39 resultados para solidary economy
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
The present paper studies the case of cooperatives incubated at Technology Incubator of Popular Cooperatives that belongs to the Alberto Luiz Coimbra Engineering Graduate and Research Institute (COPPE) in the scope of Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Is analyzes if occurs the dialogic process in its management endorsed by Habermas's Critic Theory and the Paraecomomic Model of Guerreiro Ramos. For that, the study is based on conceptual frameworks enclosing Critic Theory as well as Solidary Economy, Cooperativism and Incubators. Its historical roots and the movement in Brazil. The paper presented finals conclusions closes with a set of recommendations to extend the research field as well as its applicability.
Resumo:
O objetivo dessa dissertação foi investigar os desafios da utilização dos Bancos Comunitários de Desenvolvimento (BCDs) como política pública. Segundo a Rede Brasileira de Bancos Comunitários estes podem ser definidos como serviços financeiros solidários, de natureza associativa e comunitária, voltados para a geração de trabalho e renda na perspectiva de reorganização das economias locais por meio da constituição de redes de economia solidária. Desde o surgimento da primeira experiência de banco comunitário, em 1998 em Fortelza/CE, até o presente momento os BCDs foram replicados em mais de 100 localidades. Pela singularidade em lidar com a concessão de microcrédito e por conseguir uma capilaridade junto as populações em situação de pobreza ou extrema pobreza, os BCDs despontaram como alternativas a algumas políticas públicas do microcrédito tradicional e tem recebido apoio do governo federal para replicação de novas experiências e consolidação das já existentes. Além disso, os governos estaduais e municipais também vem adotando políticas de replicação dos bancos comunitários e em alguns casos, como é o estudo de caso desta investigação, a iniciativa para a constituição dos BCDs tem partido das prefeituras. A pergunta de pesquisa que norteia este trabalho foi analisada por meio de uma abordagem qualitativa, com a utilização de entrevistas e observação participante junto ao Banco Comunitário Cidade de Deus, situado na cidade de Rio de Janeiro/RJ. A pesquisa de campo abrangeu os meses de maio a agosto do corrente e ano e os resultados apontam para existência de três dimensões de desafios aos processos de instrumentalização dos BCDs como políticas públicas, quais sejam: eficiência técnica, sustentabilidade financeira e conflitos políticos internos.
Resumo:
We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.
Resumo:
In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one
Resumo:
In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .
Resumo:
This paper reviews part of the political economy literature on exchange rate policy relevant to understanding the political motivations behind the Brazilian exchange rate policy. We shall first examine the distributive role of the exchange rate, and the way it unfolds in terms of the desired political goals. We will follow by analyzing exchange policy as indicative of government effciency prior to elections. Finally, we discuss fiscal policy from the point of view of political economy, in which the exchange rate results from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Over this review, the Brazilian exchange rate policy is discussed in light of the theories presented.
Resumo:
The study analyses the role of services in modern and less-developed economies. It shows the different meanings of the value, definition and classification of service activities found in economic literature. It discusses the relation between service production growth and economic development observing the role of these activities in the dynamics of economic restructuring. Further, it also examines the differences between private and public sector service restructuring and the consequences of internationalization of services. It concludes that economic restructuring also caused by changes in the nature of goods and services has important regional effects.
Resumo:
A Desgovernança Econômica Global, Mais do que a Governança Caracteriza Hoje a Economia Mundial. Dois Fatos Substanciam Essa Afirmativa: a Crise Recorrente do Balanço de Pagamentos nos Países em Desenvolvimento, e o Enorme Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos. as Crises nos Mercados Emergentes são Essencialmente Resultantes da Estratégia que o Norte Propõe para o Sul: a Estratégia de Crescimento com Poupança Externa. Dado o Fato de que a Entrada de Capital Aumenta a Taxa de Cambio, e que os Paises não Reconheceram as Principais Oportunidades de Investimento nos Anos 1990, Tal Estratégia Levou não ao Aumento das Taxas de Acumulação de Capital e ao Crescimento, Mas ao Aumento do Déficit em Conta Corrente e À Crise do Balanço de Pagamento (Financeiro). por Outro Lado, o Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos é um Problema Sério. Aquele Já é um País Devedor, Mas os Ajustes Continuam a ser Adiados. a Probabilidade de um Soft Landing (Desfecho Satisfatório) é Pequena. as Duas Fontes de Instabilidade Estão Relacionadas Aos Déficits em Conta Corrente e À Moeda Sobrevalorizada. a Política Econômica por Trás tem um Nome: Taxa de Câmbio Populista, uma das Duas Formas de Populismo Econômico (A Outra é o Populismo Fiscal). Isto não é Surpreendente em Países em Desenvolvimento, Mas Pode ser em um País Desenvolvido, como os Estados Unidos. Ainda Assim não é Surpreendente Quando se Considera a Recessão Política e Social que a Sociedade Americana Está Vivendo Desde o Fim da Segunda Guerra
Resumo:
This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.
Resumo:
This paper has three original contributions. The first is the reconstruction effort of the series of employment and income to allow the creation of a new coincident index for the Brazilian economic activity. The second is the construction of a coincident index of the economic activity for Brazil, and from it, (re)establish a chronology of recessions in the recent past of the Brazilian economy. The coincident index follows the methodology proposed by TCB and it covers the period 1980:1 to 2007:11. The third is the construction and evaluation of many leading indicators of economic activity for Brazil which fills an important gap in the Brazilian Business Cycles literature.