On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

On endogenous cost of altruism

The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

Lucas (1987) has shown the surprising result that the welfare cost of business cycles is quite small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-áedged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for the post-WWII era using the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition for trends and cycles, which considers not only business-cycle uncertainty but also uncertainty from the stochastic trend in consumption. The post-WWII period is relatively quiet, with the welfare costs of uncertainty being about 0:9% of per-capita consumption. Although changing the decomposition method changed substantially initial results, the welfare cost of uncertainty is qualitatively small in the post-WWII era - about $175.00 a year per-capita in the U.S. We also computed the marginal welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty using this same technique. It is about twice as large as the welfare cost ñ$350.00 a year per-capita.

An ordering of measures of the welfare cost of inflation in economies with interest-bearing deposits

This paper builds on Lucas (2000) and on Cysne (2003) to derive and order six alternative measures of the welfare costs of inflation (five of which already existing in the literature) for any vector of opportunity costs. The ordering of the functions is carried out for economies with or without interestbearing deposits. We provide examples and closed-form solutions for the log-log money demand both in the unidimensional and in the multidimensional setting (when interest-bearing monies are present). An estimate of the maximum relative error a researcher can incur when using any particular measure is also provided.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

With standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-fledged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for post-war U.S. using the BeveridgeNelson decomposition. Welfare costs are about 0.9% per-capita consumption ($175.00) and marginal welfare costs are about twice as large.

Measures of the welfare cost of inflation: a complete ordering

This paper presents three contributions to the literature on the welfare cost of ináation. First, it introduces a new sensible way of measuring this cost - that of a compensating variation in consumption or income, instead of the equivalent variation notion that has been extensively used in empirical and theoretical research during the past fiftt years. We Önd this new measure to be interestingly related to the proxy measure of the shopping-time welfare cost of ináation introduced by Simonsen and Cysne (2001). Secondly, it discusses for which money-demand functions this and the shopping-time measure can be evaluated in an economically meaningful way. And, last but not least, it completely orders a comprehensive set of measures of the welfare cost of ináation for these money-demand specification. All of our results are extended to an economy in which there are many types of monies present, and are illustrated with the log-log money-demand specification.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Three applications of the marginal cost of public funds concept

This paper illustrates the use of the marginal cost of public funds concept in three contexts. First, we extend Parry’s (2003) analysis of the efficiency effects excise taxes in the U.K., primarily by incorporating the distortion caused by imperfect competition in the cigarette market and distinguishing between the MCFs for per unit and ad valorem taxes on cigarettes. Our computations show, contrary to the standard result in the literature, that the per unit tax on cigarettes has a slightly lower MCF than the ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Second, we calculate the MCF for a payroll tax in a labour market with involuntary unemployment, using the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model as our framework. Our computations, based on Canadian labour market data, indicate that incorporating the distortion caused by involuntary unemployment raises the MCF by 25 to 50 percent. Third, we derive expressions for the distributionally-weighted MCFs for the exemption level and the marginal tax rate for a “flat tax”, such as the one that has been adopted by the province of Alberta. This allows us to develop a restricted, but tractable, version of the optimal income tax problem. Computations indicate that the optimal marginal tax rate may be quite high, even with relatively modest pro-poor distributional preferences.

The marginal cost of funds from public sector borrowing

An expression for the welfare cost of a marginal increase in the public debt is derived using a simple AK endogenous growth model. This measure of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) can be interpreted as the marginal benefit-cost ratio that a debtfinanced public project needs in order to generate a net social gain. The model predicts an increase in the public debt ratio will have little effect on the optimal public expenditure ratio and that most of the adjustment will occur on the tax side of the budget.

Bank relationships: effect on the availability and marginal cost of credit for firms in Argentina

The paper provides evidence on what affects at the margin the cost and availability of bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use different pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in the credit market. Some private information is transferable, like balance sheet data. Private information generated in relationships is not. To capture the closeness of bank relationships, we resort to the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit lines in a bank. We also consider public information available in the Central de Deudores. The cost of credit is measured using overdrafts, the most expensive line of credit, at the bank that charges the highest rate for overdrafts. We find that the cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the marginal bank. Firms with large assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate at the margin. A good credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the marginal interest rate. The availability of credit is measured by unused credit lines as a proportion of total liabilities with the main bank. The availability of credit depends positively on a close relationship with the main bank. Large assets, a high return over assets, a high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit history, and collateral lead to higher credit availability. Our measure of unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures like leverage, which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit.

Welfare cost of inflation considering adoption decisions and interest-bearing deposits

Attanasio et al. (JPE, 2002) have used microeconomic data on households to provide new estimates of the welfare costs of infiation using Bailey's unidimensional welfare measure as a basis for their calculations. Such a measure does not properly take into consideration lhe fact that the majority of households in their sample (58.7 percent) holds not only bank deposits and currency, but also a second type of interest-bearing assct. This work devises alternative formulas which account for the existence of bank deposits and a sccond interest-bearing asset in the economy, as well as for adoption decisions regarding alternative financiai technologies.

Pricing the cost of an election: the impact of the 2014 elections on stock markets

Qual o efeito de eleições em ativos reais? É possível mensurar diretamente a diferença de preços mesmo que só possamos enxergar um dos resultados potenciais? Essa dissertação estima esses efeitos utilizando metodologia baseada em opções sobre ações. O modelo aqui desenvolvido adaptção tradicional Black-Scholes para incorporar dois novos parâmetros: um salto no preço do ativo perfeitamente antecipado e uma série de probabilidades diárias refletindo as crenças sobre quem venceria a corrida eleitoral. Aplicamos esse método para o caso brasileiro das Eleições Presidenciais de 2014 e a Petrobras - uma importante companhia do setor petrolífero do país -utilizando dados de bolsa do segundo turno das eleições. Os resultados encontrados mostram uma diferença de 65-77% para o valor da companhia, dependendo de quem vencesse nas urnas. Isso é equivalente a aproximadamente 2.5% do PIB de 2014 do país.