Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

Understanding the critical distance in sparse distributed memory

Modelos de tomada de decisão necessitam refletir os aspectos da psi- cologia humana. Com este objetivo, este trabalho é baseado na Sparse Distributed Memory (SDM), um modelo psicologicamente e neuro- cientificamente plausível da memória humana, publicado por Pentti Kanerva, em 1988. O modelo de Kanerva possui um ponto crítico: um item de memória aquém deste ponto é rapidamente encontrado, e items além do ponto crítico não o são. Kanerva calculou este ponto para um caso especial com um seleto conjunto de parâmetros (fixos). Neste trabalho estendemos o conhecimento deste ponto crítico, através de simulações computacionais, e analisamos o comportamento desta “Critical Distance” sob diferentes cenários: em diferentes dimensões; em diferentes números de items armazenados na memória; e em diferentes números de armazenamento do item. Também é derivada uma função que, quando minimizada, determina o valor da “Critical Distance” de acordo com o estado da memória. Um objetivo secundário do trabalho é apresentar a SDM de forma simples e intuitiva para que pesquisadores de outras áreas possam imaginar como ela pode ajudá-los a entender e a resolver seus problemas.