A economia como ciência. Dos clássicos a Keynes

Este ensaio se propõe confrontar a abordagem neoclássica da economia como ciência positiva, com a modelo keynesiano e a visão da economia dinâmica de Kalecki, onde a economia é tratada desde a perspectiva de uma ciência moral e normativa. Para tanto analisaremos as bases teóricas de cada modelo, seus pressupostos, leis fundamentais e principais conclusões. Dado o propósito didático do texto nos preocupamos em tentar explicar os antecedentes, axiomas, leis e relações funcionais de cada modelo, dando especial ênfase às que surgem da crítica de postulados anteriores, pois admitimos que cada modelo incorpora valores, pressupostos e metodologia própria, cuja crítica é essencial para o avanço da ciência. A economia neoclássica supõe agentes racionais, informação completa e ações e resultados imediatos. Seu método de análise é a otimização com restrições. O principio ordenador, necessário e suficiente da atividade econômica, consiste no comportamento racional dos agentes. Este modelo tem sua concepção política e ética das relações econômicas, consistente com seus pressupostos, o que fica patente, por exemplo, a propósito de sua teoria da distribuição da renda. Com a introdução de conceitos como: o tempo histórico; o caracter monetário da produção; a preferência pela liquidez; o comportamento subjetivo dos agentes; o predomínio da procura sobre a oferta; as expectativas e a incerteza em relação ao futuro, etc., a macroeconomia de Keynes consegue romper o paradigma anterior, do ajuste automático dos mercados de acordo com um feedeback contínuo e estável, capaz de garantir o equilíbrio de pleno emprego. Embora a análise keynesiana tivesse permitido a abordagem precisa de questões tão importantes como: a natureza e as causas do desemprego; o papel da moeda e do crédito; a determinação dos juros; os condicionantes do investimento, etc., faltava ainda uma teoria dos preços, da distribuição e do ciclo econômico, no que o trabalho de M. Kalecki, certamente parece ter avançado. Este autor parte de um contexto cultural e ideológico que lhe permite abordar sem entraves a natureza do capitalismo. Seu enfoque micro e macroeconômico é integrado e está apoiado no pressuposto da concorrência imperfeita. No universo keynesiano os mercados podem estar em equilíbrio, mas não no de pleno emprego, já segundo Kalecki o ciclo econômico é inevitável. Em ambos os casos os mercados não são perfeitos e não tendem naturalmente para o equilíbrio, o que justifica a ação reguladora do Estado, de acordo sua opção política e um código de valores preestabelecido. É de se imaginar que cada modelo de análise esteja condicionado pelo conjunto de valores dominantes do momento, o que não invalida o caracter de ciência social da economia. Por exemplo, desde a perspectiva individualista da troca mercantil, a economia se apresenta com a metodologia de ciência pura, porém, levando em conta as relações de classe social, é uma ciência moral.

Low expectations, low demand : when should the government intervene?

Este trabalho estuda o impacto de diferentes políticas que procuram mitigar falhas de coordenação em um ambiente macroeconômico. Abordamos questões relativas ao timing dos estímulos econômicos. Quando o governo deveria começar a incentivar a economia? Deveria gastar mais para prevenir crises ou para tirar a economia da recessão quando os fundamentos estão melhorando? Como o estímulo deve alterar a complementaridade estratégica? Para responder a estas perguntas, construímos um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico com concorrência monopolística e decisões de investimento sequenciais. Aplicando resultados da literatura teórica de jogos dinâmicos com fricções, selecionamos um único equilíbrio neste modelo, nos dando um instrumental tratável para a análise de políticas. Nossos resultados sugerem que o governo não deveria viesar incentivos nem para a prevenção de crises nem para resgatar a economia quando esta já está em crise.

