Gestão intercultural: a experiência de executivos brasileiros no México

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo levantar quais as dificuldades que os executivos brasileiros, caracterizados por um estilo gerencial brasileiro, enfrentam ao fazer negócios e trabalhar no México. Escolhemos Brasil e México por dois motivos: o primeiro é que atualmente estes dois países representam as duas maiores economias da América Latina, sendo responsáveis por mais de 60% do PIB da região. O segundo é nosso interesse pessoal, devido nossa própria experiência de trabalho, iniciada em 2002 (e que continua acontecendo até o presente momento) quando começamos a interagir com o México no nosso trabalho cotidiano dentro de uma empresa privada. Para alcançar o nosso objetivo primeiramente definimos o que é cultura, cultura nacional, e como ela afeta o estilo gerencial. Estudamos na bibliografia os estilos gerenciais brasileiro e mexicano, e utilizamos o modelo de comparação de estilos gerenciais de Hofstede para identificar as diferenças entre eles, pois acreditamos que as dificuldades se relacionam com as diferenças entre os dois estilos. Posteriormente, fizemos uma pesquisa de campo, entrevistando de forma semi-estruturada sete executivos brasileiros que trabalharam no México para confirmar as diferenças nos estilos gerenciais e levantar quais foram as dificuldades que eles tiveram por conta das mesmas. Finalmente, apresentamos essas diferenças e concluímos que, ainda que os estilos gerenciais de ambos os países sejam próximos – e isso se reflete nos rankings que ambos ocupam nas quatro dimensões de Hofstede – as diferenças trazem sim dificuldades que precisam ser levadas em conta para facilitar a adaptação e o sucesso nos desafios profissionais que os executivos brasileiros venham a empreender no México.

Procedimento de manifestação de interesse: interesse de quem?

O Procedimento de Manifestação de Interesse (“PMI”) vem sendo utilizado por diferentes entes federativos brasileiros, principalmente nos últimos dois anos, quando o instituto foi regulamentado em muitos Estados. Seu objetivo é viabilizar a modelagem de projetos de infraestrutura sem onerar os cofres públicos e sem requerer expertise técnica pública. Insere-se no contexto de incentivo às possíveis sinergias oriundas das parcerias entre os setores público e privado. Entretanto, é importante considerar como principal obstáculo para a utilização do PMI a possibilidade de discrepância entre o interesse público e o privado. A análise econômica do direito oferece ferramentas capazes de contribuir com a averiguação dessa possível discrepância, tal como a teoria da agência. As premissas teóricas da agência podem ser aplicada à autorização conferida pelo poder público ao particular. No que tange ao conteúdo, o interesse visado pelo mercado com a elaboração de estudos de viabilidade pode destoar da persecução pelo interesse público, norte da Administração Pública. Em nível procedimental, é possível que ocorra a captura do interesse público na realização de um procedimento licitatório – capaz de selecionar o parceiro privado mais apto a cumprir com o objeto contratual – pelo particular autorizado a elaborar os estudos de viabilidade. Para tanto, foi realizado levantamento empírico acerca dos projetos de infraestrutura modelados via PMI, em que já ocorreu a licitação para contratos de PPPs, a fim de confirmar a hipótese de captura.

Preferência por redistribuição afeta a decisão individual de voto?

Parte dos estudos em economia e ciência política argumenta que preferências por redistribuição são capazes de explicar os diferentes esforços redistributivos ao redor do mundo. É natural pensar que a decisão de voto é o único canal relevante para que esta argumentação seja válida. Este trabalho buscará evidências empíricas de que haja correlação entre preferências por redistribuição e a decisão individual de voto nos Estados Unidos. Primeiro, apresento um modelo teórico que faz ligação entre a identificação partidária do indivíduo com seus interesses próprios e coletivos. Com base neste modelo, serão usados dados do General Social Survey para encontrar tais relações. Nos resultados encontra-se que as preferências por redistribuição estão relacionadas à identificação partidária e, consequentemente, à decisão de voto por redistribuição. Há também alguma evidência de que esta influência esteja crescendo nas últimas décadas.

Evaluating the existence of structural change in the brazilian term structure of interest: evidence based on cointegration models with structural break

This paper investigates whether there is evidence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. Multivariate cointegration techniques are used to verify this evidence. Two econometrics models are estimated. The rst one is a Vector Autoregressive Model with Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) with smooth transition in the deterministic coe¢ cients (Ripatti and Saikkonen [25]). The second one is a VECM with abrupt structural change formulated by Hansen [13]. Two datasets were analysed. The rst one contains a nominal interest rate with maturity up to three years. The second data set focuses on maturity up to one year. The rst data set focuses on a sample period from 1995 to 2010 and the second from 1998 to 2010. The frequency is monthly. The estimated models suggest the existence of structural change in the Brazilian term structure. It was possible to document the existence of multiple regimes using both techniques for both databases. The risk premium for di¤erent spreads varied considerably during the earliest period of both samples and seemed to converge to stable and lower values at the end of the sample period. Long-term risk premiums seemed to converge to inter-national standards, although the Brazilian term structure is still subject to liquidity problems for longer maturities.

