Sale of credit portfolio and risk : the case of financial institutions in Brazil

Este estudo analisa se as vendas de carteiras de crédito são utilizadas por instituições financeiras para gestão de risco, de acordo com Stanton(1998) e Murray(2001) ou para captação recursos, como apontado em Cebenoyan e Strahan(2001) e Dionne e Harchaoui(2003). Duas hipóteses foram testadas quanto às vendas de carteira de crédito: 1) implicam em melhor rating na carteira remanescente; ou 2) promovem alavancagem financeira - com piora na carteira remanescente -, controlando para a existência de coobrigação e para quem esses ativos foram transferidos. A amostra inclui informações trimestrais de 145 instituições financeiras do primeiro trimestre de 2001 ao segundo trimestre de 2008. Os resultados oferecem evidências empíricas de que as instituições financeiras utilizam estas vendas para melhora do rating da carteira de crédito remanescente, ou seja, elas transferem, em sua maioria, ativos de baixa qualidade, garantindo bons ratings e melhorando a liquidez. Adicionalmente, seguindo a proposta Dionne e Harchaoui(2003) - que além de testar, evidenciam que exigências regulatórias promovem alavancagem em ativos de alto risco - foi observada a relação entre o Índice de Basiléia e rating da carteira de crédito. As conclusões foram semelhantes às encontradas por Dionne e Harchaoui(2003): quanto mais adequada – maior Índice de Basiléia - uma instituição financeira for, maiores as chances de ela possuir uma carteira de crédito com qualidade ruim.

Citizens vs. banks: institutional drivers of financial market litigiousness in Brazil

This article analyzes the institutional drivers of Brazil’s alarmingly high levels of litigation between clients and financial institutions. Most of the policy oriented literature that explores that phenomenon discusses the impacts of a perceived debtor-friendly bias of Brazilian courts on generating feedback loops of litigation that further increases interest rates and creates adverse selection within the pool of potential debtors. This literature therefore addresses the way courts behave once disputes reach their doorstep; conversely, we take a step back to understand the underlying reasons for why such a large number of disputes end up in courts in the first place. We accordingly attribute endemic litigation in Brazilian financial markets to a framework of political, economic and legal institutions and circumstances, which this article aims to unbound and explain.

Essays on banking theory and history of financial arrangements

Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.

Estimating economic interactions of financial suppliers in Thailand

This paper presents a methodology to estimate and identify different kinds of economic interaction, whenever these interactions can be established in the form of spatial dependence. First, we apply the semi-parametric approach of Chen and Conley (2001) to the estimation of reaction functions. Then, the methodology is applied to the analysis financial providers in Thailand. Based on a sample of financial institutions, we provide an economic framework to test if the actual spatial pattern is compatible with strategic competition (local interactions) or social planning (global interactions). Our estimates suggest that the provision of commercial banks and suppliers credit access is determined by spatial competition, while the Thai Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives is distributed as in a social planner problem.

Consolidação de demonstrações financeiras elaboradas segundo o método da correção monetária integral: um estudo de sua elaboração

Este trabalho teve por objetivo verlficar a praticabilidade de aplicação simultinea das metodologias de "consolidação de demonstrações financeiras" e da "correção monetária integral" (Contabilidade a Nível Geral de Preços), através de um estudo de cunho exploratório. Para tanto, procedeu-se a uma revisão dos conceitos existentes na literatura nacional e estrangeira, enfatizando as principais normas e procedimentos instituídos no Brasil, com o objetivo de dar fundamentação teórica e justificar os limites e as contribuições de estudo. Neste sentido, foram elaborados quatro exemplos simulados, a partir de situações reais, com a aplicação de dois procedimentos possíveis quais sejam: Procedimento "A"; "Corrigir as demonstrações consolidadas"; e Procedimento "B"; "Consolidar as demonstrações já. corrigidas." Com base nos resultados obtidos foi possível fazer uma análise comparativa dos dois procedimentos e, ainda, chegar a importantes conclusões, além de ensejar algumas recomendações e sugestões para futuros trabalhos sobre o assunto estudado.