Investment coordination failures and the confidence channel of fiscal policy

Este trabalho desenvolve um novo "canal de Confiança" da política fiscal e caracteriza a política ótima quando esse canal é levado em consideração. Para esse objetivo, utilizamos um modelo estático com (i) concorrência monopolística, (ii) custos de ajustamento fixos para investir, (iii) complementaridade estratégica devido a informação imperfeita com respeito a produtividade agregada, e (iv) bens privados como substitutos imperfeitos de bens privados. Este arcabouço acomoda a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação nos investimentos, mas apresenta um equilíbrio único. Mostramos que a política fiscal tem efeitos importantes na coordenação. Um aumento dos gastos do governo leva a uma maior demanda por bens privados. Mais importante, este também afeta as expectativas de ordem superior com relação a demanda das demais firmas, que amplifica os efeitos do aumento inicial da demanda devido a complementaridade estratégica nas decisões de investimento. Como as demais firmas estão se deparam com uma demanda maior, espera-se que estas invistam mais, que por sua vez, aumenta a demanda individual de cada firma, que aumenta os incentivos a investir. Denominamos isto como o "canal de confiança" da política fiscal. Sob a ameaça de falhas de coordenação, a política fiscal ótima prescreve produzir além do ponto em que o benefício marginal resultante do consumo de bens públicos é igual ao custo marginal desses bens. Este benefício adicional vem do fato de que a política fiscal pode ampliar a coordenação dos investimentos.

Arrecadação governamental e sistema tributário como resultados políticos

Esse paper introduz escolha simultânea do sistema político, sistema tributário e composição do gasto governamental em um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico de economia política com mercados incompletos onde o tamanho das arrecadações governamentais deve ser decidido a cada período. Além disso avalia o efeito de cada uma dessas instituições sobre a política fiscal de equilíbrio político. A inclusão dessas variáveis torna o modelo mais realista e possibilita o estudo de como a política econômica do governo é escolhida pela sociedade. A especificação mais geral do modelo calibrada para os EUA foi capaz de aproximar de maneira satisfatória a taxa efetiva e a relação tributária capital-trabalho observada nos dados.

Robustness and stabilization properties of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Based on three versions of a small macroeconomic model for Brazil, this paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of parameter uncertainty on monetary policy rules and on the robustness of optimal and simple rules over different model specifications. By comparing the optimal policy rule under parameter uncertainty with the rule calculated under purely additive uncertainty, we find that parameter uncertainty should make policymakers react less aggressively to the economy's state variables, as suggested by Brainard's "conservatism principIe", although this effect seems to be relatively small. We then informally investigate each rule's robustness by analyzing the performance of policy rules derived from each model under each one of the alternative models. We find that optimal rules derived from each model perform very poorly under alternative models, whereas a simple Taylor rule is relatively robusto We also fmd that even within a specific model, the Taylor rule may perform better than the optimal rule under particularly unfavorable realizations from the policymaker' s loss distribution function.

Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies

This paper proposes a simple macroeconomic model with staggered investment decisions. The model captures the dynamic coordination problem arising from demand externalities and fixed costs of investment. In times of low economic activity, a firm faces low demand and hence has less incentives for investing, which reinforces firms’ expectations of low demand. In the unique equilibrium of the model, demand expectations are pinned down by fundamentals and history. Owing to the beliefs that arise in equilibrium, there is no special reason for stimulus at times of low economic activity.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

Lucas (1987) has shown the surprising result that the welfare cost of business cycles is quite small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-áedged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for the post-WWII era using the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition for trends and cycles, which considers not only business-cycle uncertainty but also uncertainty from the stochastic trend in consumption. The post-WWII period is relatively quiet, with the welfare costs of uncertainty being about 0:9% of per-capita consumption. Although changing the decomposition method changed substantially initial results, the welfare cost of uncertainty is qualitatively small in the post-WWII era - about $175.00 a year per-capita in the U.S. We also computed the marginal welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty using this same technique. It is about twice as large as the welfare cost ñ$350.00 a year per-capita.

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

With standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-fledged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for post-war U.S. using the BeveridgeNelson decomposition. Welfare costs are about 0.9% per-capita consumption ($175.00) and marginal welfare costs are about twice as large.

