Cálculo do Value at Risk (VaR) para o Ibovespa, pós crise de 2008, por meio dos modelos de heterocedasticidade condicional (GARCH) e de volatilidade estocástica (Local Scale Model - LSM)

O objetivo deste estudo é propor a implementação de um modelo estatístico para cálculo da volatilidade, não difundido na literatura brasileira, o modelo de escala local (LSM), apresentando suas vantagens e desvantagens em relação aos modelos habitualmente utilizados para mensuração de risco. Para estimação dos parâmetros serão usadas as cotações diárias do Ibovespa, no período de janeiro de 2009 a dezembro de 2014, e para a aferição da acurácia empírica dos modelos serão realizados testes fora da amostra, comparando os VaR obtidos para o período de janeiro a dezembro de 2014. Foram introduzidas variáveis explicativas na tentativa de aprimorar os modelos e optou-se pelo correspondente americano do Ibovespa, o índice Dow Jones, por ter apresentado propriedades como: alta correlação, causalidade no sentido de Granger, e razão de log-verossimilhança significativa. Uma das inovações do modelo de escala local é não utilizar diretamente a variância, mas sim a sua recíproca, chamada de “precisão” da série, que segue uma espécie de passeio aleatório multiplicativo. O LSM captou todos os fatos estilizados das séries financeiras, e os resultados foram favoráveis a sua utilização, logo, o modelo torna-se uma alternativa de especificação eficiente e parcimoniosa para estimar e prever volatilidade, na medida em que possui apenas um parâmetro a ser estimado, o que representa uma mudança de paradigma em relação aos modelos de heterocedasticidade condicional.

Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Essays in corporate risk management

This research investigates the factors that lead Latin American non-financial firms to manage risks using derivatives. The main focus is on currency risk management. With this purpose, this thesis is divided into an introduction and two main chapters, which have been written as stand-alone papers. The first paper describes the results of a survey on derivatives usage and risk management responded by the CFOs of 74 Brazilian non-financial firms listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA), and the main evidence found is: i) larger firms are more likely to use financial derivatives; ii) foreign exchange risk is the most managed with derivatives; iii) Brazilian managers are more concerned with legal and institutional aspects in using derivatives, such as the taxation and accounting treatment of these instruments, than with issues related to implementing and maintaining a risk management program using derivatives. The second paper studies the determinants of risk management with derivatives in four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). I investigate not only the decision of whether to use financial derivatives or not, but also the magnitude of risk management, measured by the notional value of outstanding derivatives contracts. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to use derivatives holdings information in emerging markets. The use of a multi-country setting allows the analysis of institutional and economic factors, such as foreign currency indebtedness, the high volatility of exchange rates, the instability of political and institutional framework and the development of financial markets, which are issues of second-order importance in developed markets. The main contribution of the second paper is on the understanding of the relationship among currency derivatives usage, foreign debt and the sensitivity of operational earnings to currency fluctuations in Latin American countries. Unlikely previous findings for US firms, my evidence shows that derivatives held by Latin American firms are capable of producing cash flows comparable to financial expenses and investments, showing that derivatives are key instruments in their risk management strategies. It is also the first work to show strong and robust evidence that firms that benefit from local currency devaluation (e.g. exporters) have a natural currency hedge for foreign debt that allows them to bear higher levels of debt in foreign currency. This implies that firms under this revenue-cost structure require lower levels of hedging with derivatives. The findings also provide evidence that large firms are more likely to use derivatives, but the magnitude of derivatives holdings seems to be unrelated to the size of the firm, consistent with findings for US firms.

Essays on regulation and risk

In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.

An SDF approach to hedge funds’ tail risk: evidence from Brazilian funds

The main purpose of this paper is to propose a methodology to obtain a hedge fund tail risk measure. Our measure builds on the methodologies proposed by Almeida and Garcia (2015) and Almeida, Ardison, Garcia, and Vicente (2016), which rely in solving dual minimization problems of Cressie Read discrepancy functions in spaces of probability measures. Due to the recently documented robustness of the Hellinger estimator (Kitamura et al., 2013), we adopt within the Cressie Read family, this specific discrepancy as loss function. From this choice, we derive a minimum Hellinger risk-neutral measure that correctly prices an observed panel of hedge fund returns. The estimated risk-neutral measure is used to construct our tail risk measure by pricing synthetic out-of-the-money put options on hedge fund returns of ten specific categories. We provide a detailed description of our methodology, extract the aggregate Tail risk hedge fund factor for Brazilian funds, and as a by product, a set of individual Tail risk factors for each specific hedge fund category.