Testing unit root based on partially adaptive estimation

This paper proposes unit tests based on partially adaptive estimation. The proposed tests provide an intermediate class of inference procedures that are more efficient than the traditional OLS-based methods and simpler than unit root tests based on fully adptive estimation using nonparametric methods. The limiting distribution of the proposed test is a combination of standard normal and the traditional Dickey-Fuller (DF) distribution, including the traditional ADF test as a special case when using Gaussian density. Taking into a account the well documented characteristic of heavy-tail behavior in economic and financial data, we consider unit root tests coupled with a class of partially adaptive M-estimators based on the student-t distributions, wich includes te normal distribution as a limiting case. Monte Carlo Experiments indicate that, in the presence of heavy tail distributions or innovations that are contaminated by outliers, the proposed test is more powerful than the traditional ADF test. We apply the proposed test to several macroeconomic time series that have heavy-tailed distributions. The unit root hypothesis is rejected in U.S. real GNP, supporting the literature of transitory shocks in output. However, evidence against unit roots is not found in real exchange rate and nominal interest rate even haevy-tail is taken into a account.

Estratégia de trading utilizando o modelo dinâmico de Nelson-Siegel

Esta pesquisa busca testar a eficácia de uma estratégia de arbitragem de taxas de juros no Brasil baseada na utilização do modelo de Nelson-Siegel dinâmico aplicada à curva de contratos futuros de taxa de juros de 1 dia da BM&FBovespa para o período compreendido entre 02 de janeiro de 2008 e 03 de dezembro de 2012. O trabalho adapta para o mercado brasileiro o modelo original proposto por Nelson e Siegel (1987), e algumas de suas extensões e interpretações, chegando a um dos modelos propostos por Diebold, Rudebusch e Aruoba (2006), no qual estimam os parâmetros do modelo de Nelson-Siegel em uma única etapa, colocando-o em formato de espaço de estados e utilizando o Filtro de Kalman para realizar a previsão dos fatores, assumindo que o comportamento dos mesmos é um VAR de ordem 1. Desta maneira, o modelo possui a vantagem de que todos os parâmetros são estimados simultaneamente, e os autores mostraram que este modelo possui bom poder preditivo. Os resultados da estratégia adotada foram animadores quando considerados para negociação apenas os 7 primeiros vencimentos abertos para negociação na BM&FBovespa, que possuem maturidade máxima próxima a 1 ano.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

A unit root test based on partially adaptive estimation

This paper constructs a unit root test baseei on partially adaptive estimation, which is shown to be robust against non-Gaussian innovations. We show that the limiting distribution of the t-statistic is a convex combination of standard normal and DF distribution. Convergence to the DF distribution is obtaineel when the innovations are Gaussian, implying that the traditional ADF test is a special case of the proposed testo Monte Carlo Experiments indicate that, if innovation has heavy tail distribution or are contaminated by outliers, then the proposed test is more powerful than the traditional ADF testo Nominal interest rates (different maturities) are shown to be stationary according to the robust test but not stationary according to the nonrobust ADF testo This result seems to suggest that the failure of rejecting the null of unit root in nominal interest rate may be due to the use of estimation and hypothesis testing procedures that do not consider the absence of Gaussianity in the data.Our results validate practical restrictions on the behavior of the nominal interest rate imposed by CCAPM, optimal monetary policy and option pricing models.

Aggregate vs disaggregate data analysis: a paradox in the estimation of money demand function of Japan under the low interest rate policy

We investigate the issue of whether there was a stable money demand function for Japan in 1990's using both aggregate and disaggregate time series data. The aggregate data appears to support the contention that there was no stable money demand function. The disaggregate data shows that there was a stable money demand function. Neither was there any indication of the presence of liquidity trapo Possible sources of discrepancy are explored and the diametrically opposite results between the aggregate and disaggregate analysis are attributed to the neglected heterogeneity among micro units. We also conduct simulation analysis to show that when heterogeneity among micro units is present. The prediction of aggregate outcomes, using aggregate data is less accurate than the prediction based on micro equations. Moreover. policy evaluation based on aggregate data can be grossly misleading.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Assessing interdependence among countries' fundamentals and its implications for exchange rate misalignment estimates: An empirical exercise based on GVAR

Exchange rates are important macroeconomic prices and changes in these rates a ect economic activity, prices, interest rates, and trade ows. Methodologies have been developed in empirical exchange rate misalignment studies to evaluate whether a real e ective exchange is overvalued or undervalued. There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of long-term real exchange rates and on empirical strategies to implement the equilibrium norms obtained from theoretical models. This study seeks to contribute to this literature by showing that the global vector autoregressions model (GVAR) proposed by Pesaran and co-authors can add relevant information to the literature on measuring exchange rate misalignment. Our empirical exercise suggests that the estimate exchange rate misalignment obtained from GVAR can be quite di erent to that using the traditional cointegrated time series techniques, which treat countries as detached entities. The di erences between the two approaches are more pronounced for small and developing countries. Our results also suggest a strong interdependence among eurozone countries, as expected