An analysis of quit and dismissal determinants between 1988 and 1999 using the bivariate probit model

Excessive labor turnover may be considered, to a great extent, an undesirable feature of a given economy. This follows from considerations such as underinvestment in human capital by firms. Understanding the determinants and the evolution of turnover in a particular labor market is therefore of paramount importance, including policy considerations. The present paper proposes an econometric analysis of turnover in the Brazilian labor market, based on a partial observability bivariate probit model. This model considers the interdependence of decisions taken by workers and firms, helping to elucidate the causes that lead each of them to end an employment relationship. The Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED) conducted by the State System of Data Analysis (SEADE) and by the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE) provides data at the individual worker level, allowing for the estimation of the joint probabilities of decisions to quit or stay on the job on the worker’s side, and to maintain or fire the employee on the firm’s side, during a given time period. The estimated parameters relate these estimated probabilities to the characteristics of workers, job contracts, and to the potential macroeconomic determinants in different time periods. The results confirm the theoretical prediction that the probability of termination of an employment relationship tends to be smaller as the worker acquires specific skills. The results also show that the establishment of a formal employment relationship reduces the probability of a quit decision by the worker, and also the firm’s firing decision in non-industrial sectors. With regard to the evolution of quit probability over time, the results show that an increase in the unemployment rate inhibits quitting, although this tends to wane as the unemployment rate rises.

The macroeconomic effects of infrequent information with adjustment costs

We extend the macroeconomic literature on Sstype rules by introducing infrequent information in a kinked ad justment cost model. We first show that optimal individual decision rules are both state-and -time dependent. We then develop an aggregation framework to study the macroeconomic implications of such optimal individual decision rules. In our model, a vast number of agents act together, and more so when uncertainty is large.The average effect of an aggregate shock is inversely related to its size and to aggregate uncertainty. These results are in contrast with those obtained with full information ad justment cost models.

Model selection, estimation and forecasting in VAR models with short-run and long-run restrictions

We study the joint determination of the lag length, the dimension of the cointegrating space and the rank of the matrix of short-run parameters of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model using model selection criteria. We consider model selection criteria which have data-dependent penalties as well as the traditional ones. We suggest a new two-step model selection procedure which is a hybrid of traditional criteria and criteria with data-dependant penalties and we prove its consistency. Our Monte Carlo simulations measure the improvements in forecasting accuracy that can arise from the joint determination of lag-length and rank using our proposed procedure, relative to an unrestricted VAR or a cointegrated VAR estimated by the commonly used procedure of selecting the lag-length only and then testing for cointegration. Two empirical applications forecasting Brazilian inflation and U.S. macroeconomic aggregates growth rates respectively show the usefulness of the model-selection strategy proposed here. The gains in different measures of forecasting accuracy are substantial, especially for short horizons.

Model selection, estimation and forecasting in VAR models with short-run and long-run restrictions

We study the joint determination of the lag length, the dimension of the cointegrating space and the rank of the matrix of short-run parameters of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model using model selection criteria. We consider model selection criteria which have data-dependent penalties as well as the traditional ones. We suggest a new two-step model selection procedure which is a hybrid of traditional criteria and criteria with data-dependant penalties and we prove its consistency. Our Monte Carlo simulations measure the improvements in forecasting accuracy that can arise from the joint determination of lag-length and rank using our proposed procedure, relative to an unrestricted VAR or a cointegrated VAR estimated by the commonly used procedure of selecting the lag-length only and then testing for cointegration. Two empirical applications forecasting Brazilian in ation and U.S. macroeconomic aggregates growth rates respectively show the usefulness of the model-selection strategy proposed here. The gains in di¤erent measures of forecasting accuracy are substantial, especially for short horizons.

Targeting the poor: a macroeconomic analysis of cash transfer programs

This paper introduces cash transfers targeting the poor in an incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents facing idiosyncratic risk. These transfers change the degree of insurance in the economy and affect precautionary motives asymmetrically, leading the poorest households to decrease savings proportionally more than their richer counterparts. In a model economy calibrated to Brazil, once the cash transfer program is adopted, wealth inequality and social welfare increase, poverty decreases, while employment and income inequality remain about the same. Imperfect access to financial markets is important for these results, whereas whether the program is funded with lump sum or distortive taxes is not.

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.