Procedimento de manifestação de interesse: interesse de quem?

O Procedimento de Manifestação de Interesse (“PMI”) vem sendo utilizado por diferentes entes federativos brasileiros, principalmente nos últimos dois anos, quando o instituto foi regulamentado em muitos Estados. Seu objetivo é viabilizar a modelagem de projetos de infraestrutura sem onerar os cofres públicos e sem requerer expertise técnica pública. Insere-se no contexto de incentivo às possíveis sinergias oriundas das parcerias entre os setores público e privado. Entretanto, é importante considerar como principal obstáculo para a utilização do PMI a possibilidade de discrepância entre o interesse público e o privado. A análise econômica do direito oferece ferramentas capazes de contribuir com a averiguação dessa possível discrepância, tal como a teoria da agência. As premissas teóricas da agência podem ser aplicada à autorização conferida pelo poder público ao particular. No que tange ao conteúdo, o interesse visado pelo mercado com a elaboração de estudos de viabilidade pode destoar da persecução pelo interesse público, norte da Administração Pública. Em nível procedimental, é possível que ocorra a captura do interesse público na realização de um procedimento licitatório – capaz de selecionar o parceiro privado mais apto a cumprir com o objeto contratual – pelo particular autorizado a elaborar os estudos de viabilidade. Para tanto, foi realizado levantamento empírico acerca dos projetos de infraestrutura modelados via PMI, em que já ocorreu a licitação para contratos de PPPs, a fim de confirmar a hipótese de captura.

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Government policy and private investment in Brazil (1955/82)

The questlon of the crowding-out of private !nvestment by public expenditure, public investment in particular , ln the Brazilian economy has been discussed more in ideological terrns than on empirical grounds. The present paper tries to avoid the limitation of previous studies by estlmatlng an equation for private investment whlch makes it possible to evaluate the effect of economic policies on prlvate investment. The private lnvestment equation was deduced modifylng the optimal flexible accelerator medel (OFAM) incorporating some channels through which public expendlture influences privateinvestment. The OFAM consists in adding adjustment costs to the neoclassical theory of investrnent. The investment fuction deduced is quite general and has the following explanatory variables: relative prices (user cost of capitaljimput prices ratios), real interest rates, real product, public expenditures and lagged private stock of capital. The model was estimated for private manufacturing industry data. The procedure adopted in estimating the model was to begin with a model as general as possible and apply restrictions to the model ' s parameters and test their statistical significance. A complete diagnostic testing was also made in order to test the stability of estirnated equations. This procedure avoids ' the shortcomings of estimating a model with a apriori restrictions on its parameters , which may lead to model misspecification. The main findings of the present study were: the increase in public expenditure, at least in the long run, has in general a positive expectation effect on private investment greater than its crowding-out effect on priva te investment owing to the simultaneous rise in interst rates; a change in economlc policy, such as that one of Geisel administration, may have an important effect on private lnvestment; and reI ative prices are relevant in determining the leveI of desired stock of capital and private investrnent.