Uma investigação sobre o impacto dos accruals na variabilidade dos resultados nos diferentes contrastes cross-sectional nas firmas brasileiras de capital aberto

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo principal investigar o impacto dos accruals na variabilidade dos resultados corporativos (EVAR) que influenciam a aplicação prática do income smoothing nas firmas brasileiras de capital aberto. Inicialmente, é demonstrada a importância das demonstrações contábeis que devem ser evidenciadas em cumprimento aos princípios contábeis geralmente aceitos. Sua evidenciação deve representar a realidade econômico-financeira da firma para o processo de tomada de decisão dos acionistas e credores. Porém, em determinados momentos, os gestores se sentem motivados a praticar o gerenciamento dos resultados contábeis na tentativa de reduzir a variabilidade dos lucros por meio da utilização dos accruals. Os accruals correspondem à diferença entre o lucro líquido e o fluxo de caixa operacional. Nesse processo de redução da volatilidade dos resultados, os gestores se utilizam da prática do income smoothing procurando reduzir eventuais distorções no preço das ações da firma. A amostra neste estudo é composta por um grupo de 163 firmas de capital aberto listadas na Bovespa e que apresentaram informações financeiras no intervalo de 2000 a 2007, categorizadas por setores através de dados obtidos na Economática. O modelo estatístico utilizado na pesquisa foi a análise de regressão para explicar os diferentes modelos de cross-sectional. Os resultados desta pesquisa indicam que os accruals são significativos para explicar a variabilidade dos resultados corporativos (EVAR) de empresas brasileiras. Além disso, nossos resultados sugerem que o modelo estrutural de identificação do EVAR nas empresas brasileiras deve ser explicado por variáveis não contábeis diferentes das que são apresentadas pelas firmas norte-americanas.

O ensino de julgamento e tomada de decisão nos cursos de graduação em ciências contábeis no Brasil

A convergência das normas brasileiras de contabilidade às normas internacionais permitiu que nossas regras mudassem a um novo patamar. Os princípios contábeis anteriores eram baseados em um conjunto de regras detalhadas e autoridades reguladoras verificavam a adequação dos Demonstrativos Financeiros a estas regras. Com a mudança surgiu um novo paradigma, as novas normas são baseadas muito mais em princípios do que em regras, especificamente em conformidade com os International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) na elaboração dos Demonstrativos Financeiros, que depende do julgamento profissional em maior escala do que em conformidade com as antigas normas baseadas em regras. Este trabalho teve o objetivo de investigar como vem sendo abordado o Julgamento e Tomada de Decisão (J&TD) nos cursos de Graduação em Ciências Contábeis, onde é iniciada a formação de competências e habilidades do profissional da área.

Impactos do início da harmonização contábil internacional (lei 11.638/07) nos resultados de 2008 das empresas brasileiras abertas

Este estudo analisa os efeitos da primeira frase da transição para o IFRS no Brasil (Lei 11.638/07 e CPC 13) nos resultados publicados em 2009 (exercício de 2008 e republicações de 2007) pelas empresas listadas na Bovespa. É aplicado o inverso do “Índice de Conservadorismo” de Gray (1980,1988), renomeado “Índice de Comparabilidade” por Weetman et al. (1998), para determinar se e o quanto os resultados reportados pelas novas normas são superiores aos apurados pela norma brasileira anterior – indicando o conservadorismo do sistema contábil brasileiro, previsto por Gray e outros estudos – ou inferiores (otimismo). Reduziu-se gradativamente a amostra inicial conforme a compliance com o CPC 13 e a transparência das demonstrações e das Notas Explicativas. Isso permitiu, após aplicação do Teste de Wilcoxon, verificar em média resultados maiores conforme a nova norma em relação à norma tradicional – preconizando-se que persistirão aumentos até a adoção do full IFRS em 2010. Após o exame de ajustes ao resultado, foi possível relacionar certas inconsistências entre 2007 e 2008 a impactos da crise financeira de 2008 nos ajustes “custos de transação na emissão de títulos” e “valor justo (marcação a mercado) de instrumentos financeiros”.

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.

Firm financial constraints and the impact of monetary policy: evidence from financial conglomerates

Building on recent evidence on the functioning of internal capital markets in financial conglomerates, this paper conducts a novel test of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. It does so by comparing monetary policy responses of small banks that are affiliated with the same bank holding company, and this arguably face similar constraints in accessing internal/external sources of funds, but that operate in different geographical regions, and thus face different pools of borrowers. Because these subsidiaries typically concentrate their lending with small local businesses, we can use cross-sectional differences in state-level economic indicators at the time of changes of monetary policy to study whether or not the strength of borrowers' balance sheets influences the response of bank lending. We find evidence that the negative response of bank loan growth to a monetary contraction is significantly stronger when borrowers have 'weak balance sheets. Our evidence suggests that the monetary authority should consider the amplification effects that financial constraints play following changes in basic interest rates and the role of financial conglomerates in the transmission of monetary policy.

The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.