unionism style, especially the pattern followed by the Workers Union's Congress (CUT). From the processes that have been developing in the automotive factories of the ABC region, as well as inside the unions, we can say that: (i) the participation of the unions in the elaboration and modificaton of the productive processes and the labor organization has been increasing; (ii) this trend has been spreading very quickly inside the workers union movement linked to the CUT, strenghtening the inflexion taken by this Congress since the beginning of the nineties; (iii) the negotiations and its outcomes are drawing away from an approach that seeks to establish a mechanical correspondance between production flexibilization measures and the implementation of certain industrial relations.

Tripartismo e descentralização na Política de Emprego, Trabalho e Renda: estudo de caso do Rio de Janeiro

Intends to analyse the Brazilian tripartite, paritarian and de-centralized model that manages the resources of FAT (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador - Workers Protection Fund) in the employment public system of Rio de Janeiro. To reach the proposed objective, the first chapter begins with a discussion on the corporativism in Brazil, its configuration and the determinants that permitted changes in its arrangements throughout Brazilian trade-union history. In the second chapter is presented the Brazilian employment public system, and the programs and plans that forms it, and its structural characteristics; at the end, a discussion is made about why the employment system is considered as being an hibrid corporative structure. The third chapter presents how is structured the Rio de Janeiro State Employment Comission nowadays, its history and main decisions and programs, and then verifies how is ocurring the representation of political interests in the Rio de Janeiro employment system, how the politics is being integrated to the programs, and to which extension the de-centralization is ocurring according to the legal presumptions of the public politic. At the end, the analisys is concluded by some considerations that try to resume the conclusions raised by the proposed reflection.

Trabalho e educação da classe operaria: a perspectiva politica da escola tecnica do Sindicato dos Metalurgicos - RJ

Esta dissertação procura refletir os pressupostos teóricos da relação trabalho-educação, a partir da vida real da classe operária, bem como a partir da prática político-pedagógica da escola técnica do Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do Rio de Janeiro. Contextualizando o nexo entre a escola e a entidade de trabalhadores nos diferentes momentos do movimento sindical, procura resgatar a lógica da educação promovida pelos próprios operários-metalúrgicos. Ao tomar o trabalho como princípio educativo, analisa a experiência vivida por professores, operários-estudantes, dirigentes e ativistas sindicais na reconstrução do processo de produção pedagógica. Reflete então, a formação dos trabalhadores tendo como perspectiva o encontro entre o saber escolar e o saber prático do operariado adquirido no cotidiano da fábrica. Analisando a dicotomia trabalho manual/trabalho intelectual, o processo de automação da produção, a condição de classe do técnico industrial, entre outras questões, enfatiza a necessidade de se resgatar a unidade entre educação técnica e educação política da classe operária.

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

Firms?: heterogeneity, organizations, power and trade

This paper develops a theory which investigates the two-way relationship between the internaI organization of the firm and market competition.We introduce heterogenous firms with internal hierarchies in a Knlgman (1980) monopolistic competition model of trade. The model simultanously determines firms' organizational choices anel heterogeneity across firms in size and proeluctivity.Ve show that intenlational trade, market size and the toughness of competition in international markets incluce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to a reorganization of firms towards more decentralized corporate hierarchies.We show further that trade triggers produetivity growth through inter-firm reallocations towards more produetive firms in whieh CEOs have power in firms. At the same time, however trade- induced organizational changes towards fiattened corporate hierarchies lead to a softening of lnternat.ional competition which may contribute a eountervailing negative effect on seetoral productivity.

Trade or investment? location decisions under regional integration

This paper studies the production and trade patterns that may arise between two different countries if plant location is introduced as a first step in the producers' decision making. A three-stage game is used: the first deals with location and the next two with capacity and final sales decisions. Demand and cost structures differ by country, and the latter contain specific elements related to the foreign operation. The structure of possible Nash-equilibria is examined and an analysis of the changes in the solution, if the countries engage in an integration process, is made. As in previous models, though global welfare gains may not be very high, single country ones may be considerable, due to changes in the location of the plants. However, even if full integration takes place, global Marshallian welfare may decrease. Conditions which determine a tendency towards multinationalisation are obtained. Assuming a move toward integration, conditions are also provided to characterize when exporting will be preferred to local production. The fact that producers may retain a certain discriminating power, notwithstanding the elimination of barriers to arbitrage, creates a tendency to locate production in the country where prices are higher. This explains why welfare gains may not be obvious. An empirical illustration, with real data from two MERCOSUL countries (Brazil and Argentina) illustrates the possible outcomes.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Cidadania vis-a-vis democracia : estudo analitico-interpretativo das greves, nos anos 80, como fenomeno indicador de mudanças nas relações do trabalho em instituições universitarias da administração publica federal : UFRJ e UFF

Consiste essa dissertação num estudo analítico interpretativo indicador de das greves nos anos 80, como fenômeno indicador de mudanças nas relações do trabalho em instituições univer5it'rias da administração pública federal: UFRJ e UFF. A investigação sobre o incremento do sindicalismo de classe média, no setor público, nos anos 80 processou-se de modo a que se compreendesse/interpretasse o novo paradigma de ação sindical indicativo de mudanças no papel sócio político de atores coletivos/individuais, vis-à-vis à prática do associativismo em IFES. A opção metodológica assumida foi a de uma abordagem qualitativa do tema, utilizando-se como categorias de análise: cidadania, democracia, participação e poder, aplicadas ao estudo, numa visão comparativa dos movimentos organizados/grevistas, na UFRJ e UFF. Pelo estudo, conclui-se, em síntese, que docentes e servidores técnico-administrativos da UFRJ e UFF, via participação organizada nos movimentos grevistas dos anos 80, vieram a assumir novos papéis sociais e posições políticas, construindo ocasionando uma nova cidadania e, consequentemente, trabalho entre categorias profissionais do setor público E o federal. governo Isto, porque, graças ao seu poder de convocação/influência e pela sua seu vida associativa constituiram-se essas categorias profissionais em forças sociais/políticas suscetíveis de modificar/intervir em decisões político-administrativas que disseram respeito a formulação/gestão de políticas, com destaque para as de Pessoal das IFES e de Rendas/Salários, bem como as de Ensino Superior e de Financiamento da Educação.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.