Evidence on the relationship between incentives and exogenous risk

Theoretical models on moral hazard provide competing predictions on the incentive-risk relationship. These predictions are derived under the assumptions of homogeneous agents and exogenous risk. However, the existing empirical evidence does not account for risk-aversion heterogeneity and risk endogeneity. This paper uses a well-built database on tenancy contracts to address these issues. Detailed information on cropping activities is used to measure the exogenous risk. Risk-aversion heterogeneity and other self-selection problems are addressed through a portfolio schedule and a subsample of farmers who simultaneously own and sharecrop different farms. This controlled exercise finds a direct relation between incentives and exogenous risk.

Some notes about the determination of current account equilibrium real exchange rate and the relation between real exchange rate and productive specialization

The objective of these notes is to present a simple mathematical model of the determination of current account real exchange rate as defined by Bresser-Pereira (2010); i.e. the real exchange rate that guarantees the inter temporal equilibrium of balance of payments and to show the relation between Real Exchange rate and Productive Specialization at theoretical and empirical level.