37 resultados para idea competition
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
It is often suggested that competition improves productivity, however, the underlying support for this idea is surprisingly thin. This paper presents a case study examining the e ects of a change in the competitive environment on productivity at the Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company. Petrobras had a legal monopoly on production, re ning, transportation and importation of oil in Brazil until it was removed in 1995. Even though Petrobras continues to have a de facto monopoly, the end of legal monopoly labor productivity growth rate more than doubled. A growth accounting of the industry shows that between 1977 and 1993 output growth rate (and productivity growth rate) is explained by the accumulation of capital, while Total Factor Productivity (TFP) decreased. Between 1994 and 2000 labor productivity growth rate is completely explained by the growth rate of TFP. The results suggest that the threat of competition alone is su cient to improve productivity. They also provide evidence that restricting competition help cause Brazil's depression of the 1980s.
Resumo:
This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).
Resumo:
In an early paper, Cavalcanti and Wallace (2001) showed, using a computable version of Cavalcanti-Wallace model (CW-1999), that optimal regulation induces banks to pay interests, instead of contracting the money supply in an inside money allocation. Here, we generalize CW in two fashions, assuming inside money allocations, so that banks are supposed to issue money as they find a potential producer wishing to produce. The first generalization allows for seasonality due to real shocks on preferences with persistence and for monetary policy improvement. We found an asymmetric path for interest rates when constraints matter, even when shocks are independent. The second generalization allows for bank competition, in the sense that banks can choose between two different banking nets. We proof the existence of simple stable and unstable equilibria and also verify the existence of multiple equilibria.
Resumo:
The purpose of this article is to discuss the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection these relations in three key sectors of Brazil’s infrastructure: telecommunications, electricity and water supply. A study of the literature points to two general principles. First, the need for consumer protection depends on the “degree of sovereignty” enjoyed by consumers, defined in terms of the cost of consumer organization, consumers’ ability to evaluate services, and the level of competition in each sector. Second, the less sovereignty consumers enjoy the more consumer protection institutions are involved with regulation agencies. The evidence for the Brazilian case apparently corroborates these points. In addition, it is important to stress that consumer complaints in regulated sectors seem to have increased more intensely than in others. The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 presents theoretical elements and aspects of the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection evidenced by international experience. Section 2 analyzes the Brazilian experience and in particular the available statistics on consumer complaints about telecommunications, electricity and water supply, submitted to Fundação Procon-SP during the nineties. The last section points to possible configurations of the institutional relations between competition policy, regulation and consumer protection, showing how the existing configuration of these areas in the three infrastructure sectors discussed confirms that the theoretical framework proposed has reasonable predictive power.
Resumo:
Este Trabalho Discute a Evolução da Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil a Partir de uma Perspectiva Histórica e Comparada. para Tanto, Primeiramente são Apresentadas as Transformações Estruturais da Economia Brasileira Assim como as Circunstâncias Internacionais que Fizeram com que a Defesa da Concorrência se Tornasse Relevante, o que Permite Fazer um Contraste com a Evolução de Outros Regimes de Concorrência. em Segundo Lugar, são Apresentados os Desafios e as Peculiaridades da Implementação da Defesa da Concorrência em uma Economia em Desenvolvimento e como Tais Desafios Foram Tratados no Caso Brasileiro. a Principal Conclusão é que as Melhores Práticas dos Países do Ocde não Podem ser Automaticamente Importadas sem a Devida Atenção Às Peculiaridades de uma Economia em Desenvolvimento.
Resumo:
Este Artigo Testa a Proposição da Teoria Econômica de que Propriedade Intelectual e Defesa da Concorrência são Políticas Complementares. um Modelo Probit Ordenado é Utilizado para Estimar os Efeitos Marginais do Uso e Qualidade do Enforcement dos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual em uma Medida da Gravidade dos Problemas Relacionados À Concorrência. os Resultados Obtidos Reforçam a Noção de que as Políticas de Concorrência e Propriedade Intelectual não são Contraditórias.
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to argue that the dissemination of competition laws is positive for the world economy. However, the benefits derived depend crucially on adequate enforcement and institutional building in the various jurisdictions for which international cooperation within WTO and in other fora is crucial. The paper addresses two issues. Section 1 underlines a few aspects of the increasing importance of competition policy in the developing world. The second section provides a few suggestions for the international cooperation agenda.
Resumo:
Over the past few years, innovation has increasingly garnered the headlines as one of the core competencies every sustainable organisation must have. Yet, it is the idea which is the foundation of any innovation. This paper draws together knowledge about idea generation, and its management, and how the process of encouraging ideas, creativity and then managing them effectively will enhance the opportunities of successfully finding and implementing innovations which will add value to the organisation and its stakeholders. Extensive review of literature in the field of idea and innovation management, as well as a study of Souza Cruz¿s recently conceptualised and implemented Idea Management programme has brought together the many facets involved in successfully harnessing and implementing ideas.
Resumo:
O presente estudo discute o movimento das privatizações recentemente ocorridas e seus impactos nas relações trabalhistas e sindicais brasileiras. A discussão está focada em estudo de caso de três organizações, pertencentes a ramos de negócio diferentes e busca entender os reflexos havidos nas relações entre os agentes SOCIaIS envolvidos: empregados, empregadores, gerentes, sindicatos e autoridades. O fenômeno estudado se situa a partir da década de noventa e trás conseqüências ao movimento trabalhista, ao emprego e às relações capital e trabalho pelo potencial de conflito que as privatizações apresentam. Para organizar o pensamento desenvolvemos uma abordagem histórica que mostra o desenvolvimento das relações trabalhistas, com as organizações aperfeiçoando os instrumentos de regulação de conflito e construindo, com os empregados, uma considerável experiência de convivência ainda que marcada por interesses imediatos conflitantes. Um pouco à frente observamos uma ruptura que é explicitada pela definição do modelo vigente, pela internacionalização da economia que é imposta como um determinismo histórico e pela necessidade de sobrevivência das empresas submetidas à globalização e competição sem fronteiras. Ainda procuramos entender o movimento de flexibilização dos direitos trabalhistas que de algum modo se constituem em obstáculo à equalização competitiva dos custos das empresas e estão a sofrer forte pressão para que possam se adequar às novas realidades econômicas e necessidades empresariais. Na narrativa dos fatos apontamos erros e acertos observados e, de forma crítica, sugerimos alternativas aos modelos políticos e gerenciais adotados.
Resumo:
Essa tese analisa dois temas muito relevantes: o processo estratégico enfrentado pelas firmas líderes do segmento produtor de aves durante os anos 80 e a possibilidade de firmas emergentes situadas em regiões que experimentaram intensos processos desenvolvimentistas alcançarem a fronteira tecnológica a partir de 'Janelas de oportunidades" específicas. A idéia desenvolvida foi a de comparar as condições de emergência e desenvolvimento das indústrias de aves da região Sul com aquelas que deram origem à implantação de projetos avícolas na porção sulmatogrossense.
Resumo:
We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.
Resumo:
We develop a model to study shelf space allocation in retail. Retailers compete for consumers not only choosing prices but also by the space allocated to each product on shelves. Our approach depart from the existing literature on shelf allocation, as we model the problem of price setting and shelf allocation in an oligopolistic retail market. We present a simple model of retail competition in which prices are dispersed in the crosssection of stores but shelf allocation is not.