Optimal taxation with gradual learning of types

An important feature of life-cycle models is the presence of uncertainty regarding one’s labor income. Yet this issue, long recognized in different areas, has not received enough attention in the optimal taxation literature. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap. We write a simple 3 period model where agents gradually learn their productivities. In a framework akin to Mirrlees’ (1971) static one, we derive properties of optimal tax schedules and show that: i) if preferences are (weakly) separable, uniform taxation of goods is optimal, ii) if they are (strongly) separable capital income is to rate than others forms of investiment.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

The long run economic impact of AIDS

This paper studies the long-run impact of HIV/AIDS on per capita income and education. We introduce a channel from HIV/AIDS to long-run income that has been overlooked by the literature, the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity. We work with a continuous time overlapping generations mo deI in which life cycle features of savings and education decision play key roles. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, a quarter poorer than they would be without AIDS, due only to the direct (human capital reduction) and indirect (decline in savings and investment) effects of life-expectancy reductions. Schooling will decline on average by half. These findings are well above previous results in the literature and indicate that, as pessimistic as they may be, at least in economic terms the worst could be yet to come.

O professor-ator ou o jogo da sedução na relação professor-aluno

Todos nós conhecemos vários tipos de atores: os de cinema, os de televisão, os de teatro, os de circo... porém há um outro tipo de ator a quem as pessoas não se referem: o ser humano. Este ator em especial representa vários papéis ao longo de sua vida. Um deles, para muitos de nós, é o de professor. O professor-ator representa para uma platéia específica - os alunos - com um objetivo também específico -seduzi-los para que haja êxito no processo ensino-aprendizagem. O presente estudo aponta para as contribuições deste processo ator no processo educativo. Da mesma forma, ressalta o tipo de relação estabelecida com os alunos, a partir do ponto de vista, tanto do professor, como do aluno. Trata-se de uma abordagem fenomenológica sobre a relação professor-aluno e suas consequências para o processo ensino-aprendizagem.

Information learning and the stability of fiat money

We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in a decentralized economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and agents only learn from their personal trading experiences. We show that in poorly informed economies, monetary stability depends heavily on the government's commitment to the long run value of money, whereas in economies where agents gather information more easily, monetary stability can be an endogenous outcome. We generate a dynamics on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual colIapse of overissued paper money. Moreover, our results provide an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is a very recent development.

The long-run economic impact of AIDS

This paper studies the long-run impact of HIV / AIDS on per capita income and education. We introduce a channel from HIV / AIDS to long-run income that has been overlooked by the literature, the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity. We work with a continuous time overlapping generations mo deI in which life cycle features of savings and education decision play key roles. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, a quarter poorer than they would be without AIDS, due only to the direct (human capital reduction) and indirect (decline in savings and investment) effects of life-expectancy reductions. Schooling will decline on average by half. These findings are well above previous results in the literature and indicate that, as pessimistic as they may be, at least in economic terms the worst could be yet to come.