What really matters in auction design

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems, and the Anglo-Dutch auction a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. Effective anti-trust policy is also critical. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circum- stances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal, but this author (and others) correctly predicted the same for- mat would fail in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Auction design is not one size Þts all . We also discuss the 3G spectrum auctions in Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, and football TV-rights, TV franchise and other radiospectrum auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles.

First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.

First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.

Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence

In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. This auction mechanism shares some important features with that used in the sale of the companies constituted through the partial division of the Telebras System - the government-owned Telecom holding in Brazil. We designed an experiment where individuals participate in a sequence of independent …rst-price auctions followed by a sequence of hybrid auctions. Several conclusions emerged from this experimental study. First, ex-post e¢ciency was achieved overwhelmingly by the hybrid auctions. Secondly, although overbidding (with respect to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium) was a regular feature of participants’ bidding behavior in the …rst-price auctions — as it is commonly reported in most experimental studies of …rst-price auctions, it was less frequent in the hybrid auctions. By calibrating the results to allow for risk-averse behavior we were able to account for a signi…cant part of the overbidding. Finally, we compared the revenue generated by the hybrid auction with that generated by a standard …rst-price sealed bid auction and the results were ambiguous.

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm has to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdiction compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infraestructure, commitments to spend on infraestructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.

Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.

Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities

We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to extend the classical models of Mussa and Rosen and Baron and Myerson for arbitrary distributions

The effects of commodity dependence on the brazilian economy: a test of the dutch disease hypothesis

A doença holandesa tornou-se amplamente conhecida na década de 1960, quando a descoberta repentina de reservatórios de gás natural em território holandês, na região do mar do norte, transformou o país em uma economia rica em recursos. A desagradável consequência que proveio da recém-adquirida abundância de commodities foi o declínio da próspera indústria holandesa, que perdeu sua competitividade devido à valorização do florim holandês, como consequência do aumento do influxo de capital estrangeiro no país. Desde então este fenômeno tem sido observado em diversos países que possuem abundância de commodities. O objetivo desta tese é aplicar o modelo da doença holandesa ao Brasil, já que a maior economia da América latina poderá também ter de encarar a ameaça de se tornar prisioneira da “armadilha das commodities”, devido à sua abundância de recursos naturais. O autor revisa a bibliografia básica abordando o tema geral da doença holandesa e dá enfoque a estudos realizados anteriormente no Brasil. Além disso, os quatro maiores sintomas que caracterizam a doença holandesa são testados: (1) valorização das taxas de câmbio do real, (2) declínio do setor industrial, (3) crescimento do setor de serviços, e (4) aumento dos salários. Todos estes sintomas foram observados e podem ser comprovados através das abordagens de cointegração ou de correlação, com exceção do sintoma número dois. Ainda que estes resultados sejam significativos, há muito outros fatores determinantes que influenciam o desenvolvimento dos sintomas examinados, motivo pelo qual futuros estudos serão necessários para se obtiver conclusões definitivas sobre como o Brasil é afetado pela doença holandesa.

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

Auction econometrics by least squares

This paper proposes a method to structurally estimate an auction model using a variation of OLS, under commonly held assumptions in both auction theory and econometrics. In spite of its computational simplicity, the method applies to a wide variety of environments, including interdependent values in general, and certain forms of endogenous participation and bidder asymmetry. Furthermore, it can be used for hypotheses testing about the shape of the valuation distribution, valuation interdependence, or existence of bidder asymmetry.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

How to neutralize the adverse developmental effects of the Dutch disease?

This paper addresses the subject of the adverse developmental effects of the Dutch disease: the theory, the experience of Latin America over the last decade, and the economic policy management issues on what to do about it.

Existe arbitragem entre a metalúrgica Gerdau e a Gerdau S.A.?

A principal contribuição deste trabalho consiste na descoberta de uma evidência, na bolsa de valores de São Paulo, muito semelhante ao caso da Royal Dutch/Shell analisado por Froot e Dabora (1999): após o lançamento das ADRs por parte da Gerdau S.A, o desconto da Metalúrgica Gerdau em relação à Gerdau S.A passou a ser fortemente correlacionado tanto com a NYSE, quanto com a Bovespa, mesmo na presença do efeito tributário. Em outras palavras, após este divisor de águas, o preço relativo das duas empresas passou a ser afetado pelo local aonde elas são relativamente mais transacionadas, independentemente dos seus fundamentos.